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I. INTRODUCTION 
War is one of the most destructive phenomena in the con-
temporary world. Its potential to inflict damage had always been 
considerable, but modern technology has greatly magnified its 
consequences. Therefore, the need to prevent the occurrence of 
armed conflict is more apparent than ever. 
At the same time the complete eradication of war continues 
to be an unrealistic goal, The use of force by international actors 
is a symptom of deep-seated forces that are likely to remain a 
potent factor in shaping world events. These forces cannot be 
neutralized, let alone eliminated. Thus, even the limited objec-
tive of regulating war poses a considerable challenge to the in-
ternational community, Yet, while more ambitious aspirations 
reflect legitimate concerns and should not be dismissed, it is ar-
guably more productive to be guided by a measure of realism, 
Throughout this century, the relatively modest attempts by 
the international community to contain the phenomenon of war 
have been unsuccessful. These attempts have invariably stopped 
short of totally banning the use of force and have resulted in 
compromise formulas that permit resort to armed coercion 
under certain circumstances. Furthermore, states have liberally 
interpreted these formulas, demonstrating the gap that sepa-
rates even limited norms from reality. 
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In fact, the international community has not been particu-
larly successful in enforcing its own norms concerning war. Ef-
fective collective action within an international institutional 
framework has been the exception rather than the rule, and it is 
arguable that the capacity to undertake such action has dimin-
ished over time because of the multipolar nature of the emerging 
international system. Collective enforcement remains a possibil-
ity, but the formidable difficulties encountered in foregoing in-
ternational consensus serve to illustrate that war, however objec-
tionable in principle and harmful in practice, is an inescapable 
feature of international relations. 
This is not to say, of course, that efforts to control armed 
conflict need to be abandoned altogether. Between the two ex-
tremes of seeking to ban war and adopting a completely passive 
attitude toward it,1 there is a middle course of endeavouring to 
qualify the use of force and impose limits upon it. Such a middle 
course finds an expression in the approach favored by those who 
attempt to draw a viable distinction between just and unjust 
wars. 
Admittedly, the distinction between just and unjust wars is 
not the only feasible one. One could, for instance, differentiate 
between "moral" and "immoral" wars, "offensive" and "defen-
sive," "rational" and "irrational" types. It appears, however, 
that the just versus unjust dichotomy has withstood better the 
test of time and has, by definition, been found more useful. 
The distinction between just and unjust wars has also 
spawned an elaborate set of criteria that render it an attractive 
analytical tool. Although these criteria have originated in a mul 
titude of historical and intellectual sources, they have evolved 
into a coherent whole. Taken together, the criteria form a com-
prehensive cluster of normative yardsticks that may be em-
ployed to determine the justifiability of war in a wide range of 
contexts. 
The just war criteria may be divided into two broad catego-
ries: those pertaining to jus ad bellum,2 the conditions under 
which force may be justified; and those pertaining to jus in 
1. For a discussion of these extreme positions, see Mushkat, Is War Ever Justifia-
ble? A Comparative Survey, 9 LOY. L.A. INT'I, & COMP. L.J. 227-317 (1987) [hereinafter 
Mushkat, Is War Ever Justifiable?]. 
2. Jus ad bellum is defined as the right to wage war. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 770, 
141 (5th ed. 1979). 
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bello,3 the restraints and limits on the conduct of war. The fol-
lowing criteria relate to jus ad helium: legitimate authority; 
right intention; just cause, including probability of success and 
last resort; and possibly, a formal declaration of war. Jus in 
hello focuses on "just means" which, in turn, are assessed in 
terms of proportionality, discrimination, chivalry, and a number 
of more specific prohibitions. 
Legitimate authority under the jus ad bellum relates to the 
question of who may wage war. The other three criteria — right 
intention, just cause, and declaration of war — relate to the 
question of when war may be waged. This Article examines his-
torical and contemporary legal perspectives on when war may be 
justifiably waged. It then synthesizes reflections by theorists on 
the subject and evaluates, within a single overall framework, 
parallel international legal norms and practices. It concludes the 
justifiability of war depends upon the particular circumstances 
leading up to the conflict. 
II. ANALYTICAL HISTORICAL SUMMARY 
A. Right Intention 
The criterion of "right intention," which was first intro 
duced by St, Augustine in the fourth century, was principally 
directed at preventing any resort to war from motives such as 
hatred, ambition, vengeance, cruelty, personal glory, or greed.4 
St. Augustine stated that wars waged by the "true followers of 
God" were not those "made for greed or out of cruelty, but from 
desire of peace, to restrain the evil, and assist the good."6 He 
believed that war should be conducted "with a loving, Christian 
disposition since the guilty nation was only being punished for 
its own good."9 The right intention criterion was further elabo-
rated nine centuries later by Thomas Aquinas. Aquinas pro-
posed that the condition of right intention was a necessary one 
and had to be satisfied before a war could be considered just.7 
The corollary to Aquinas' theory was that wars declared by legit-
3. Jus in bello is defined as the limited right to wage war. Id. 
4. ST. AUGUSTINE, DE CIVITATE DEI XXXIX, at 6 (Dods trans. 1948) [hereinafter ST, 
AUGUSTINE). 
5. ST. AUGUSTINE, supra note 4. 
6. ST, AUGUSTINE, supra note 4. 
7. See T. AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGIAE ch. II-II, quae. 40, art. 1 (Fathers of the 
English Dominican Province trans. 1919) [hereinafter T. AQUINASJ, 
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imate authority and waged for just causes might be "rendered 
unlawful through wicked intention."8 
Three valid interpretations of the concept of right intention 
emerge from the writings of the principal thinkers that ex-
amined the issue. St. Augustine and his followers, for instance, 
emphasized the essential element of peace as the ultimate objec-
tive or end of war.* They perceived war not as an end in itself 
but as a means to achieving another end; namely a just or better 
peace.10 By implication belligerent acts, which unnecessarily in-
creased the destructive nature of war, thereby undermining the 
prospects of a true and lasting peace, were liable to condemna-
tion as violations of the right intention criterion. 
Another interpretation stressed the limited objectives of 
just wars. Right intention allegedly restricted the belligerent to 
the pursuit of just causes. For instance, if a belligerent waging a 
war of self-defense was presented with the opportunity to con-
quer its opponent, such a conquest would indicate the absence 
of right intention. This would change the status of the war from 
that of a just war to an unjust one, or a mere instrument of 
expansion. 
The definition of right intention as a commitment to sup-
port or advance just cause characterized discussions by writers 
such as Aquinas,11 de Victoria,12 Ayala,13 von Pufendorf,14 and 
de Vattel.1* A compelling argument was put forth by von 
Pufendorf with respect to the unjustifiability of wars fought for 
reasons grounded in avarice, ambition, fear prompted by wealth 
and power of neighbors, a wish to gain an undeserved advantage, 
or a mere desire to acquire better lands.14 Similarly, de Vattel 
hailed as "proper and commendable motives" the promotion of 
8. T. AQUINAS, supra note 7. 
9. ST, AUGUSTINE, supra note 4. 
10. ST. AUGUSTINE, supra note 4. 
11. T. AQUINAS, supra note 7. 
12. F. DE VICTORIA, ON THE LAW OF WAR, DE INDIS ET D E IURE BELLI REFLECTIONES 11 
20, 173 (J. Bate trans. 1917) [hereinafter F. DE VICTORIA], 
13. B. AYALA, D E IURE ET OFFICIIS BELLICIS ET DISCPLINA MILITARI LIBERI bk. Ill, ch. 
II, 3, 4, at 8 & 10, at 10 (J. Bate trans. 1912) [hereinafter B. AYALA], 
14. S. VON PUFENDORF, DE OFFICIO HOMINIS ET CIVIS JUXTA LEGEM NATUKALEM 
LIBERI DUO ch. XVI, 2 & 4, at 138 (F. Gardner trans. 1927) [hereinafter S. VON 
PUFENDORF). 
15. E. DE VATTEL, LES DROIT DES GENS OU PRINCIPES DE LA LOI NATURELLE, APPLI-
QUES A LA CONDUITE ET AUX AFFAIRES DES NATIONS ET DES SOVEBAINS bk. Ill, ch. Ill, 11 28 
(C. Fenwick trans. 1916) [hereinafter E. DE VATTEL]. 
16. S. VON PUFENDORF, supra note 14. 
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the welfare and safety of the state or the common good of its 
citizens.17 
A third interpretation of right intention imposed restraints 
on the conduct of war rather than the circumstances of its initia-
tion.18 An obligation to act charitably toward one's enemies was 
thus understood to apply, stemming from a prescription of right 
intention, which assumed that charity and love prevailed among 
belligerents.19 
Apart from the three interpretations espoused by tradi-
tional thinkers, many authorities support other contentions. One 
commonly held view was that the right intention requirement 
was only relevant in determining the culpability of the waring 
ruler and did not affect the justice or injustice of the war itself.20 
A similar proposition was advanced by Cajetan who regarded the 
application of right intention as merely reflecting the personal 
morals and religious commitments of the ruler.21 Specifically, the 
ruler, in assuming improper intentions, might be considered to 
have committed a sin while executing an otherwise just war.22 
Another interpretation deemed a belligerent — who fought a 
properly authorized war for a just cause while harboring evil in-
tentions — as a "bad soldier" rather than a brigand.23 It was 
also argued that since it was difficult to draw a clear line be-
tween the interior moral disorder of a sinful ruler and the public 
manifestations of his wicked intentions, just cause and legiti-
mate authority were the only conditions necessary for a lawful 
war.24 The notion of the right intention was even dismissed by 
one writer as redundant. This author believes that it was an in-
tegral part of the very idea of just cause.25 
The belief that right intention was conceptually indistin-
guishable from just cause may account for the lack of references 
to right intention in writing since the nineteenth century. An 
17. B. DE VATTEL, supra note 15. 
18. See supra notes 10-17. 
19. The significance of "right intention" in the context of jus in bello is discussed in 
R. Mushkat, The Concept of Just War in International Law ch. 4 (LL.D. Thesis, UNISA, 
1986) [hereinafter R. Mushkat, The Concept of Just War], 
20. See E. MIDCLEY, THE NATURAL LAW TRADITION AND THE THEORY OF INTERNA-
TIONAL RELATIONS 62 (1975) [hereinafter E. MIDGLEY]. 
21. E. MIDGLEY, supra note 20. 
22. E. MIDGLEV, supra note 20. 
23. See E. MIDGLEY, supra note 20, 
24. See E. MIDGLEY, supra note 20, at 45. 
25. See Newman, Modern War and Pacifism, 28 IRISH THEOLOGICAL Q. 193 (1961). 
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other possible explanation is that the growing emphasis in that 
period on the sovereign right of states to wage war resulted in a 
shift of focus from the rulers to the war itself. Indeed, early 
twentieth century authorities indicate that attention was in-
creasingly accorded to the objective circumstances of war rather 
than the subjective motives of individual sovereigns.26 Nonethe-
less, the criterion of right intention has arguably been expressed 
in the rules requiring humanity in warfare. 
B. Just Cause 
An indispensable ingredient of the just war legacy is the cri-
terion of just cause. Almost every text written by traditional war 
theorists contains references to "just," "legitimate," or "suffi-
cient and valid" causes as prerequisites for overcoming the pre-
sumption against the use of force.27 While specific just causes 
varied from one period to another, three general circumstances 
have consistently been regarded as justifiable grounds for re-
course to war: protecting innocents from an unjust attack; re-
storing rights wrongfully denied; and obtaining vindication 
against an offense. 
Under medieval and natural law theories of bellum justum, 
self-defense was the most important reason for a just war.28 His-
torically, it has been recognized that states, in order to ensure 
survival, should be allowed to protect their territory, their peo-
ple, and their rights against attack.29 The concept of "defense" 
took on different meanings at various junctures and in various 
contexts. Interestingly, the concept was not limited to self-de-
fense in the strict sense of the term.30 It is worth emphasizing 
26. See R. Mushkat, The Concept of Just War, supra note 19. 
27. See generally ST. AUGUSTINE, supra note 4. 
28. In the period leading up to World War I, during which the right of states to go 
to war was seen as inherent in their sovereignty, the concept of self-defense lost some of 
its relevance (since in such a system the right to use force in self-defense could not be 
doubted-) Yet, self-defense as a concept continued to play a prominent role in state prac-
tice and international legal theory. Thus, despite the general acceptance of a sovereign 
right to go to war, this right was scarcely invoked in practice, and governments justified 
war to national and international audiences in terms of self-defense (or self-help). 
29. T. AQUINAS, supra note 7, at ch. II-II, quae. 188, art. 3. 
30. Aquinas, for instance, acknowledged as legitimate, in addition to defense from 
external enemies, the defense of the poor and the oppressed as well as the defense of the 
whole "commonwealth" while Suarez deemed the defense of innocent people anywhere 
in the world as a just cause of war. Included within Gentili's category of "human" just 
causes were defense for the sake of honor, assistance to nations against unjust oppres-
sors, and coming to the aide of other states subjects in the fight against their own sover 
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that apart from a wide variety of reasons that states could in-
voke in self-defense, states were also entitled to a great deal of 
freedom with respect to the nature of the action of self-defense. 
Thus, a defensive action was thought to encompass an anticipa-
tory attack,31 defense in anticipation of probable danger,33 a pre-
ventive measure to right a balance of power,33 and a response to 
a threat of attack.34 
The notion of restitution was also featured in early writings. 
Thus, retaking what had been unjustly appropriated was re-
garded by most writers as justifying war. While later articula-
tions of restitution referred to the denial of rights in general, 
classic scholars such as St. Augustine,36 Aquinas,36 de Victoria,37 
and Ayala38 alluded to the restoration or recovery of property 
rights. Other vague formulations — like Grotius' "obtaining 
what is owed,"39 Wolff's "attainment of one's own or that which 
ought to be one's own,"40 or de Vattel's "obtaining of what be-
longs to one or that which is due"*1 — might nonetheless lend 
support to a wider interpretation of the concept of "rights" in 
this context. The Covenant of the League of Nations recognized 
as legitimate the redress of "properly validated legal claims,"42 
and thus, reflects a more cautious attitude. 
The third justification for war under the traditional theory 
was retributive justice. A strong punitive element characterized 
eign. A similarly broad interpretation of "defense" was imposed by Henry Wheaton 
(nineteenth century) who listed amongst the just causes of war the defense of territory, 
vital interests, honor and dignity of state, as well as self-preservation. See infra note 51 
and accompanying text. See T. AQUINAS, supra note 7, at ch. II-II, quae. 188, art. 3; A. 
GENTILI, DE IURE BELLI LIBRI TRES bk. I, ch. X, H 110, at 68-69 & bk. I, ch. XVI, H 121, at 
75 (J. Rolfe trans. 1933) [hereinafter A. GENTILI]; F. SUAREZ, De Bello, De Triplici Vir-
tute Theologica Fide, Spe et Charitate, in SELECTIONS FROM THREE WORKS BY SUAREZ 
eh. V, n 5, 7 & 8 (J. Scott ed. 1944) [hereinafter F. SUAREZ]; von Elbe, The Evolution of 
the Concept of the Just War in International Law, 33 AM. J- INT'L L- 665, 686-87 (1939). 
31. B. AYALA, supra note 13, ch. II", at 9. 
32. A. GENTILI, supra note 30, bk. I, ch. XIX, at 61. 
33. E. DE VATTEL, supra note 15, bk. Ill, ch. Ill , §§ 44-50, at 248-53. 
34. T. BATY, T H E CANONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 99 (1930). 
35. ST. AUGUSTINE, supra note 4, ch. XIX, at 7. 
36. T. AQUINAS, supra note 7, at ch. II-II, quae. 40, art. 1. 
37. F. DE VICTORIA, supra note 12, H 16, at 171. 
38. B. AYALA, supra note 13, ch. II, § 11, at 11. 
39. H. GROTIUS, DE JURE BELLI AC PACIS LIBRI TRES bk. II, ch. I, § II, H 2, at 171 (F. 
Kelsey trans. 1925) [hereinafter H. GROTIUS], 
40. C, WOLFF, JUS GENTIUM METHODO SCIENTIFIC^ PERTRACTATUM ch. VI, H 620, at 
316 (J. Drake trans. 1934) [hereinafter C. WOLFF]. 
41. E. DE VATTEL, supra note 15, bk. Ill, ch. Ill , 11 28, at 244. 
42. LEAGUE OF NATIONS COVENANT art. 8. 
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discussions of just causes of war by St. Augustine,43 Aquinas,44 
de Victoria,46 Ayala,46 Suarez,47 Gentili,48 Grotius,49 de Vattel,60 
and Wheaton.51 The punitive element was also preserved in 
early twentieth century works justifying war in response to egre-
gious violations of international law.62 
Within the three general types of legitimate causes outlined 
above, other specific causes were often advanced, reflecting the 
concerns of the time. Cicero's list of specific causes,63 for in-
stance, was tinged with the formalism that characterized ancient 
Rome. Similarly, the strong religious convictions prevalent in 
the Middle Ages were used to justify wars against infidels and 
heretics.64 Moreover, the development of commercial interests 
and trade ties among nations in the fifteenth and sixteenth cen-
turies might explain the prominence accorded to just causes con-
cerning rights of passage, trade rights, or freedom of the seas in 
the works of de Victoria,85 Suarez,66 and Gentili.67 
43. St. Augustine asserted that just wars were those "[that] avenge injuries, when 
the nation or city against which warlike action is to be directed has neglected either to 
punish wrongs committed by its own citizens or to restore what has been unjustly taken 
by it." See ST, AUGUSTINE, supra note 4, bk. XIX, at 7, 
44. Aquinas cited two venerable offenses by the enemy that justified a war: failure 
by a government to "punish what has been done wickedly by its own [citizens];" or to 
"give back what was unjustly carried away." T. AQUINAS, supra note 7, at ch. II-II, quae. 
40, art. 1. 
45. de Victoria basically embraced the general causes put forth by St. Augustine and 
Aquinas, including punishment. See F. DE VICTORIA, supra note 12, at ch. XIX, It 7. 
46. Ayala also accepted the "trilogy" of general just war causes, including punish-
ment "for some wrong [that] has been unjustifiably inflicted," See B, AYALA, supra note 
13, ch. II, § 11, at 11. 
47. Suarez also considered as "just" wars of punishment aimed at redressing wrongs 
done to one's allies and friends. See F. SUAREZ, supra note 30, ch, IV, at 3. 
48. Gentili listed as an "expedient" cause of war the "right of taking vengeance for a 
wrong [that] one has suffered." See A. GBNTIU, supra note 30, bk. I, ch. XVIIT, 11 135, at 
S3. 
49. Grotius endorsed the just cause of punishment of crimes committed anywhere in 
the world. See H. GROTIUS, supra note 39, bk. II, ch. I, § II, II 2, at 171. 
50. de Vattel laid down as one object of a lawful war: "to provide for our future 
security by punishing the aggressor or the offender." See E. DE VATTEL, supra note 15, 
bk. Ill, ch. Ill , § 28, at 244. 
51. Wheaton reflected prevailing sentiments when discussing the right to wage war 
for "avenging of injured rights." See WHEATON'S ELEMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 404 
(5th ed. 1916). 
52. See, e.g., W. HALL, A TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 56 (7th ed. 1917) [herein-
after W. HALL]. 
53. See Z. PHILLIPSON, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF ANCIENT GREECE AND ROME 182 
(1911). 
54. See F. RUSSEL, THE JUST WAR IN THE MIDDLE AGES (1975). 
55. F. DE VICTORIA, supra note 12, ch. Il l , It 19, at 173; ch. Ill, 11 2 & 3, at 151, 152. 
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Notwithstanding the wide range of causes perceived as just 
in the traditional literature, certain basic issues pertaining to 
this question were generally agreed upon. It was thought that 
causes must be of sufficient seriousness and weight to override 
the presumption against war. References to the "gravity" and 
"necessity" of causes thus pervade the writings of Suarez,68 Gen-
tili,BB Rachel,*0 Textor,ei de Vattel,82 and Hall.63 The tests for 
evaluating the substance of causes, however, varied from the 
subjective64 to the objective.66 
Most traditional writers were also favorably disposed to-
ward the requirement of proportionality between the good to be 
accomplished through war and the harm expected to be suffered 
by all parties.66 There were also ample references in classical 
56. See A. VANDERPOL, LA DOCTRINE SCHOLASTIQUE DU DROIT DE LA GUERRE 379 
(1925). 
57. A. GENTILI, supra note 30, bk. I, ch. XIX, f 138, at 86. 
58. F. SUAREZ, supra note 30, ch. IV, at 1-2. 
59. A. GENTILI, supra note 30, bk. 1, ch. XIII, H 96, at 60; bk. I, ch. XIV, H 104, at 65. 
60. S. RACHEL, D E JURE NATURAE ET GENTIUM DISSERTIONES H XL, at 183 (J. Bate 
trans. 1916) [hereinafter S. RACHEL]. 
61. J. TEXTOR, SYNOPSIS JURIS GENTIUM eh. XVII, 111 1 & 3, at 167-68 (J. Bate trans. 
1916) [hereinafter J. TEXTOR]. 
62. E. DE VATTEL, supra note 15, bk. Ill, eh. Ill, § 37, at 246. 
63. W, HALL, supra note 52, at 53. 
64. For example, "subjective" tests included: Aquinas' reference to the culpability of 
the wrongdoer rather than to the injury itself, T. AQUINAS, supra note 7, at ch. II-II, 
quae. 40, art. 1; Ayala's emphasis on culpability and subjective guilt, B. AYALA, supra 
note 13, ch. II, § 11, at 11; and Grotius' insistence on the additional factor of evil inten-
tion, H. GROTIUS, supra note 39, bk, II, ch. XXIII, g XIII, 1 3, at 565 66. 
65. For example, "objective" tests included: de Victoria's "standard of a Wiseman's 
judgment," F. DE VICTORIA, supra note 12, H 20, at 173; Gentili's and Suarez's rejection of 
evidence of culpable state of mind of the enemy, A. GENTILI, supra note 30, bk. I, ch. 
XXI, H 163, at 100; F. SUAREZ, supra note 30, ch. VI, at 2; Textor's proposals for a dili-
gent inquiry into the causes, J. TEXTOR, supra note 61, ch. XVI, 1 12, at 161; and Wolff's 
suggestion of an obligatory arbitration in case of doubtful causes, C. WOLPF, supra note 
40, ch. VI, 11 631, at 232. 
66. Aquinas, for instance, asserted that offenses should be overlooked if punishing 
the offender would cause more harm than the offense itself. Similarly, de Victoria main-
tained that punishment correspond to the measure of the offense and Grotius urged that 
the benefits involved should outweigh the costs. The latter criterion was reiterated in the 
early twentieth century by Hall. See T. AQUINAS, supra note 7, ch. II-II, quae. 108, art. I, 
at 5; F. DE VICTORIA, supra note 12, H 14, at 171; H. GROTIUS, supra note 39, bk. II, ch. 
XXIV, § V, H 2, at 572; W. HALL, supra note 52, at 56. It has been argued, however, that 
de Victoria — as well as Suarez — distinguished between defensive wars and wars initi-
ated for the purpose of repressing or correcting "injurious actions" other than armed 
attack (e.g., infringement of rights, customs of laws) and that the requirement of propor-
tional grave reason applied only to the latter case and not to the case of defense against 
armed aggression. It has also been contended that de Victoria and Suarez did not believe 
that "defensive war" required moral justification or was subject to legitimate limitation. 
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writings to the need to ensure due proportion between causes 
and the means employed in their pursuit.97 
Another element of just cause that led to opinions which 
tended to converge was probability of success. In this context 
Suarez proposed that the expectation of victory should precede 
the launching of an offensive war.** Wolff was equally adamant 
that war should not be resorted to unless a reasonable degree of 
success could be assumed.*9 Later writers, however, postulated 
that such a requirement was a dictate of prudence rather than a 
factor in the justness of the cause.70 
The last component of just cause, which was generally en-
dorsed, was the requirement that war should be employed only 
as a last resort, after exhausting all peaceful alternatives. Thus, 
only strict necessity could legitimize recourse to war," and every 
peaceful means of obtaining redress had to be explored,72 
C. Formal Declaration of War 
The perception that war ought to be "a last effort to end the 
dispute without the shedding of blood,"73 has enlightened some 
scholars to suggest that war "should be publicly declared, and in 
fact proclaimed so publicly that the notification of this declara-
tion be made by one of the parties to another."74 The initial pur-
pose of such a declaration was to indicate to the potential enemy 
"It was rather 'an involuntary act' forced upon an innocent political community, which 
was not then required to justify or limit its response as it should do in the case of 'volun-
tary' taking up arms to repair some previous violation of justice," P. RAMSEY, T H E JUST 
WAR 205 (1968) (hereinafter P. RAMSEY]. 
67. For a complete discussion of this issue, see R. Mushkat, The Concept of Just 
War, supra note 19. 
68. F. SUAREZ, supra note 30, ch, IV, at 10 (wars of self-defense were excluded on 
the assumption that they are embarked upon irrespective of the prospects of success 
since self-defense is not a matter of free will but of necessity)-
69. C. WOLFF, supra note 40, ch. VI, II 622, at 316-17. 
70. See, e.g., E. DE VATTEL, supra note 15, bk. II, ch. Il l , 11 29, at 244. 
71. See, e.g., ST. AUGUSTINE, supra note 4, bk. XXXIX, at 6; B. AVALA, supra note 
13, ch. II, § 11, at 11; F. DE VICTORIA, supra note 12, II 60, at 187; A, GBNTILI, supra note 
30, bk. I, ch. XIII, 11 96, at 60; bk. I, ch. XIV, 11 104, at 65. 
72. See, e.g., H. GfiOTlUS, supra note 39, bk. II, ch. XXIII, §§ VIHX, at 560-63; S. 
VON PUFENDOKF, ELEMENTOKUM JURfSPRUnENTIAE UNIVERSALIS LlBRl DuO V. II , a t 145 (W. 
Oldfather trans. 1931) [hereinafter S. VOti PUFENDORF, JURISPRUDENT™] (indeed, it was 
von Pufendorf's view that failure to submit a dispute to peaceful settlement amounted to 
an unjust cause); see also C, FENWJCK, INTERNATIONAL LAW 382 (1924); S. RACHEL, /supra 
note 60, H XLI, at 183-84; J. TEXTOR, supra note 61, ch. XVII, 11 29, at 176; E. DE VATTEL, 
supra note 15, bk. Ill, ch. Ill, § 37, at 246. 
73. E. DE VATTEL, supra note 15, bk. Ill, ch. IV, § 51, at 254. 
74. H. GROTIUS, supra note 39, bk. III, ch. Ill , § V, at 633. 
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the conditions under which a settlement could be reached.75 The 
secondary purpose of a declaration of war was to provide formal 
evidence of the public nature of the war and to signal that the 
war enjoyed the support of the people.76 The tertiary purpose 
was to inform neutral powers so that they could assess the jus-
tice of the cause and conduct themselves accordingly.77 A decla-
ration of war was also intended to serve internal or domestic 
purposes such as the "instruction and guidance" of the subjects 
themselves.7* 
The degree of formality attached to a declaration of war, 
however, has varied in practice throughout history.78 While post-
sixteenth century state practice suggests that attack without 
prior warning had become the rule rather than the exception,80 
the parties to the Hague Convention of 1907 for the Pacific Set-
tlement of International Disputes81 sought to restrict the right 
to resort to war by making it dependent on a prior delivery of a 
reasoned declaration of war or an ultimatum with a specified 
time limit.82 Indeed, forty-seven declarations of war were made 
during World War I, but the prohibition of war in the Kellogg-
Briand Pact83 led again to "wars in disguise," which by their 
very nature, were initiated without a formal declaration of war.84 
75. H. GROTIUS, supra note 39, bk. Ill, ch. Ill, § VI, at 634-35. Grotius argued that 
even though under the law of nature no declaration was required when an attack was 
being warded off, or penalty demanded from the very person who had done wrong, or 
when the owner wished to seize what belonged to him, it was nonetheless "honourable 
and praiseworthy" to make such a declaration in order that an offense might be avoided 
or that the wrong be atoned for by repentance and compensation. Id, 
76. H. GROTIUS, supra note 39, bk. Ill, ch. Ill, § XI, at 639. 
77. E. DE VATTEL, supra note 15, bk. III, ch. IV, § 64, at 262. 
78. E. DE VATTEL, supra note 15, bk. Il l , ch. IV, § 64, at 262. 
79. Indeed, even according to Grotius, war under the law of nations could be waged 
simultaneously with its declaration although he emphasized that "by the law of nature 
some time may be required, as when restitution or punishment for a guilty person has 
been sought, and this has not been refused." H. GROTIUS, supra note 39, bk. Ill, ch. Ill, § 
XIII, at 640. 
80. It has been expertly estimated that of 117 wars that took place between 1700 
and 1870 only 10 were declared wars. See Eagleton, The Form and Function of the Dec-
laration of War, 32 AM. J. INT'L L. 19, 20 n.5 (1938) (hereinafter Bagleton]. 
81. Hague Convention of 1907 for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, 
Oct, 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2199, 2 Malloy 2220 [hereinafter Hague Convention]. 
82. Hague Convention, supra note 81. 
83. General Treaty for Renunciation of War as an Instrument of National Policy 
(Kellog-Briand Pact), opened for signature Aug, 27, 1928, 46 Stat. 2343, T.S- No, 796, 94 
L.N.T.S. 2137 [hereinafter Kellog-Briand Pact]. 
84. Kellog-Briand Pact, supra note 83. 
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D. Application of the Criteria 
The preceding survey of the conditions under which re-
course to war was deemed just by traditional theorists leaves un-
answered the question of the relative weight and interrelation-
ships of the criteria they proposed. Specifically, were all the 
conditions highlighted absolutely necessary? Did each one have 
to be satisfied at all times for a war to be deemed just? Or, 
would the inability to meet any single requirement render a war 
unjust? Similarly, should all criteria be given equal weight or, 
conversely, ranked according to some order of priorities? 
It appears that the key thinkers in early periods failed to 
address these important issues. It is legitimate to conclude that 
each criterion was deemed necessary for a just war and all were 
collectively sufficient.86 This conclusion is supported by the oc-
casional references to wars that were considered unjust because 
of the lack of right intention,86 pursuit of unjust cause,87 or fail-
ure to exhaust all peaceful means of redress.88 That no distinc-
tions among these criteria were drawn by traditional writers fur-
ther supports this conclusion. This conclusion also dovetails 
with the presumption against war that necessitated a fulfillment 
of all just war conditions in order to be overcome.89 Moreover, 
early theorists perceived just war conditions as equally impor-
tant, although the relative emphasis placed on each tended to 
shift in response to changing times and circumstances."0 
III. CONTEMPORARY CRITERIA 
The criteria examined in the preceding section provide a 
framework in which the question of when war is justified may be 
addressed in the contemporary context. Given the transforma-
tion in the fabric of international relations and corresponding 
changes in perceptions of international reality, however, the cri-
teria have not all survived intact or some have become irrele-
vant. The following discussion seeks to establish the extent to 
85. See Johnson, Just War Theory: What's the Use?, 19 WORLDVIEW 41-42, 46 
(July-Aug. 1976). 
86. T. AQWNAS, supra note 7, at ch. II-II, quae. 40, art. 1. 
87. F. DE VICTORIA, supra note 12, If 10, at 170: H. GROTIOS, supra note 39, bk. II, ch. 
XXII, § II, at 547; C. WOLFF, supra note 40, ch. VI, Hit 645, 646, at 331, 332. 
88. S. VON PUFENDORF, JURISPHUDENTIAE, supra note 72, at 145, 
89. See W. O'BRIEN, THE CONDUCT OP JUST AND LIMITED WAR 35 (1981) [hereinafter 
W. O'BRIEN]. 
90. W. O'BRIEN, supra note 89, at 38. 
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which they still constitute useful yardsticks when assessing 
whether a particular war is just. 
A. Right Intention 
1. The Relevance of Intention 
The classical requirement that belligerents waging a just 
war be motivated by right intention does not appear to have 
found explicit expression in contemporary international law. 
Nonetheless, it is significant in analyzing the use of force in in-
ternational relations. Thus, for instance, the question of inten-
tion, albeit in the negative form of wrong intention of an unjust 
warrior, was the subject of numerous debates during the deliber-
ations of the Special Committee on the Question of Defining Ag-
gression (Special Committee).*1 
Some United Nations Representatives took the position 
that in determining aggression, due consideration should be 
given not only to the illegality of the act committed but also to 
the intent on the part of the aggressor.82 Specifically, they ar-
gued that certain illegal acts might be committed accidentally 
without any intention of aggression or that acts, which seem to 
present all the physical characteristics of force, might in fact 
constitute an exercise in self-defense.*3 The implication was that 
the element of intent was essential in the determination of an 
act of aggression. Various delegates further contended that in-
cluding intent in the definition of aggression was required by the 
United Nations Charter (Charter), which distinguished between 
acts of aggression and other illicit uses of force.94 Intent, they 
stressed, appeared to be the only adequate criterion for that 
purpose. 
During the deliberations, the United Nations Representa-
tives emphasized the importance of intent as an element of 
criminal responsibility.65 It was claimed that since aggression 
91. The following discussion is based on the Report of the Special Committee on 
the Question of Defining Aggression, 26 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 19) at 11-13, U.N. Doc. 
A/8419 (1971) [hereinafter Report of the Special Committee]. For a detailed considera-
tion of the positions of the various states, see J. STONE, CONFLICT THEOUGH CONSENSUS: 
UN APPROACHES TO AGGRESSION ch. 4, §§ IIUIV (1977) [hereinafter J. STONE]. 
92. Report of the Special Committee, supra note 91. 
93. Report of the Special Committee, supra note 91. 
94. Report of the Special Committee, supra note 91 (such as "threat to the peace" 
or "breach of the peace"). See also U.N. CHARTER. 
95. Report of the Special Committee, supra note 91, 
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was to be defined as an international crime giving rise to inter-
national criminal responsibility, the element of intent could 
hardly be ignored.86 This argument was based on the principle 
that criminal responsibility is inextricably interwoven with in-
tent."7 As a corollary, it would be unacceptable if those accused 
of an act involving responsibility were unable to exonerate them-
selves by proving that they had no culpable intent.98 
Arguments against the inclusion of intent in the definition 
of aggression were advanced before the Special Committee with 
equal vigor.9" It was asserted that making intent a constituent 
element of the definition might lead to abuse, since aggressors 
would be provided with the convenient excuse that they had no 
intent of inflicting harm through an act of aggression.100 The 
proposal to include intent in the definition of aggression was 
also said to conflict with article 51 of the United Nations Char-
ter, which stipulates that should an armed attack occur, the vie-
tim is free to exercise the right of self-defense.101 Furthermore, 
given the considerable difficulties in ascertaining an aggressor's 
96. Report of the Special Committee, supra note 91. 
97. Report of the Special Committee, supra note 91. 
98. Report of the Special Committee, supra note 91. Clearly, if intent was not con-
sidered as an element of the offense, the absence of intention could not lead to an acquit-
tal. Relevant in this respect are the Nuremberg Principles that define as a "punishable 
crime under international law" the "(1) planning, preparation, initiation, or waging of a 
war of aggression . . . " (Principle VI), reprinted in L. HENKIN, R, PUGH, 0. SCHACTER 
& H. SMIT, INTEBNATIONAL LAW 906 (2d ed. 1980). The principles were affirmed in 1946 
by the United Nations General Assembly (General Assembly). See G.A. Res. 95(1), re-
printed in D. OjONOvrcH, 1 UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTIONS 175 (eer. 1 1946-48). Also rele-
vant is the Draft Code of Offenses Against the Peace and Security of Mankind prepared 
by the International Law Commission in 1954 that listed the following as "an offense 
against the peace and security of mankind" in article 2: 
(1) Any act of aggression, including the employment by the authorities of a 
state of armed force against another state for any purpose other than national 
o r collective self-defense . . . . 
(2) Any threat by the authorities of a state to resort to an act of aggression 
against another state. 
(3) The preparation . . . for the employment of armed force against another 
state for any purpose other than national or collective self-defense or in pursu-
ance of a decision or recommendation by a competent organ of the United 
Nations . . . . 
9 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 9) at 9-12, U.N. Doc. A/2693, ITU 41-50 (1954). 
Evidently, ascribing international responsibility under the above prescriptions with-
out due regard to the intention of the perpetrators of the alleged acts would be contrary 
to basic principles of criminal law. 
99. Report of the Special Committee, supra note 91. 
100. Report of the Special Committee, supra note 91. 
101. Report of the Special Committee, supra note 91; U.N. CHARTER art. 51. 
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motives, the facts and circumstances surrounding the commis-
sion of the act were deemed more valuable criteria in determin-
ing whether the act was aggressive.102 Some confusion appeared 
to prevail among the representatives with respect to overlapping 
terms such as "intent," "motive," "objective," "purpose," and 
"animus aggresionis."103 Proponents of the inclusion of inten-
tion in the definition of aggression sought to remove ambiguity 
by stressing that they did not equate intention with motive.104 
They argued that if the motive for a state's use of force was to 
liberate citizens of another state from an oppressive government, 
and if its intention was to deprive the other state of its political 
independence, the state resorting to force in such circumstances 
would be considered an aggressor.105 
The outcome of the "priority versus intention"106 debates 
was a somewhat oblique reference to intent in the 1974 Defini-
tion of Aggression (Definition of Aggression),107 which was an at-
tempt to reconcile the two basically inconsistent views. Article 2 
thus stipulates: 
The first use of armed force by a state in contravention of the 
Charter shall constitute prima facie evidence of an act of ag-
gression although the [United Nations] Security Council may, 
in conformity with the Charter, conclude that a determination 
that an act of aggression has been committed would not be jus-
tified in the light of other relevant circumstances including the 
fact that the acts concerned or their consequences are not of 
sufficient gravity.108 
102. Report of the Special Committee, supra note 91. 
103. Report of the Special Committee, supra note 91. 
104. Report of the Special Committee, supra note 91. 
105. Five examples of "intention" were listed by the working group as explicitly "ag-
gressive:" the elimination of another state; the annexation of another state or the altera-
tion of the borders of another state; the changing of an existing political or social regime 
in another state; the suppression of national liberation movements in colonies or depen-
dent territories and the keeping of people in colonial dependence; and the receipt of 
economic and other advantages from another state. Report of the Special Committee, 
supra note 91, 
106. Controversy surrounded the question whether the existence of an act of aggres-
sion should be determined exclusively on the basis of "who fired the first shot," that is, 
overt action by states, or whether account should be taken of the intent of the parties. 
See Report of the Special Committee, supra note 91. 
107. Definition of Aggression, G.A. Res. 3314, 29 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 31), U.N. 
Doc. A/9S31, at 42 (1974) [hereinafter Definition of Aggression]. See also Norton, Be-
tween the Ideology and the Reality: The Shadow of the Law of Neutrality, 17 HARV. 
INT'L L.J. 249 (1976). 
108. Definition of Aggression, supra note 107, at art. 2. 
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The reference to "other relevant circumstances" served to cir-
cumvent the thorny issue of whether intent and purpose should 
be considered in the determination of aggression. Nevertheless, 
those who favored the inclusion of intent continued to insist 
that intent was implicitly included in the general language of the 
clause.108 Indeed, the divergent interpretations surrounding arti-
cle 2 suggest that the delegates did not agree on the meaning of 
the words finally adopted. Presumably, the underlying substan-
tive disagreements over the concept of intent still persist. 
Priority cannot be dismissed lightly as wholly irrelevant to 
determinations as to whether the use of force is permissible. No 
mechanical rule may be applied when characterizing force as im-
permissible without reference to intention or other contextual 
factors. After all the international community has not prohibited 
all recourse to force; rather, it explicitly permits use of force for 
certain purposes such as self-defense.110 
The importance of mens rea in the determination of aggres-
sion may indicate that certain defensive actions are legitimate. 
Thus, an armed coercion induced, for instance, by provocation, 
mistake of fact, or bona fide misguided discretion should not 
constitute aggression and hence should not carry international 
responsibility. Such use of force, which has been termed "devi-
ated self-defense," might be considered an international offense, 
but its gravity would be less than that of an international crime 
and, therefore, would not justify the triggering of the mechanism 
109. See, e.g., Report of the Special Committee, 29 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 19), 
U.N. Doc. A/9619 (1374). 
110. It should also be noted that while an aggressor should not be allowed to escape 
responsibility by aimply claiming some obscure legitimate intention, rational reconstruc-
tion of the "subjectivities of a participant" can, according to McDougal and Feliciano, be 
"appropriately inferred from acts and the effects of acts, the totality of a participant's 
operations, verbal and nonverbal considered in a detailed content." McDougal & Felici-
ano, Legal Regulation of Resort to International Coercion: Aggression and Self-defense 
in Policy Perspective, 68 YALE L.J. 1057, 1100 (1959) [hereinafter McDougal & Felici-
ano], An illuminating discussion follows that outlines factors that feature in the process 
of distinguishing actual from publicly declared purposes of a belligerent and in the con-
sideration of the concordance of actual purposes with the fundamental policies of the 
United Nations Charter (Charter), Included are factors such as consequentially of objec-
tives, their extension or conservation, participants' expectations, the modalities of coer-
cion, dimensions of coercion, and the acceptance or rejection of community procedures. 
Id. at 1108-58. 
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of international coercion under chapter VII of the Charter.111 
2. Right Intention as Applied in the Distinction Between 
Self-Defense and Reprisals 
The concept of right intention in the sense of pursuing just 
aim or purpose, may also underlie the Charter's distinction be-
tween lawful self-defense and prohibited reprisals. The punitive 
aim of reprisals is "to impose reparation for the harm done, or to 
compel a satisfactory settlement of the dispute created by the 
initial illegal act, or to compel a delinquent state to abide by the 
law in the future."112 These alternative aims do not comply with 
the right intention requirement and should therefore be consid-
ered unjust wars. In contrast, acts in self-defense aimed at "pro-
tecting the security of the state and the essential rights — in 
particular the rights of territorial integrity and political inde-
pendence — upon which the security depends,"113 clearly exhibit 
the right intention necessary for a war to be regarded as just or 
permissible under contemporary international law.114 
3. Right Intention in the Sense of Limited Objectives in 
Limited Wars 
Another contemporary application of the right intention cri-
terion could be observed in the context of "limited wars" as ad-
vocated and practiced in international relations in recent years. 
The limited war theory has incorporated certain principles that 
may be viewed as the contemporary expression of traditional 
just war criteria. These stem from modern political realism, 
evolution of the institutions of collective security and collective 
defense, reaction against total war as characterized by World 
War II, search for strategic alternatives to nuclear war, and a 
revival of the just war doctrine.115 
Insofar as the requirement of right intention is concerned, 
two limited war guidelines are particularly relevant, namely "po-
litical primacy and control over the military instrument" and 
111. See, e.g., Z. Taimr, Extra Legal Self-defense in International Law (unpublished 
Ph.D dissertation, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 1970). 
112. Bowett, Reprisals Involving Recourses to Armed Force, 66 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 3 
(1972) [hereinafter Bowett]. 
113. Bowett, supra note 112, at 3. 
114. Bowett, supra note 112, at 3. 
115. For an illuminating discussion of these sources and others, see W. O'BRIEN, 
supra note 89, at 220-21, 
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"limited objectives." The former, which has come to be regarded 
as the "first and foremost guideline of limited war,"118 views war 
as not an end in itself but as an instrument of policy. By exten-
sion the use of armed force is permissible only to the extent that 
it advances the political purposes of war.117 This perception of 
war as an instrument of politics and justice — and not as a 
"vendetta driven by hatred,"118 to borrow St. Augustine's phrase 
— may be viewed as the modern day equivalent of the earlier 
condition of right intention. The requirement of "limited objec-
tives" is yet another example of the contemporary application of 
the right intention criterion that reflects the objective rooted in 
traditional writings of creating a sound basis for a just and last-
ing peace while rejecting temptations to totally defeat and de-
stroy the enemy.119 
Other self-imposed rules of limited conflict are similar to 
the classic condition of right intention. For instance, the require-
ment of "restraint with the psychological instrument" ("painting 
the enemy as the embodiment of evil and depravity"120) aims at 
keeping a balanced perspective even toward a bitter enemy. An-
other rule is the principle of "fight and negotiate," which em-
bodies the traditional spirit of preparing for peace while war is 
in progress.121 
The latter notion of preparing for reconciliation even as one 
wages war finds additional expression in contemporary discourse 
concerning the use of force on humanitarian grounds. Concur-
rent initiation of the decision-making machinery of appropriate 
regional organizations, immediate reporting to the Security 
116. W. O'BRIEN, supra note 89, at 224. 
117. The Yom Kippur War of 1973 provides an illustration of this aspect given the 
rejection for political reasons of an airforce proposal to strike first in view of an immi-
nent Arab attack, at a cost of grave injury to Israel. See, e.g., C. HERZOG, THE WAR OP 
ATONEMENT, OCTOBER 1973, at 452-54 (1975) [hereinafter C. HERZOG]. 
118. See ST. AUGUSTINE, supra note 4. 
119. The Korean War provides a case in point. See S.C. Res. S/1588, reprinted in D. 
OJONOVICH, 2 UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTIONS 85 (ser. 2 1946-48) ("to repel the armed at-
tack and to restore international peace and security in the area"); G.A. Res. 376(V), 5 
U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 20) at 9, UN Doc. A/1775 (1950) ("to bring about a cessation of 
hostilities in Korea and the achievement of (United Nations] objectives in Korea by 
peaceful means"). The limited objectives pursued by Israel in the Yom Kippur War fur-
nish another example. It was evident that Israel did not aspire to the total defeat and/or 
destruction of its Arab enemies. Rather, it wanted to defend its territory and achieve a 
limited military victory to provide a position of strength for negotiations. See C. HERZOG, 
supra note 117, at 128-29, 
120. W. O'BRIEN, supra note 89, at 232. 
121. W. O'BRIEN, supra note 89, at 232-33. 
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Council, prompt disengagement consistent with the purposes of 
the action, and minimizing the effects on authority structures, 
are among the actions proposed by present-day international 
jurists.122 
4. Right Intention in the Sense of Peace as the Object of 
War 
The aspect of right intention emphasizing peace as the ob-
ject of war has also retained its traditional significance insofar as 
the conduct of war is concerned. It is thus generally accepted 
that war should not be waged in a manner likely to militate 
against future peace. A war entailing a disproportionate use of 
force and the infliction of unnecessary suffering would, for in-
stance, breach the peace-keeping aim of right intention.123 
5. Concluding Observations on the Contemporary Relevance 
of the Right Intention Criterion 
In concluding this discussion concerning the relevance of 
the traditional just war criterion of right intention in contempo-
rary international relations, a few additional observations are of-
fered. To begin with, Hoffmann's contention that the require-
ment of right intention is not applicable in the contemporary 
context is unwarranted.124 Hoffmann asserts that the just war 
doctrine was elaborated "for a world in which the Princes were 
sufficiently Christian to have 'right intention' required, or in 
which the [cjhurch was sufficiently strong in authority and 
power to define and interpret morality — not for a world in 
which the right intention becomes a matter of self-righteous and 
self-serving self-interpretation."125 His view reflects an overly re-
strictive interpretation of right intention and ignores contempo-
rary application of the criterion. 
122. See J. MOORE, Toward an Applied Theory for the Regulation of Intervention, 
in LAW AND CIVIL WAR IN THE MODERN WORLD 25 (J. Moore ed. 1974) [hereinafter J. 
MOORE]; Fonteyne, The Customary International Law Doctrine of Humanitarian Inter-
vention: Its Current Validity Under the UN Charter, 4 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 203, 258-68 
(1974) [hereinafter Fonteyne]. 
123. For a discussion of the relationship between the purposes of war and the limi-
tations on its conduct, see 1. CLARK, LIMITED NUCLEAR WAB: POLITICAL THEORY AND WAR 
CONVENTIONS (1982) (hereinafter I. CLARK], 
124. S. HOFFMANN, DUTIES BEYOND BORDERS: ON THE LIMITS AND POSSIBILITIES OF 
ETHICAL INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 50 (1981) [hereinafter S. HOFFMANN], 
125. S. HOFFMANN, supra note 124. 
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A more valid and appealing interpretation is put forth by 
O'Connor who asserts that "the requirement of 'right attitude' is 
relevant to present moral judgments in war."12* After all, the 
claim that war was undertaken with a restricted intention to re-
pel enemy attack and establish a just peace has been made by 
countries throughout the ages, including the contemporary 
era.127 In fact, states appear to share the view that the pursuit of 
motives other than defense and just settlement is undesirable. 
Furthermore, right intention is one of the principal criteria by 
which nations tend to be judged in practice.128 
126. O'Connor, A Reappraisal of the Just War Tradition, 84 ETHICS 167, 170 (1974) 
[hereinafter O'Connor], 
127. Compare, for example, United States claims in 1912 concerning a military re-
sponse to attacks by Mexican marauders on American villages near Texas that "in no 
circumstances will [United States troops] be suffered to trench in any degree upon the 
sovereignty of Mexico or develop into intervention of any kind into the internal affairs of 
our sister republic," (Letter from the United States Secretary of State to a representa-
tive of the Mexican Government of Mar. 13, 1916, reprinted in 20 G. HACKWORTH, D I -
GEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 292 (1941)), with Israel's protestation of its lack of territo-
rial designs in Lebanon as expressed by Prime Minister Begin in his announcement to 
the Israeli Knesset on May 7, 1979; "I hereby announce in the name of the [government 
of Israel that our state does not have any territorial demands on Lebanon. We support 
the territorial integrity and national sovereignty of Lebanon." Quoted in Ambassador 
Blum's speech to the Security Council on May 31, 1979, 34 U.N. SCOR (2146th mtg.) at 
2116, U.N. Doc. S/PV.2146 (1979). The statement by Ambassador Goldberg in relation to 
United States action in Vietnam provides another clear illustration of the importance 
attached by states to right intention: 
Our aims in giving this assistance to South Vietnam are strictly limited. We 
are not engaged in a 'holy war' against communism. We do not seek to estab-
lish an American empire or a sphere of influence in Asia, We seek no perma-
nent military bases, no permanent alliances, no permanent American presence 
of any kind in South Vietnam. We do not seek to impose a policy of alignment 
on South Vietnam. We do not seek to overthrow the government of North Vi-
. etnam. We do not seek to do any injury to mainland China nor to threaten any 
of its legitimate interests. We do not ask of North Vietnam an unconditional 
surrender or indeed the surrender of anything that belongs to it. 
Meeker, Vietnam and International Law of Self-defense, 56 DEP'T ST. BULL. 54, 60 
(1967). 
128. The United States, for instance, was charged with a clear violation of the right 
intention requirement during World War II because arguably its aim was that of an 
"unconditional surrender," See Murray, Theology and Modem War, in W. NAGBL, M O -
RALITY AND MODERN WARFARE 69, 83 (1960) [hereinafter Murray]- Similarly, some of the 
most scathing criticisms of United States involvement in Vietnam were on grounds of 
right intention. The specific argument was that the United States had been committed 
to containment of communism regardless of the consequences for the Vietnamese people, 
and as such its motive stemmed from immoral and hence wrong intentions. In a similar 
vein, critics asserted that since a factual error was involved in estimating the danger to 
world security posed by communist insurgency in Vietnam, a wrong attitude of fear and 
hostility was needlessly encouraged. See O'Connor, supra note 126, at 170. The criticisms 
levelled against Israel's actions in Lebanon provide another example of a judgment based 
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Finally, the requirement that the intentions of a state en-
gaged in a just war should encompass the establishment of a fair 
peace may seem Utopian under present circumstances for the 
wars of this century have invariably released a torrent of hatred 
and desire for vengeance. Moreover, it is very hard to envision 
the establishment of a just peace following an all-out nuclear 
war. Be that as it may, this should not in itself constitute a rea-
son for rejecting the relevance of the criterion of right intention, 
particularly in the light of past experiences that saw the "great-
est enemies of the modern era . . . brought round in the cyclical 
process of international politics to become trusted allies against 
former friends who are now viewed with fear and distrust."129 
on the criterion of right intention, reflecting in this instance the requirement that war 
should not extend beyond the pursuit of the just cause of defense. Specifically, it was 
contended that even if one conceded the justifiability of Israel's move against Palestine 
Liberation Organization (PLO) forces in Southern Lebanon, an extension of the action 
by Israel revealed evil intentions as the war had no longer a strictly preventive nature 
and hence was unjust. One may, however, query whether a just war or, in its contempo-
rary form, a legitimate war of self-defense must be limited to repelling the immediate 
danger or can be directed toward removing the danger. Authorities may he cited in this 
respect to support the view that: 
Permissible objectives of [self-defense] against massive military attack and in-
vasion, for instance, need not necessarily be limited to stopping and repelling 
or punishing back invading enemy troops to their own side of the frontier; real-
istically, the necessity to which the target-claimant is responding may not, in 
the circumstances of a particular case be wholly terminated merely by repul-
sion of the enemy invasion, and may reasonably require counter-invasion of 
the enemy's own territory. 
See McDougal & Feliciano, supra note 110, at 1136. See also Schwarzenberger, The Fun-
damental Principles of International Law, 87 HAGUE RECUEIL 195, 335 (1955) [hereinaf-
ter Schwarzenberger]; W. O'BHIEN, supra note 89, at 26. At the same time, it is arguable 
that a license to remove the danger can be abused. On the other hand, an action limited 
to repelling a danger may lose its purpose if circumstances permit the danger to reappear 
(indeed, such a danger developed after the 1978 Israeli incursion into Lebanon), It 
seems, therefore, that in the context of the Lebanon imbroglio, some support could be 
mustered for the contention that the destruction of the PLO did constitute a "legiti-
mate" end given the PLO's open commitment to destroy Israel and the activities under-
taken by it in pursuit of this aim. See id, 
129. W. O'BRIEN, supra note 89, at 35. O'Brien uses the performance of the Western 
allies in World War II to highlight the difference between subjective desires and inten-
tions and actual behavior. In his view, by forming the United Nations, the Western allies 
subsequently limited themselves to their original just cause and "made the most serious 
effort in history to establish a just and lasting peace through a world organization." Id. 
at 76. 
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B. Just Cause 
1. Nature of the Cause 
a. The Notion of Justice 
In the context of contemporary international law, considera-
tion of the central condition of just war, namely just cause, has 
been generally limited to questions relating to self-defense as 
stipulated in article 51 of the Charter."0 It is within the parame-
ters of this clause that nations have tended to justify war or re-
ject the use of force by others. This apparent restriction on the 
range of traditionally permissible just causes has prompted writ-
ers like Johnson and O'Brien to conclude that modern interna-
tional law has sacrificed justice in its attempt to virtually elimi-
nate the competence of states to unilaterally engage in war.131 
Nonetheless, this conclusion should be qualified for a num-
ber of reasons. First, it assumes a rather narrow meaning of jus-
tice in the international domain. An international standard of 
justice is a compound concept expressing a variety of common 
interests and values that bind members to the world community 
of states. This complex notion encompasses values such as free-
dom, sovereignty, self-determination, democracy, equality, toler-
ance, and peace.132 "Peace" is but one component of "justice." 
Therefore, it is not entirely accurate to speak of a subordination 
of justice as a criterion for justifying the use of force. In addi-
tion, the Charter does not necessarily compel states to view uni-
lateral recourse to force in an overly restrictive manner. 
Whether this has resulted from a liberal interpretation of article 
51133 or a broad interpretation of customary international law, 
various notions of justice have consistently entered into consid-
130. Article 51 of the Charter states that: 
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or 
collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a [m|ember of the 
United Nations, until the [United Nations] Security Council has taken mea-
sures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken 
by [mjembers in the exercise of this right of self-defense shall be immediately 
reported to the [United Nations) Security Council and shall not in any way 
affect the authority and responsibility of the [United Nations] Security Coun-
cil under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems nec-
essary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security. 
U.N. CHARTER art. 51. 
131. See Johnson, Ideology and the Jus Ad Bellum: Justice in the Initiation of 
War, 41 J. AM. ACAD. R E L I C 212, 221 (1973); W. O'BRIEN, supra note 89, at 23. 
132. See H. Kelsen, Foundations of Democracy, 66 ETHICS 27, 38 (1955). 
133. U.N. CHARTER art. 51. See also supra note 130. 
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erations pertaining to the permissibility and justifiability of re-
sort to force. 
It is also highly probable that forcible interventions in the 
name of justice will continue to occur, and any normative formu-
lation, which fails to acknowledge this factor, would not be oper-
ationally viable.134 As Stone has aptly observed: 
"[I]t is because a definition of aggression, which systematically 
ignores demands sincerely made in the name of justice, is not 
operationally viable, while an agreed definition that is precise 
enough to guide us and yet flexible enough to take these de-
mands into account is beyond our reach, that the hope of bas-
ing peace enforcement on a definition of aggression has gradu-
ally faded."136 
Finally, United Nations resolutions endorsing wars of na-
tional liberation in pursuit of self-determination may be cited as 
further evidence of the relevance of the notion of justice to the 
use of force in international relations.136 These resolutions 
clearly suggest that justice has not become completely sub-
servient to the twin objectives of peace and security. 
An examination of the scholarly debate concerning the per-
missibility of humanitarian intervention may also demonstrate 
to what extent the use of force in the name of justice is still 
prevalent. Protection of human rights is as much a value of the 
Charter as is the avoidance of war.137 For this reason the Charter 
should be interpreted to permit forcible actions or sanctions by 
individual states to protect human rights. This is particularly 
true since the United Nations lacks effective enforcement 
machinery. 
During certain points in history, characterized by interna-
tional turbulence, peace and security arguably assumed a more 
prominent position in the hierarchy of international values. Re-
cent experience suggests, however, that considerations of justice 
134. J. STONE, AGGRESSION AND WORLD ORDER: A CRITIQUE or UN THEORIES OF AG-
GRESSION 182 (1958) [hereinafter J. STONE, AGGRESSION AND WORLD ORDER]. 
135. J. STONE, AGGRESSION AND WORLD ORDER, supra note 134. 
136. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 2105 (XX) (1965); G.A. Res. 2181 (XXI) (1966); G.A. Res. 
2270 (XXII) (1967); G.A. Res. 2708 (XXV) (1970); G.A. Res. 3070 (XXVIII) (1973). For 
an account of these and other relevant resolutions, see W. VERWEY, Decolonization and 
lus ad Bellum: A Case Study on the Impact of the United Nations General Assembly 
on International Law, in DECLARATIONS ON PRINCIPLES: A QUEST FOR UNIVERSAL PEACE 
121-40 (R. Akkerman ed. 1977) [hereinafter W. VERWEV]. 
137. For a discussion of humanitarian intervention, see supra note 47 and accompa-
nying text. 
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have been accorded great weight, possibly because of fairly long 
periods without a major war.138 
In today's decentralized world the concept of justice may be 
interpreted subjectively and the meaning that it is given often 
hinges on the sociopolitical values of a particular political entity. 
Notwithstanding the common interests accepted as binding by 
the international community, viewpoints on how to resolve con-
flicts differ. The just cause principle, therefore, entails a deter-
mination of relative justice, a process that is uncertain at best. It 
does not, however, fundamentally differ in this respect from 
other moral judgments, all of which require the reconciliation of 
conflicting values. As O'Connor indicated, these inherent diffi-
culties notwithstanding, it may be legitimately argued that the 
allied forces fought for a just cause in World War II.139 
At the same time a distinction must be drawn between the 
"justness" and the "righteousness" of a cause. The righteousness 
of a cause pertains to problematic situations in which the parties 
conclude — by virtue of their ideology, race, or religious beliefs 
— that their cause is just.140 The justness of a cause, on the 
other hand, is measured by rational criteria and is further quali-
fied by conditions other than the perceived worth of the cause 
itself.141 The application of such criteria is bound to be inexact. 
Nonetheless, it enables one to distinguish one-sided claims from 
justifiable causes of war and to ascertain whether the boundary 
between proper and improper use of force has been crossed. 
Today, however, the evaluation of the substance of a just 
cause is a far more challenging task. In classical just war theory 
a specific incident or unjust action provided the impetus for 
waging a war.142 In contrast, the modern approach views interna-
tional conflict as a long-term process in which the specific 
"cause" leading to an outbreak of hostilities may be less impor-
tant than the sociopolitical circumstances underlying the rela-
tionships between the warring nations.143 One is, therefore, inev-
138. See, e.g., Claude, Jr., Just Wars: Doctrines and Institutions, 95 Pot. SCJ. Q. 83, 
95-96 (1980). 
139. O'Connor, supra note 126, at 169. 
140. Mushkat, Is War Ever Justifiable?, supra note 1, at 232-33. 
141. Mushkat, Is War Ever Justifiable?, supra note 1, at 230-31. 
142. See supra notes 4-90 and accompanying text. 
143. The official views expressed in response to the 1973 Arab-Israeli war provides a 
case in point. In the debate conducted in the United Nations Security Council (Security 
Council) in October 1973, the representatives of several countries took the position that 
the military action resorted to by Egypt and Syria was justified in view of the overall 
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itably led into a comparative analysis of the political 
characteristics inherent in a warlike confrontation. As O'Brien 
vividly stated: "[I]n our time the substance of the just cause 
condition of just war has been essentially the issue of being Red 
or Dead."144 It is, in fact, often a question of survival in compari-
son to which substantive just causes found in traditional theo-
ries may appear "almost insignificant."1,16 
b. Permissible Forms of Just Causes 
The forms of pursuing just causes are, however, on the 
whole more restricted in today's legal doctrines. Under positive 
international law wars of vindictive justice, in which the belliger-
ent endeavors to right error and evil as a matter of principle, are 
no longer condoned.14* Thus, for example, wars to free the So-
viet people from Communist rule would not be permitted. On 
the other hand, some might insist that saving part of the Soviet 
population from genocide or enslavement would be justifiable. 
It is generally maintained that the only form of offensive 
war legally permissible under contemporary international law is 
a United Nations enforcement action to suppress threats to 
peace under chapter VII of the Charter.147 The distinction, how-
ever, between "offensive" and "defensive" wars may be blurred 
at times. As suggested by Aron, for example, it is possible for a 
country to conduct an offensive foreign policy that may put it 
into a defensive position in the context of a war.148 
Considerable confusion surrounds the characterization of a 
forcible action as self-defense or reprisal.14* Notwithstanding 
situation in the Middle East. See UN MONTHLY CHRON. 3 (Nov, 1973), 
144. W. O'BRIEN, supra note 89, at 21. 
145. W. O'BRIEN, supra note 89. 
146. Kellog-Briand Pact, supra note 83. 
147. See U.N. CHARTER ait. 42. In addition, there is of course the theoretical possi-
bility of military action against "enemy states" under articles 53(1) or 107 of the Char-
ter, or joint action of the five Permanent Members of the Security Council under article 
106, But, as noted by Farer, expectations about the possibility of such action would ap-
pear to be very low and the relevant provisions might reasonably be characterized as the 
"Charter analogue of the vermiform appendix." T. FARER, Law and War, in III T H E 
FUTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER 15, 27 n.50 (C. Black & R. Falk ed. 1971) 
[hereinafter T. FABER, Law and War]. 
148. R. ARON, PEACE AND WAR: A THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 85 (1966). 
149. For a discussion concerning United States bombing raids against military posi-
tions in North Vietnam following the Gulf of Tonkin attacks on United States destroyers 
in August 1964, see Resort to War and Armed Force, in DIGEST OF UNITED STATES PRAC-
TICE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW ch. 14, § I (1980) [hereinafter Resort to War and Armed 
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this confusion, one salient feature that accords a defensive char-
acter to a cause pursued through force can be identified. This 
feature is the action's direct relationship to rights previously vio-
lated, although the wrongdoing that gives rise to such wars may 
be "less visible than a blitzkrieg sweeping across international 
boundaries,"150 Thus, a "war of intervention to correct a flagrant 
and persistent denial of justice may . . . be justified as a defense 
of the innocent."161 It is also arguable that governments are 
often constituted "in order to form a more perfect union, estab-
lish justice, insure domestic tranquility, provide for the common 
defense, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of 
liberty;"162 if these purposes are not served a right devolves to 
the people to reconstitute the political organs of their society 
and reassert violated rights by force if necessary,153 
Despite the emphasis on the restoration of rights wrongfully 
denied, the punitive motives behind many old just wars are not 
legitimate under contemporary international law. Thus, the just 
warring power may no longer exercise the judicial function its 
traditional counterpart used to perform in punishing a wayward 
nation. Today, it is generally believed that all sanctions in inter-
national relations must assume the form of acts undertaken or 
authorized by the United Nations. Nonetheless, a similar objec-
tive may be accomplished through a liberal interpretation of the 
right of self-defense resembling that suggested by O'Brien.1*4 
According to O'Brien, as long as the measures are necessary, 
proportionate, and closely related to the sources of illegal armed 
coercion, a positive result may be achieved. This result is devoid 
of the pitfalls of reprisals and at the same time effectively fulfills 
Force]. The attacks were justified by the Department's Legal Adviser Stevenson as "self-
defense" but were referred to in the Senate Hearings by Senator Fulbright and Secretary 
of Defense McNamara as "retaliation." Id. Similarly, United States air strikes and 
bombing raids that followed the North Vietnamese attack at Pleiku in February 1965 
were characterized by the White House as "appropriate reprisal action" and defended in 
the United Nations as "measures of self-defense." Id. 
150. R. POTTER, WAR AND MORAL DISCOURSE 10 (1969) [hereinafter R, POTTER]. 
151. R, POTTER, supra note 150, at 10. 
152. U.S. CONST, preamble. 
153. R. POTTER, supra note 150, at 11. The recent events in Grenada may be relied 
upon to illustrate this point, for the Governor-General there, seeking to protect the con-
stitution, presumably exercised his reserved powers under it, (see The Const, of Gre-
nada, in III THE CONSTITUTIONS OF THE WORLD 57-58 (A. Blaustein & G. Flanz eds. 
1974)), to invite the forcible assistance of external forces. Thus, subject to factual verifi-
cation, the intervention that followed may perhaps be regarded as justified on this 
ground. 
154. W. O'BRIEN, supra note 89, at 25-27. 
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the intended role of such measures.155 
c. Defensive Causes 
i. Self-Defense Under the United Nations Charter 
While the issue of the legitimacy of offensive wars is subject 
to considerable controversy, no reservations exist as to the just-
ness of defensive wars. The legitimacy of defense in the face of 
unjust attack is axiomatic. Yet, the conditions and details of the 
cause of self-defense are by no means agreed upon. Through the 
plethora of scholarly assessments and erratic state behavior, at 
least one specific requirement has been agreed upon: namely 
that self-defense must be preceded by an event consisting of a 
breach of legal duty owed to the state claiming a right of self-
defense. There is, however, much doubt as to what rights a state 
is entitled to defend or what are the delicts that would provide 
belligerents with the just cause of self-defense. 
The common view is that a broad understanding of self-de-
fense, often understood to be identical with self-preservation, 
has given way to a much narrower concept of self-defense as a 
restricted exception to the general prohibition of the use of force 
in a system of collective security. Indeed, a literal reading of ar-
ticle 51 of the Charter suggests that self-defense is permissible 
only in the case of armed attack.158 Although the core meaning 
of an "armed attack" is the armed violation of the territorial 
integrity and political independence of another state, there is a 
residual category of cases that defy easy classification. Even if 
the terms armed attack and aggression are assumed to be identi-
cal, the efforts of the United Nations General Assembly to de-
fine aggression have left may questions unanswered.167 
155. W. O'BRIEN, supra note 89, at 25-27. For Falk's discussion of "reasonable" re-
prisals, see Falk, The Beirut Raid and the International Law of Retaliation, 63 AM, J. 
INT'L L. 415-43 (1969) [hereinafter Falk], 
156. U.N, CHARTER art. 51. For expositions of such a construction, see, e.g., Henkin, 
Force, Intervention and Neutrality in Contemporary International Law, PROC. AM. 
Soc. INT'L L. 147, 149, 165 (1963); P. JESSUP, A MODERN LAW OF NATIONS 166 (1948) 
[hereinafter P. JKSSUP]; H. KELSEN, T H E LAW OF THE UN 797-98 (1950); Kunz, Individ-
ual and Collective Self-Defense in Article 51 of the Charter of the UN, 41 AM. J. INT'L 
L. 872, 878 (1947) [hereinafter Kunz, Individual and Collective Self-Defense]; G. 
ScHWARZENBERGER, REPORT ON S E L F - D E F E N S E UNDER THE CHARTER OF THE U N AND TOP-
ICS COVERED BY THE DVBROVNIC R E S O L U T I O N 617 (1958). 
157. This assumption has not gone undisputed despite the fact that the term "ag-
gression armee" in the French version of article 51 of the Charter appears as the 
equivalent of armed attack. On the meaning of "armed attack" and its relationship to 
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For instance, it is unclear whether a state's support of 
armed bands committing acts of violence in another state justi-
fies the use of force in self-defense.1*8 It is well established in 
international law and practice that a state harboring armed 
bands incurs responsibility for acts of aggression committed by 
these groups.169 Support may be similarly marshaled for the con-
tention that a victim state possesses a right of forceful abate-
ment under customary international law. Oppenheim and Lau-
terpacht maintain that on failure of the host state to prevent, or 
on notice to abate, attacks by armed bands, "a case of necessity 
arises and the threatened state is justified in invading the neigh-
aggression, see generally D. BOWBTT, SELF-DEFENSE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 187-93 (1958) 
[hereinafter D. BOWETT]; I. BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY 
STATES 365-68 (1968) [hereinafter I. BROWNLIE]; R, HIGGINS, T H E DEVELOPMENT OF IN-
TERNATIONAL LAW THROUGH THE POLITICAL ORGANS OF THE UN 199-205 (1963); M. Mc-
DOUCAL & F. FELICIANO, LAW AND MINIMUM WORLD PUBLIC ORDER: THE REGULATION OF 
INTERNATIONAL COERCION 232-41 (1961); J. STONE, AGGRESSION AND WORLD ORDER, supra 
note 134, at 72-76. 
158. Definition of Aggression, supra note 107, at art. 3(g). 
159. These propositions are well documented in a long series of proposals and inter-
national instruments including article 4 of the Draft Declaration on Rights and Duties of 
States, 1949 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 287; and article 2(6) of the Draft Code of Offenses 
Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, 1951 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 135. Article 2(4) 
of the same code, as extended by the commission in 1954, condemned as an international 
crime under the principles consecrated at Nuremberg: 
[T]he organization, or the encouragement of the organization by the authori-
ties of a state, of armed bands within its territory or any other territory for 
incursions into the territory of another state, or the toleration of the organiza-
tion of such bands in its own territory, or the toleration of the use by such 
armed bands of ita territory as a base of operations or as a point of departure 
for incursions into the territory of another state, as well as direct participation 
in or support of such incursions. 
Id. 
A further aspect of the illegality of countenancing this kind of activity is stressed in 
the Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States 
and the Protection of their Independence and Sovereignty, which forbids states to "or-
ganize, assist, foment, finance, incite, or tolerate subversive, terrorist, or armed activities 
directed toward the violent overthrow of the regime of another state." G.A. Res. 2131, 20 
U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 14) at 11, U.N. Doc. A/6014 (1965). The Declaration on Princi-
ples of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States 
in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations of 1970 (Declaration on Friendly 
Relations), moreover, proscribes the "acquiescing [by states] in organized activities 
within its territory" aimed at fomenting civil war or omitting terrorist acts in another 
state. G.A. Res. 2625, 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 28) at 121, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970) 
[hereinafter Declaration on Friendly Relations], Finally, the 1974 Definition of Aggres-
sion in its "compromise" formula terms as "aggression," inter alia, "the sending by or on 
behalf of a state of armed bands, groups, irregulars, or mercenaries [that] carry out acts 
of armed force against another [sjtate of such gravity as to amount to the acts [of aggres-
sion] listed above, or its substantial involvement therein." Definition of Aggression, 
supra note 107, at art. 3(g). 
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boring country and disarming the intending raiders."160 
Some doubts have been raised, however, with regard to the 
legality of the victim state's recourse to measures of abatement 
under article 51 of the Charter. It is Garcia-Mora's opinion, for 
instance, that the Charter has excluded the remedial license of 
forceful abatement previously permitted under customary inter-
national law.1*1 Nonetheless, Garcia-Mora fails to explain con-
vincingly why article 51 should not apply to a type of armed 
attack clearly conceived by the international community as "ag-
gression" and "an escalating threat to all nations."182 
In this regard much, of course, depends on whether one is 
inclined to give a narrow or broad interpretation to the expres-
sion "if an armed attack occurs." According to Brownlie only a 
"co-ordinated and general campaign by powerful bands of ir-
regulars, with an obvious or easily proven complicity of the gov-
ernment of the state from which they operate" would constitute 
an "armed attack."163 Kunz also views the approval of a state as 
a precondition for a "legitimate" armed attack.184 On the other 
hand, one may question why government complicity or approval 
should be determinative of an armed attack. More convincing is 
the accumulation of events theory, whereby a series of terrorist 
acts reveals a distinct pattern that would qualify as an armed 
attack.168 United Nations Security Council (Security Council) 
practice in relation to Israeli counter-terrorist activities does 
not, however, lend support to this proposition. An examination 
of relevant Security Council resolutions enacted between 1968 
and 197818" distinctly suggests that no aggregation of terrorist 
160. L, OFFBNHBIM, 1 INTERNATIONAL LAW H 130 (H, Lauterp&eht 7th ed. 1944). See 
also Kunz, Sanctions in International Law, 54 AM. J. INT'L L. 324, 331-32 (1960) [here-
inafter Kunz, Sanctions in International Law}; J- STONE, AGGRESSION AND WORLD OR-
DER, supra note 134, at 92-103; J. STONE, OF LAW AND NATIONS ch. I (1974). 
161. M. GARCIA-MORA, INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR HOSTILE ACTS OF PRIVATE 
PERSONS AGAINST FOREIGN STATES 118-29 (1962) [hereinafter M. GARCIA-MORA], 
162. M. GARCJA-MORA, supra note 161. 
163. I. BROWNUE, supra note 157, at 731. 
164. Kunz, Sanctions in International Law, supra note 160, at 878. 
165. See, e.g., Blum, State Response to Acts of Terrorism, 19 GER. Y.B. INT'L L. 
223, 233 (1976). It may be of interest to note that patterns of attacks or infiltration can 
rise to the level of an "armed attack" thus justifying the use of force in the exercise of 
the right of self-defense. The United States made this determination both in its legal 
defense of American participation in the Vietnam War and in the Cambodian incursion 
of May 1970. See Resort to War and Armed Force, supra note 149. 
166. These include: 
S.C. Res. 262, U.N. Doc. S/RES/262 (1968). 
S.C. Res. 270, U.N. Doc. S/RES/270 (1969). 
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attacks, as long as they remained merely the activities of armed 
bands, could legitimize an Israeli response. It is apparent that 
the Security Council considered each case of use of force indi-
vidually and refused to consider political and military 
justifications.187 
From a practical standpoint this restrictive approach ig-
nores the problems inherent in counter-insurgency self-defense. 
As Falk has pointed out, states confronted with attacks consist-
ing of small cross-border raids have limited options.168 They can 
seek out and destroy the guerrillas in their sanctuaries or con-
vince the sanctuary state to undertake the task itself.169 In exer-
cising either option the target state is likely to be condemned by 
the international community for responding disproportionately 
given the large, overt nature of the operation and the possible 
involvement of regular forces of one state in the territory of an-
other.170 A refusal to consider all the circumstances surrounding 
an asserted right of self-defense is unrealistic and particularly 
unsuited for a world lacking an impartial and effective Security 
Council. In fact, it "aggravates the frustration generated by inhi-
bitions on recourse to full scale war."171 
In any event by restricting the right of self-defense to cases 
of armed attack, article 51 leaves an uncomfortable gap between 
acts illegally violating rights of states and acts against which 
self-defense is permitted. Several attempts have been made to 
bridge this gap, the most notable being the claim that there is a 
customary right of self-defense in addition to article 51. Empha-
sizing the declaration in article 51 that nothing in the Charter 
shall impair the "inherent right of individual or collective self-
S.C. Res. 279, U.N, Doc. S/RES/279 (1970). 
S.C. Reg. 280, U.N. Doc. S/RES/280 (1970). 
S.C. Res. 285, U.N. Doc. S/RES/285 (1970). 
S.C, Res. 313, U.N, Doc, S/RES/313 (1972), 
S.C. Res. 316, U.N. Doc. S/RES/316 (1972). 
S.C. Res. 332, U.N. Doc. S/RES/332 (1973). 
S.C. Res. 337, U.N. Doc. S/RES/337 (1973). 
S.C. Res. 347. U.N. Doc. S/RES/347 (1974). 
S.C. Res. 425, U.N. Doc. S/RES/425 (1978). 
167. Events not immediately preceding the Israeli recourse to force simply do not 
enter into the equation when examined by the Security Council. 
168. Falk, supra note 155, at 426. 
169. Falk, supra note 155, at 426, 
170. Falk, supra note 155, a t 426. 
171. T. FARER, Law and War, supra note 147, at 74. 
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defense,"172 one may infer that the drafters intended to preserve 
the existing natural right of states to utilize force in self-de-
fense.173 Support for this argument was offered by Stone, who 
contends that: 
[I]n reserving a license limited to the case of armed attack 
against a member the draftsmen were delimiting the reserved 
powers of members as against [United Nations] organs. For 
other purposes, for instance, where the Security Council is not 
acting, the broader license of self-defense and self-redress 
under customary international law must surely continue to ex-
ist as far as the positive prohibitions of the Charter do not ex-
clude it. Article 51 itself in reserving as against the Security 
Council's powers a narrow range of self-defense, can surely not 
have destroyed the broader area of the license of self-defense 
and self-redress where the Security Council is not acting and 
there is no inconsistency within the purposes of the [United 
Nations]."17" 
This interpretation dovetails with the Charter's traveaux 
preparatories11* and, if accepted, would render any significant 
limitation on the right of self-defense doubtful.176 Even before 
the United Nations was founded, however, state practice re-
stricted the right of self-defense to cases of armed attack. There-
fore, the customary right of self-defense and self-defense under 
article 51 have been identical from the outset.177 It is nonethe-
less questionable whether a clearly established state practice to 
that effect could be demonstrated at such an early stage. 
At the same time the determination of the contents of the 
customary right of self-defense is by no means a simple task. 
According to Bowett, self-defense may be exercised to protect 
rights essential to the security of the state.178 These are the 
rights of territorial integrity, political independence, protection 
172. U.N. CHARTER art. 51. 
173. According to Brierly the object was to eliminate possible doubts regarding the 
impact of the powers of the Security Council upon the right of states to have individual 
or collective recourse to force in self-defense, J. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS: INTRO-
DUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OP PEACE 417 (Sir H. Waldock 6th ed. 1963) [herein-
after J. BRIERLY], 
174. J. STONE, AGGRESSION AND WORLD ORDER, supra note 134, at 43-44. 
175. The French phrase, traveaux preparatories, refers to the Charter's preparatory 
drafts. 
176. See J. BRIERLY, supra note 173, a t 417-18. 
177. See I. BROWNLIE, supra note 157, at 298-300. 
178. See generally D, BOWETT, supra note 157. 
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of nationals, and certain economic rights.179 As a basis of the 
customary right of self-defense, this multifaceted concept of "se-
curity" has been subjected to criticism on the grounds that it 
places self-defense on a par with a general claim of "self help," 
which is no longer legitimate under the Charter.1*0 In fact, it is 
arguable that if the right of political independence is broadly 
interpretated,181 it may result in the widening of the scope of 
self-defense to a point where it could be difficult to distinguish it 
from the older political doctrine of "self-preservation."182 Nor, 
for that matter, could a "meaningful distinction be drawn be-
tween a principle of political morality establishing 'vital inter-
ests' as the criterion of resort to force and an allegedly legal 
principle requiring that force used in self-defense must follow 
the violation or threatened violation of rights."183 
Attempts by Bowett and others to circumscribe the scope of 
the rights by which self-defense might be exercised to protect 
have been criticized. Some argue that Bowett's position falls 
short of establishing that the customary right of self-defense in-
deed encompasses the protection of rights essential to the 
state.184 While requirements such as necessity and proportional-
ity may affect the exercise of the right of self-defense, the re-
quirements still leave "largely unaffected and undetermined" 
the issue of which rights support forcible measures of self-de-
fense.185 This argument, however, overlooks the effects of pro-
portionality of ends and necessity on the justness of the cause 
itself. 
Theorists' debates notwithstanding, states continue to inter-
pret the right of self-defense as encompassing the protection of 
interests that they consider vital to their existence. Under the 
guise of article 51 the superpowers, for instance, have sought to 
further ideological objectives in a manner totally oblivious to the 
question of whether under article 51 a state can employ force in 
179. D. BOWETT, supra note 157, at 9, 24, 29, 270-71. 
180. See H. KELSEN, PRINCIPLES OP INTERNATIONAL LAW 73-74 (R. Tucker 2d ed. 
1966) [hereinafter H. KELSEN). 
181. The right of political independence is broadly interpreted in the sense, for in-
stance, of freedom of decision-making. H. KELSEN, supra note 180, at 79, 
182. That is, it may not be the response to some other state's action at all, or if it is, 
that state's action may be entirely legal. H. KELSEN, supra note 180, at 79. 
183. H. KELSEN, supra note 180, at 79. 
184. H. KELSEN, supra note 180, at 74. 
185. H. KELSEN, supra note 180, at 80. 
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self-defense in situations other than against an armed attack.186 
It is conceivable, of course, that the respective behavior of the 
superpowers merely reflects regional relaxation of criteria or de-
velopments of special criteria governing relations between the 
United States and the Soviet Union.187 There is, however, ample 
historical evidence to demonstrate that claims of self-defense 
have been advanced by all states since 1945 without particular 
regard to the restriction to cases of armed attack.188 Addition-
ally, states have not taken notice of the legal constraints that 
might endanger the very existence of a state.189 
It is indeed the post-Charter behavior of states that pro-
vides the key to the interpretation of the contemporary interna-
tional law of self-defense. As McDougal has observed, 
[i]t is not the preliminary negotiations and not the words of 
the Charter only that create contemporary expectations about 
the prescriptions of the Charter, but the words of the Charter, 
the words that preceded it, and the whole subsequent flow of 
words and interpretations by conduct [that isj relevant to the 
interpretation of what the law is today.1*" 
186. For a discussion of the Brezhnev doctrine and its Western Hemisphere ana-
logue as well as relevant references, see Mushkat, Is War Ever Justifiable?, supra note 1, 
at 227-317-
Perhaps the most candid expression of state sentiments in this respect was provided 
by former Secretary of State Dean Aehesori who boldly asserted; 
I must conclude that the propriety of the Cuban quarantine is not a legal issue. 
The power, position, and prestige of the United States had been challenged by 
another state and the law simply does not deal with such questions of ultimate 
power — power that comes closer to the sources of sovereignty. . . . The sur-
vival of states is not a matter of law. 
PROC. AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. 13, 14 (1963) (remarks of the Honorable Dean Acheson). 
187. See, eg-, T, FARER, Law and War, supra note 147, at 64. 
188. A large number of states have invoked the protection of nationals abroad as 
justification for military intervention: for example, Great Britain in the course of the 
Suez Crisis (1956); the United States in Lebanon (1958); Belgium in the Congo (1960); 
Belgium and the United States in the Congo (1964); the United States in the Dominican 
Republic (1965); Israel in Uganda (1976); Egypt in Cyprus (1978); the Federal Republic 
of Germany in Somalia (1978); and the United States in Iran (1980). 
189. See W. LEVI, CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL LAW 317 (1979). Viscount Kilmiur, 
in his address to the House of Lords on November 1, 1956, in justification of the Suez 
campaign, seemed to express a prevalent state view when he declared: 
Article 51 must be read in the light that it is part of [c]hapter VII of the 
[C]harter and concerned with defense against grave breaches of the peace. It 
would be an entire misreading of the whole intention of [a]rticle 51 to interpret 
it as forbidding self-defense in resistance to an illegal use of force not consti-
tuting an armed attack. 
199 H. HANSARD cols. 1348-59 (1956). 
190. McDougal, Authority to Use Force on the High Seas, 20 NAVAL WAR C. REV. 
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Recent state practice supports the conclusion that certain forms 
of self-help short of response to armed attack, may constitute 
legitimate just causes of self-defense under contemporary inter-
national law. 
ii. Special Cases 
Even those theorists who are generally inclined to strictly 
construe the Charter's provisions proscribing the use of force ad-
mit that "given the present stage in the development of interna-
tional society, there will be instances where the resort to force 
would be difficult to condemn in certain circumstances."1"1 This 
attitude is also reflected in the International Court of Justice's 
obiter dictum in the Case Concerning United States Diplomatic 
and Consular Staff in Teheran192 where the court referred to a 
balancing of understanding for, and concern over, the United 
States Government's action. 
(a) Rescue of Nationals Abroad 
Various reasons for the use of force by states have been re-
garded by large parts of the international community as particu-
larly compelling and have attracted considerable sympathy and 
approval.193 Raids to free hostages held in gross violation of in-
ternational law are cases in point.194 Justifications for such use 
19, 20 (1967) (emphasis added). 
191. B. BRYDE, Self Help, in 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 215 
(1982). 
192. Case Concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. 
v. Iran), 1980 I.C.J. 3, 43, 52 (Judgment of May 24). While expressing its "concern" 
regarding the United States incursion into Iran, the Court noted the: 
[Understandable preoccupation of the United States Government with respect 
to the well-being of its nationals held hostage in the [ejmbassy for over five 
months and the understandable feelings of frustration at Iran's long-continued 
detention of the hostages, notwithstanding two resolutions of the Security 
Council as well as the court's own [ojrder of 15 December 1979 calling ex-
pressly for their immediate release. 
Id. 
193. One may cite in this connection the dissenting opinion by Judge Azavedo and 
the individual opinion by Judge Alvarez in the Corfu Channel Case (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 
I.C.J. 4, 34-35, 100 (Judgment of April 9), which recognized the right of a state to inter-
vene and use force in another state in the event of an "emergency" or in "exceptional 
circumstances," respectively. The Entebee hostage-taking crisis might, for example, fit in 
with these putative exceptions to a general international rule against the use of force 
across state lines. 
194. One example is the operation in 1976 carried out by an Israeli command unit to 
rescue hostages hsld in Uganda following the hijacking of an Air France airplane. For a 
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of force have been made on four grounds. 
Perhaps the most extreme argument is the contention that 
forcible missions to rescue nationals abroad are not inconsistent 
with the terms of article 2(4) of the Charter since they aim 
neither at the territorial integrity nor at the political indepen-
dence of the target state.196 The most common argument is 
based on self-defense under article 51 of the Charter. Some writ-
ers broadly interpret the expressions "armed attack" and 
"against a [m]ember of the [United Nations]."186 In the opinion 
of these writers an armed attack perpetrated on nationals 
abroad is tantamount to an armed attack on the state itself, 
since population is an essential ingredient of statehood.197 This 
application of the doctrine of self-defense, however, has been 
challenged on the ground that the underlying assumption of ab-
solute identity between a national and state is not viable.189 This 
broad interpretation of article 51 is also flawed because it con-
travenes the principle that exceptions to the Charter should be 
strictly construed.196 
Another argument based on self-defense endeavors to cir-
cumvent the difficulties involved in the armed attack stipulation 
by relying on a customary right of protection that has either sur-
brief account of the incident and relevant United Nations resolutions, see E. McDowel, 
Introductory Note, 15 I.L.M. 1224-25 (1976); see also excerpts from Security Council 
Debates on July 9, 1976, in 15 I.L.M. 1228-34 (1976). Another example pertains to the 
American attempt on April 24-25, 1980 to rescue American nationals held hostage in 
Iran. For an account of the operation, see Case Concerning United States Diplomatic 
and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), 1980 I.C.J. 3, 18, at H 32 (Judgment of May 
24), 
195. See D. BoWETT, The Use of Force in the Protection of Nationals, in 43 THE 
GKOTIUS SOCIETY TRANSACTIONS FOR THE YEAR 1957 ch. Ill, at 112-14 (1959); J, STONE, 
AGGRESSION AND WORLD ORDER, supra note 134, at 43. 
196. U.N. CHARTER art. 51. See, e.g., Akehurst, The Use of Force to Protect Nation-
als Abroad, 5 INT'L REL. 3, 4 (1977); Nanda, The U.S. Action in the 1965 Dominican 
Crisis: Impact on World Order, Part I, 43 DEN. L.J. 439, 459 (1966) [hereinafter Nanda], 
.See also Letter from the Permanent Representative of the United States to the United 
Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council referring to the Iranian 
armed attack on United States Embassy, U.N. Doc. S/13B08 (Apr. 25, 1980). 
197. See Nanda, supra note 196. 
198. See Fairley, State Actors, Humanitarian Intervention and International Law, 
10 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 29, 54 (1980). 
199. See Fawcett's statement that "to regard the mistreatment of nationals . . . as 
an aimed attack within the scope of (a]rticle 51 would be to empty that expression of all 
real meaning and is plainly inadmissible." Fawcett, Intervention in International Law: 
A Study of Some Recent Cases, 103 HAGUE RECUEIL 347, 404 (1961) [hereinafter 
Fawcett], This argument assumes that article 2(4) is the rule and article 51 the excep-
tion. Id. 
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vived the introduction of articles 2(4) and 51,200 or was revived 
after discovering that the collective security mechanisms origi-
nally envisioned by article 51, did not work.301 It is thus con-
tended that article 51 perceives self-defense as an "interim 
right" to be exercised pending the assumption by the Security 
Council of the responsibility for resolving the dispute and re-
storing the peace.402 In view of the obvious failure and ineffec-
tiveness of the Security Council, this task devolves upon the in-
dividual members of the United Nations.203 
While the survival argument has elicited a favorable re-
sponse from members of the "realist" school of international re-
lations, it has been questioned on the ground that it lacks opinio 
juris in the present community of states.204 Nonetheless, this 
criticism is based on a subjective appraisal of relevant events 
and is not entirely consistent with a large number of scholarly 
analysis.208 
A fourth argument is based on the universally-accepted ob-
ligation of the state to ensure the human rights of its citizens 
abroad.206 A rescue operation to protect nationals abroad may 
200. See D. BOWETT, supra note 157, at 87-105; A. THOMAS & A. VAN WYNEN 
THOMAS, T H E DOMINICAN REPUBLIC CRISIS 1965, at 14 (1966) [hereinafter THOMAS & 
THOMAS]; Fawcett, supra note 199, at 404; Waldock, The Regulation of the £/se of Force 
by In-dividual States in International Law, 81 HAGUE RECUEIL 455, 466-67 (1952). See 
also statement by United States Ambassador Scranton in response to the Israeli rescue 
of hostages in Entebee, 74 DEP'T ST. BULL. 186 (Aug. 2, 1976), This assumes the qualifi-
cation of self-defense as an "inherent right" encompassing a right to protection of na-
tionals. Id. 
201. See W. REISMAN, NULLITY AND REVISION: THE REVIEW AND REINFORCEMENT OF 
INTERNATIONAL JUDGMENT AND AWARDS 850 (1971) [hereinafter W. REISMAN]; Lillich, For-
cible Self Help to Protect Human Rights, 53 IOWA L. REV. 325, 335 (1967) [hereinafter 
Lillich]. See also Schwarzenberger, supra note 128, at 338. 
202. See Schwarzenberger, supra note 128, at 338. 
203. See Schwarzenberger, supra note 12S, at 338. 
204. See, e.g., Schweisfurth, Operations to Rescue Nationals in Third States In-
volving the Use of Force in Relation to the Protection of Human Rights, 23 GBR. Y.B. 
INT'L L. 159, 165 (1980) [hereinafter Schweisfurth]. 
205. See Schweisfurth, supra note 204, at 165. Schweisfurth cites, for example, the 
Congo rescue missions to illustrate that "the alleged customary right to protect nationals 
abroad was no longer generally accepted as justifying the missions." Id. It must be noted, 
however, that the objections raised by several states (African countries and the Soviet 
Union) were largely in terms of encroachment upon domestic jurisdiction; the Security 
Council did not condemn the action; and the majority of scholars who have appraised 
the operation have concluded that it was permissible. Id. See, e.g., J. BRIERLY, supra 
note 173, at 340; W. REISMAN & M. MCDOUOAL, Humanitarian Intervention to Protect 
the Ibos, in HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND THE U.N, 185-86 (R. Lillich ed. 1973) 
[hereinafter W. REISMAN & M, MCDOUGAL]. 
206. Schweisfurth, supra note 204, at 166-80. 
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thus be considered justifiable where the obligation to protect 
human rights outweighs the obligation to refrain from the use of 
force.207 This approach arguably possesses the advantage of 
clearly identifying the values at stake as well as reflecting the 
present emphasis in international law on the preservation of 
human rights. 
(b) Humanitarian Intervention 
When appraising just causes for the use of force one must 
also consider two recent important legal and political develop-
ments. These developments are the growing international con-
cern for human rights and decolonization. Both developments 
have significantly affected the accepted interpretation of the 
limits of the right of self-defense and, more generally, the scope 
of the prohibition on the use of force. 
Growing international concern for the protection of human 
rights has led to a narrowing of the scope of nonintervention.208 
There are basic human rights, such as the rights to life and lib-
erty, that transcend the limits of the state. Hence, the outside 
207. In this connection, see Gordon, Use of Force for the Protection of Nationals 
Abroad, The Entebbe Incident, 9 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 117, 131 (1977); Schweisfurth, 
supra note 204, at 166-80, 
208. It should be noted, however, that the Socialist doctrine persists in holding that, 
as a general rule, human rights continue to belong to the internal affairs of any state in 
which no other state may interfere. There is, therefore, no universal agreement as to 
whether "a consistent pattern of gross and reliably attested violations of human rights 
and fundamental freedoms," E.S.C. Res. 1503 (XLVIII) of ECOSOC, May 27, 1970, is to 
be recognized as a subject of international concern. It can be said at the same time that 
the scope of domestic jurisdiction in human rights matters is narrowing, and the protec-
tion of fundamental human rights in situations involving grievous infractions or consis-
tent pattern of infringement appears to be no longer essentially within the domestic ju 
risdiction of states. See W. REISMAN & M. MCDOUGAL, supra note 205, at 171, 189, 190-
91; Wright, Domestic Jurisdiction as a Limit on National and Supra National Action, 
56 Nw. U.L. REV. 11, 15, 24, 35, 37 (1961). These conclusions are based: first, on the 
variety of activities in the human rights area undertaken by the United Nations and 
otheT international organizations or agencies as exemplified by the host of conventions, 
declarations, and resolutions that have been adopted on the subject in recent years, see 
BASIC DOCUMENTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS (I. Brownlie ed. 1971); second, the daily involve-
ment of the United Nations and other international agencies with human rights matters, 
see generally J. CAREY, U.N. PROTECTION OF CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS (1970); A. DEL 
Russo, THE INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS (1970); third, the position of 
both the Security Council and the General Assembly that article 2(7) does not bar con-
sideration by the United Nations of serious cases of human rights violations, see 
Fonteyne, supra note 122, at 206-09; fourth, the world community's concern with such 
extreme cases of denial of human rights as Biafra, South Africa, and Bangladesh, see 
THOMAS & THOMAS, supra note 200, at 375; Llllich, supra note 201, a t 338; McDougal & 
Bebr, Human Rights in the U.N., 58 AM. J. INT'L L. 603, 629 (1964). 
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intervention in cases of genocide or other large scale atrocities 
committed by a regime against its people may be legitimate. The 
legality of the use of force in such circumstances, however, has 
generated considerable controversy and rekindled the debate 
concerning humanitarian intervention. The significance of such a 
debate lies in the absence of the link of nationality. A justifica-
tion for the use of force on purely humanitarian grounds, unre-
lated to a threat to one's own nationals, would require a legal 
basis beyond the recognized right of self-defense. 
Attention has thus been drawn to customary international 
law under which a right of humanitarian intervention was said 
to exist prior to the Charter. Given the small number of pre-
Charter precedents a customary rule based on state practice is 
somewhat difficult to identify.zot> The validity of humanitarian 
intervention under traditional international law might be en-
hanced by views of leading scholars who concurred with Lauter-
pacht's statement that there is: 
A substantial body of opinions and practice in support of the 
view that there are limits to the discretion of states in the 
treatment of their own nationals and that when a state renders 
itself guilty of cruelties against and persecutions of its nation-
als in such a way as to deny their fundamental human rights 
and to shock the conscience of mankind, intervention in the 
interest of humanity is legally permissible.21" 
Opinions clearly differ with respect to the circumstances 
under which unilateral humanitarian intervention is legally per-
missible. The form that such action might assume is also de-
bated. Nonetheless, humanitarian intervention was generally ac-
cepted as an integral part of customary international law.211 The 
focus of the recent debate has largely shifted to the issue of the 
209. Cases such as the Syrian intervention (I860), the intervention in Bosnia, Her-
zegovina, and Bulgaria (1876-1878), and the Macedonian intervention (1903-1908), did 
reflect clear underlying concerns of the intervening states over the oppressive and inhu-
man treatment suffered by the religious and other minorities at the hands of the target 
state. For surveys of these and other cases, see M. GANJI, INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF 
HUMAN RIGHTS 22-37 (1962); Behuniak, The Law of Unilateral Humanitarian Interven-
tion by Armed Force: A Legal Survey, 79 MIL. L. REV. 157, 159-64 (1978) [hereinafter 
Behuniak]; Fonteyne, supra note 122, at 205-07. 
210. L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 312 (H. Lauterpacht 8th ed. 1955), 
211. Even Brownlie, who ultimately goes on to reject the existence of customary 
international law of humanitarian intervention, concludes that "[b)y the end of the 
[19th] century the majority of publicists admitted that a right of humanitarian interven-
tion . . . existed." I. BROWNLIE, supra note 157, at 338. 
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compatibility of humanitarian intervention with the Charter. 
Three approaches have been adopted in support of humani-
tarian intervention under contemporary international law. One 
approach emphasizes the congruity of such intervention with ar-
ticle 2(4). It is argued that article 2(4)'s prohibition extends to 
threats or attacks upon the territorial integrity or political inde-
pendence of a state, and does not extend to actions that are not 
directed to this end but which are necessary.212 The corollary is 
that measures taken in pursuit of specific humanitarian objec-
tives, without having adverse effects on the sovereignty or basic 
interests of the target state, cannot run afoul of the Charter's 
proscription against the use of force. 
Furthermore, it is contended that humanitarian interven-
tion, far from being inconsistent with the purpose of the United 
Nations, promotes a primary purpose of the United Nations, 
namely, the protection of human rights.213 It is postulated, for 
instance, that the Security Council, which is required under arti-
cle 2 of United Nations Resolution 3314214 to take account of 
relevant circumstances and sufficient gravity, would be unlikely 
to regard humanitarian intervention as aggression.210 This is 
particularly true in light of the Charter's purpose "to reaffirm 
faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of 
the human person, in the equal rights of men and women . . . , 
and to establish conditions under which justice and respect for 
the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of inter-
national law can be maintained."218 
The inability or unwillingness of the United Nations to take 
effective measures to rectify cases of human rights violations is 
212. For such a construction of article 2(4), see, e.g., R. LILLICH, Humanitarian In-
tervention: A Reply to Ian Brownlie and a Plan for Constructive Alternatives, in LAW 
AND CIVIL WAR IN THE MODERN WORLD 229, 237 (J. Moore ed. 1974) [hereinafter R. LIL-
LICH, Humanitarian Intervention]; J. STONE, AGGRESSION AND WORLD ORDER, supra note 
134, at 95; Green, Humanitarian Intervention — 1976 Version, 24 CHITTY'S L.J. 217, 222 
(1976); and Green, Rescue at Entebbe — Legal Aspects, 6 ISRAEL Y.B. ON HUM. RTS. 
312, 324 (1976). Green supports his contention by reference to inter-war definitions of 
aggression, all of which had envisaged an attack on, or threat to, a state's independence 
or territorial or political integrity. Green also cites to the Montevideo Convention on the 
Rights and Duties of States clarifying that the convention condemned the attempt of one 
state to impose its will on another. Id. at 219, 317-18. 
213. J. STONE, AGGRESSION AND WORLD ORDER, supra note 134, at 95 96; R. LILLICH, 
Humanitarian Intervention, supra note 212, at 236; W, REISMAN & M. MCDOUGAL, 
supra note 205, at 177. 
214. Definition of Aggression, supra note 107, at art. 2. 
215. Definition of Aggression, supra note 107, at art. 2. 
216. U.N. CHARTER preamble. 
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also emphasized as pertinent to the interpretation of article 2(4). 
As stated by Reisman, "article 2(4) suppresses self-help insofar 
as the organization can assume the role of enforcer. When it can-
not, self-help prerogatives revive."217 
This point may be extended further by arguing that those 
who build the case for humanitarian intervention around article 
2(4) stop short of adequately recognizing the development of 
human rights in recent years. In particular, they do not acknowl-
edge that while humanitarian intervention might have a far-
reaching impact on the political process of the target state, such 
an intervention could nonetheless be considered legitimate, pro-
vided it closely conformed to international norms governing the 
use of force. 
Another approach to the issue reflects the opinions of schol-
ars who are even more reluctant to advocate a right of humani-
tarian intervention grounded solely in human rights law, yet are 
prepared to concede the unworkability of a total ban on the use 
of force in cases of flagrant fundamental human rights viola-
tions. The proponents of this approach assert that "in circum-
stances of extreme gravity, the world community, by its lack of 
adverse reaction, in practice condones conduct which, although a 
formal breach of positive legal norms, appears 'acceptable' be-
cause of higher motives of a moral, political, humanitarian, or 
other nature."218 Thus, they argue that the lack of express con-
demnation in a given case is tantamount to conferring upon a 
humanitarian intervention a sub-legal or quasi-legal characteris-
tic.219 This "moral choice" perspective introduces a strong ele-
ment of uncertainty into the debate, particularly since certain 
217. W. REISMAN, supra note 201, at 850. Reisman cites several examples of interna-
tional practice to substantiate his construction of article 2(4). Id. at 850-51. 
218. Debates of the Charlottesville Conference on Humanitarian Intervention, re-
printed in HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND THE U.N. 3, 64, 107-08, 114 (R. Liliich ed. 
1973) [hereinafter Debates]. See also I. Brownlie, Thoughts on Kind-Hearted Gunman, 
in HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND THE U.N. 139-48 (R. Lillich ed. 1973). Franck and 
Rodley state: 
Undeniably there are circumstances in which the unilateral use of force to 
overthrow injustice begins to seem less wrong than to turn aside. Like civil 
disobedience, however, this sense of superior necessity belongs in the realm not 
of law but of moral choice which nations, like individuals, must sometimes 
make, weighing the costs and to their cause, to the social fabric, and to 
themselves. 
Franck & Rodley, After Bangladesh; The Law of Humanitarian Intervention by Mili-
tary Force, 67 AM. J. INT'L L. 275, 304 (1973). 
219. See Debates, supra note 218, at 61-62, 68-69, 118. 
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conduct may be considered both prohibited and morally justifia 
ble at the same time.220 
A more candid decision-making process is envisaged by 
those who subscribe to the third approach, which explicitly ac-
knowledges the conflicting obligations inherent in situations giv-
ing rise to humanitarian intervention.221 These commentators 
depart from the assumption that human rights provisions im-
pose binding obligations upon states.2" 
The obligatory character of human rights clauses is evi-
denced by the practice of the United Nations and its member 
states.223 Various conventions have also established legal obliga-
tions with respect to human rights.224 These obligations are said 
to possess a special quality. As stated in the holding by the In-
ternational Court of Justice in the Case Concerning the Barce-
lona Traction, Light, and Power Company Limited,226 the prin-
ciples and rules concerning the basic human rights belong to the 
category of obligation erga omnes; they are not simply obliga-
tions of a state arising vis-a-vis another state but are obligations 
of a state toward the international community as a whole.14* 
By the same token members of the United Nations are obli-
gated "to take joint and separate action in cooperation with the 
organization for the achievement of ['universal respect for and 
observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms for 
220. For other criticisms of this approach relating to the opportunities for abuse and 
toleration of impermissible breaches that may endanger the structures of international 
law, see Behuniak, supra note 209, at 182-83. 
221. See Lord, Individual Enforcement of Obligations Arising Under the U-N. 
Charter, 19 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 195, 205 (1979) [hereinafter Lord]. 
222. Lord proposed that this assumption is "no longer a matter of dispute." Lord, 
supra note 221, at 205. 
223. For a brief survey of the subject, see Schwelb, The International Court of Jus-
tice and the Human Rights Clause of the Charter, 66 AM. J. INT'L L. 337, 341 (1972). 
224. See, e.g., International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, 
adopted Dec. 16, 1966, G.A. Res- 2200 (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 44, U.N. 
Doc. A/6316 (1966) (entered into force Jan. 3, 1976) [hereinafter International Covenant 
on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights]; International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, adopted Dec. 16, 1966, G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 
52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966) (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976) [hereinafter International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights]. The preambles to both covenants contain the 
statement, "[considering the obligation of states under the Charter . . . to promote uni-
versal respect for and observance of, human rights and freedoms," International Cove-
nant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, supra, at preamble; International Cove-
nant on Civil and Political Rights, supra, at preamble. 
225. Case Concerning the Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co. Ltd. (Belg. v. 
Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 3. 
226. Id. at 32. 
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all']."*27 Hence, they must take concrete measures against a 
country infringing these rights and freedoms.228 
At the other end of the value spectrum is the obligation to 
preserve the territorial integrity and political independence of 
sovereign states. The intervening state is thus confronted with 
the task of reconciling these conflicting obligations. Ideally, bal-
ancing these duties should be resolved through a "careful con-
textual scrutiny, appraising many features of the particular con-
text"229 including perspectives,230 situations,231 base values,232 
strategies,*33 participants,234 and outcomes.238 
It is postulated that this process of value reconciliation is 
likely to prevent a hasty use of force. Restraint on the use of 
227. U.N, CHARTER arts. 54 & 55. 
228. Id. See McDougal & Reisman, Response, 3 INT'L LAW. 438, 444 (1969). 
229. M. MCDOUGAL, H. LASSWELL & L. CHEN, HUMAN RIGHTS AND WORLD PUBLIC 
ORDER 246 47 (1980) [hereinafter M. MCDOUGAL, H. LASSWELL & L. CHEN]. 
230. On this issue, one must ask: "[a]re both manifest and genuine objectives re-
lated to the preservation of human rights? Is the action being taken to save lives, to 
rescue from arbitrary incarceration or torture? How are the actions of the intervening 
state related to the aggregate interests of all states?" M. MCDOUGAL, H. LASSWELL & L. 
CHEN, supra note 229, at 246-47. 
231. Here, one must scrutinize: "[h]ow intense are expectations of irremedial loss in 
the absence of the immediate use of the military instrument? With regard to what values 
are deprivations threatened and to what degree of intensity and magnitude? Are those 
deprivations systematic and of long duration, or sporadic and occasional?" M. MCDOU-
GAL, H. LASSWELL & L. CHEN, supra note 229, at 246-47. 
232. One must appraise: "[w]hat are the disparities in relative strength of the inter-
vening state and the target state? Do differing degrees in strength suggest duress for 
nonhumanitarian purposes?" M. MCDOUGAL, H. LASSWELL &. L. CHEN, supra note 22B, at 
246-47. 
233. In a careful analysis of "strategies," one must question; "[h]ave the diplomatic, 
ideological and economic instruments been mobilized and employed prior to the use of 
the military instruments? Has recourse to available remedies through organized collec-
tive action been exhausted?" M. MCDOUGAL, H. LASSWELL & L. CHEN, supra note 225, at 
246-47. 
234. In this context, one must determine: 
Is the intervention by or against a recognized government, or by or against 
segments of a community? Is it on behalf of a substantial segment of an op-
pressed population? Is it on behalf of nationals or [nonnationals] of the inter-
vening state? How many states participate in the intervention? Is the general 
community (collectively) represented in the action? 
M. MCDOUGAL, H. LASSWELL & L. CHEN, supra note 229, at 246-47. 
235. Finally, one must look at the "outcomes:" 
With what intensity and destruction has the military instrument been used? 
What values were conserved? Was the use of the military instrument in pro-
portion to the intensity of the threats of deprivation? Did the host state or 
segments of the host state invite military intervention? Has the military inter-
vention terminated as soon as its manifest objectives were accomplished? 
M, MCDOUGAL, H. LASSWELL & L. CHEN, supra note 229, at 246-47. 
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force is greater when the decision-makers are conscious of the 
need to act only after a well-reasoned case is made for a neces-
sary and proportional action to protect fundamental human 
rights. This is distinct from an easier decision to use force based 
on the existence of an alleged right to act forcibly. 
One may of course contend that the kind of analysis envis-
aged belongs to the realm of moral choice. The fact remains, 
however, that international law may compel nations to engage in 
moral choices that entail the balancing of costs and benefits to 
their cause, to the social fabric, and to themselves. The just 
cause requirement — with its proportionality, probability of suc-
cess, and last resort elements — may provide relevant criteria in 
a comprehensive calculus of this type. 
(c) Struggles for Self Determination 
Decolonization and the concern of the United Nations with 
the objective of self-determination is another development that 
may have a significant bearing on the contemporary perception 
of just causes. Thus, the prohibition on the use of force against 
the territorial integrity or political independence of any state 
appears to be seriously challenged by the claim adopted by vari-
ous United Nations organs, and particularly, by countries of the 
nonaligned and Eastern European blocs that under the United 
Nations Charter, national liberation movements in non-self-gov-
erning territories are entitled to employ force against colonial 
and white minority regimes. Further, foreign states are entitled 
to support their armed struggle by all necessary means,216 While 
it is argued that those who struggle for self-determination, na-
tional liberation, and against colonial, alien, or racist domination 
are waging a just war, article 2(4) remains an absolute prohibi-
tion against those who would suppress these liberation efforts. 
Force is therefore exculpated or inculpated depending on 
whether it is perceived as conducive or obstructive to the "just 
cause of self-determination."297 
The common claim put forth in support of the legitimacy of 
wars of national liberation is grounded in the right of self-de-
236. For a discussion of some aspects of the latter part of this claim, see Mushkat, 
Who May Wage War? An Examination of an Old/New Question, 2 AM, U.J. INT'L L, & 
POL'V 97, 107-18, 144-45 (1987) [hereinafter Mushkat, Who May Wage War?}. 
237. See Mushkat, Who May Wage War?, supra note 236. 
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fense under article 51 of the Charter.2*8 The argument is that 
colonial domination and oppression, irrespective of its origins, 
constitutes a clear case of aggression against the people subject 
to it. Alternatively, a continuing armed attack upon the insur-
gent people's political independence vests them with a right to 
self-defense.239 Proponents of such a reading of article 51 have 
relied on an analogous use of this article in the various cumula-
tive declarations of the United Nations General Assembly since 
the 1960 Resolution on the Granting of Independence to Colo-
nial Countries.240 Recent references to an expansive reading of 
article 51 rest on several textual points in the 1974 Definition of 
Aggression, including the provisions of paragraphs 6 and 8 of the 
preamble,*41 and explanatory note (a), which is attached to arti-
cle l242 and article I.2*3 The main objection to a rationale based 
238. U.N. CHARTER art. 51. 
239. See, e.g., Report of the 1966 Special Committee on Principles of International 
Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-Operation Among States, G.A. Res. 2181 
(XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 96, U.N. Doc. A/6230, Till 136-37 (1966). 
240. See 1960 Resolution on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries, 
G.A. Res. 1514, 15 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 4, U.N. Doc. A/4684 (1960) (stating 
that "all armed action . - . against dependent peoples" should cease); see also Declara-
tion on Non-intervention, G.A. Res. 2131, 20 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 14) at 3, U.N. Doc. 
A/6014 (1965) (stipulating that "the use of force to deprive peoples of their national 
identity constitutes a violation of their inalienable rights and of the principle of non-
intervention"); Declaration on Friendly Relations, supra note 159 (affirming the applica-
bility of the principles of self-determination within existing states). It was such a reason-
ing by analogy that characterized the justification offered by India in support of its at-
tack on the Portuguese colony of Goa in 1961. This reasoning, however, was rejected by 
the majority of the Security Council, see 16 U.N. SCOR (988th mtg.) Supp. (Oct-Dec. 
1961) at 205, U.N. Doc. S/5030 (1961), although a resolution that would have deplored 
the Indian use of force against Goa, which called for a cease-fire and withdrawal of 
Indian forces from the territory, failed to be adopted because of a Soviet veto. 
241. The preamble to the 1974 Definition of Aggression states in part; 
Reaffirming the duty of states not to use armed force to deprive peoples of 
their right of self determination, freedom and independence . . . . Reaffirming 
also the provisions of the [Declaration on Friendly Relations] . . . . 
Definition of Aggression, supra note 107, at preamble. See also U.N. CHARTER art. 51. 
242. According to the explanatory note: "In this [definition the term "[s]tate:" (a) 
Is used without prejudice to questions of recognition or to whether a [sjtate is a 
[mjember of the United Nations." U.N. CHARTER art. 1 (explanatory note (a)). 
243. Article 7 states that: 
Nothing in this [definition, and in particular [a]rticle 3, could in any way 
prejudice the right to self-determination, freedom and independence, as de-
rived from the Charter, of peoples forcibly deprived of that right and referred 
to in the [Declaration on Friendly Relations], particularly peoples under colo-
nial and racist regimes or other forms of alien domination; ngr the right of 
these peoples to struggle to that end and to seek and receive support, in accor-
dance with the principles of the Charter and in conformity with the above-
mentioned [declaration. 
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on a broad construction of article 51 is that the article does not 
aPply to entities other than states. Summarizing the legal posi-
tion supporting this view, Dugard has asserted: 
Self-defense is the right of one state acting individually, or the 
right of several states acting collectively, to resort to force as a 
result of an attack on one of them by an aggressor. A sine qua 
non of such a right is an "aggressor state" and a "victim state." 
In the case of self-defense against colonial domination this nec-
essary requirement is absent. It is possible to identify the ag-
gressor state (the colonial power) but it is not possible to iden-
tify the victim state. The victim of colonial or racist aggression 
is not a state, but the nationals of the aggressor state. Lamen-
table as this may be, it does not constitute an unlawful use of 
force in terms of [a]rticle 2(4) of the Charter, which only pro-
hibits the use of force against states. As there is no unlawful 
use of force against another state by the colonial aggressor the 
question of self-defense does not arise,244 
Nor is Dugard's statement affected by note (a) to article 1 of the 
Definition of Aggression; article 1 stipulates that the term 
"state" is used in the definition "without prejudice to the ques-
tion of recognition or to whether a state is a [m] ember of the 
[United Nations]"246 
It is also argued that an interpretation treating people and 
states in a like manner would require the assumption that every 
aspiration to self-determination of a people living under the sov-
ereignty of an existing state be deemed to have matured into a 
separate new state, displacing or breaking away from the old 
state.246 This is an assumption that none of the proponents of a 
theory equating people with states were ready to accept.247 
Elimination of the state-to-state requirements incorporated 
in articles 2(4) and 51 of the Charter is thus seen as legally un-
justified and politically unwise. In his discussion Arangio-Ruiz 
U.N. CHARTER art. 7 (explanatory note). 
244. Dugard, SWAPO The Jus Ad Bellum And The Jus In Bella, 94 S. APK. L.J. 
144, 149 (1976) [hereinafter Dugard]. 
245. This note, as Ferencz observes, is closely related to the provision in paragraph 
two of the Six-Power Draft, indicating that if the territory of a state is delimited by 
international boundaries or internationally agreed lines of demarcation, it could be an 
aggressor or a victim of aggression within the definition, despite nonrecognition of it as a 
state (or of its government) by other states. See Ferencz, Defining Aggression: Where it 
Stands and Where It's Going, 66 AM. J. INT'L L, 491, 498 (1972). 
246. See J. STONE, AGGRESSION AND WORLD ORDER, supra note 134, at 73. 
247. J. STONE, AGGRESSION AND WORLD OBDEK, supra note 134, at 73. 
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points out the pitfalls involved in the "dangerous theory" of the 
"indiscriminate extension of the scope of [a]rticle 51 . . . to any 
'liberation movement.'*48 He cautions: 
[t]o apply [a]rticle 51 to the struggle of the 'liberation move-
ment' before the attainment of that minimum of stability with-
out which statehood is still in question, would mean not only 
to throw overboard any doctrine condemning premature recog-
nition but also to stretch the meaning of [a]rticle 51 beyond 
any reasonable wide interpretation and open the way — inso-
far as the law of nations is concerned — to a dangerous 
instability.249 
Supporters of the legitimacy of wars of national liberation 
based on the right to self-defense appear to want contradictory 
outcomes. On the one hand, they seek to avoid labeling groups 
employing force in their struggle for self-determination as ag-
gressors. Thus, they insist that "state" should not be interpreted 
as including such groups. On the other hand, with respect to the 
victims of aggression, they are adamant that "state" should be 
read as encompassing peoples engaged in wars of national 
liberation.250 
An alternative claim suggests that the use of force by na-
tional liberation movements is beyond the purview of article 2(4) 
since it does not constitute an armed attack upon the territory 
of any state. Proponents of this argument assert that colonial 
governments are illegally present in the territories in which na-
tional liberation movements operate.**1 Clearly, the Charter is 
not specifically concerned with the issue of how effective juris-
diction over territory was established. Rather, the Charter's ref-
erence to territorial integrity, as Wright observed, is confined to 
"de facto presence not de jure title."862 
248. Arangio-Ruiz, The Normatiue Role of the General Assembly of the U.N. and 
the Declaration of Principles of Friendly Relations, 137 HAGUE RECUEIL 569 (1972-73) 
[hereinafter Arangio-Ruiz]. 
249. Arangio-Ruiz, supra note 248, at 569, To the same effect, aee also Remarks of 
the Argentinean Representative in the Special Committee on Friendly Relations, U.N. 
Doc. A/AC.125/SR. 70, 17 (1967). 
250. See Stone, Hopes and Loopholes in the 1974 Definition of Aggression, 71 AM. 
J. INT'L L, 224, 231 (1977) [hereinafter Stone, Hopes and Loopholes]. 
251. See, e.g., Blischenko & Solutsvena, The Struggle Against Portuguese Colonial-
ism in the Light of International Law, 17 INT'L AFP. 60 (Moscow 1977), See also Czecho-
slouakian Draft Proposal to the Special Committee on Friendly Relations, U.N. Doc. A/ 
AC.125/L.16, Part VI (1966). 
252. Wright, The Goa Incident, 56 AM. J. INT'L L. 617, 623 (1962) [hereinafter 
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Contrastingly, Ronzitti argues that reliance on article 51 is 
totally superfluous since the use of force by liberation move-
ments is legal in all circumstances. Thus, Ronzitti asserts there 
is no need to justify the use of force by reference to self-de-
fense.253 He argues instead that the recourse to arms by peoples 
under colonial or alien domination is lawful by an ad hoc rule 
that developed through custom as a result of a process initiated 
by the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial 
Peoples and culminated in the adoption by the United Nations 
General Assembly (General Assembly) of the Declaration on 
Friendly Relations.aM Another theorist assumes that "it is sim-
ply not possible to derive the right to use and support armed 
force against colonial administration from the Charter as it was 
originally conceived" and proceeds to infer such a right from the 
"flexible process of supplementary and de facto amending of the 
Charter" through the "law-creating activity of the [United Na-
tions] General Assembly,"ZB5 Specifically, this theorist argues 
that "the series of resolutions on decolonization has contributed 
to new state practice and this, in turn, has contributed to the 
coercive effect of the resolutions [that] have to all intents and 
purposes developed into rules of customary international 
law."266 
While the fine details of the ongoing debate on the law-cre-
ating powers of the Generally Assembly need not be of concern 
in this instance, it is nonetheless worth examining the nature 
and extent of the evidence adduced to substantiate the norm 
claimed above in order to establish postulates and priorities of 
the existence of a global consensus for overturning the original 
Charter, First, the major pronouncements by the General As-
sembly and those that have enjoyed the widest measure of sup-
port in the United Nations, do not mirror the position adhered 
to by Third World states with respect to the relationship be-
tween the use of force and the right to self-determination. Thus, 
Wright], 
253. See N. RONZITTI, Resort to Force in Wars of National Liberation, in CURRENT 
PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 318, 350-53 (A. Cassesse ed. 1975} [hereinafter N. 
RONZITTI]. 
254. N. RONZITTI, supra note 253, at 350-53. The Declaration on Friendly Relations 
imposes on every state "the duty to refrain from any forcible action which deprives peo-
ples of the right to self-determination, freedom, and independence." Declaration on 
Friendly Relations, supra note 159, at 11 1, 
255. W. VERWEY, supra note 136, at 121, 131, 136. 
256. W. VERWEY, supra note 136, at 136. 
270 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. [Vol. XV:2 
United Nations Resolution 1514 (Resolution 1514)2*7 did not en-
dorse the use of force by states in pursuit of self-determination 
objectives. The Declaration on Friendly Relations, which con-
tains no reference to Resolution 1514, left much ambiguity in its 
stipulation that "such peoples are entitled to seek and to receive 
support in accordance with the purposes and principles of the 
Charter."258 This uncertainty is further compounded by article 7 
of the Definition of Aggression, which confirms the "right of 
peoples to struggle . . . and to seek and receive support in accor-
dance with the principles of the Charter."259 
Another major consideration in determining the existence of 
a new rule of international law is that the colonial powers, and a 
number of states supporting them, have not accepted the basic 
proposition that all forms of colonialism are illegitimate. Nor 
have they recognized that people under colonial rule are entitled 
to exercise their right of self-determination with independence 
as the predominant goal. The debates surrounding the prepara-
tion and adoption of the Definition of Aggression serve to fur-
ther highlight the division of opinion among states on this sub-
ject. Specifically, intense conflicts pervaded the preconsensual 
stage concerning proposals to reserve a people's right to employ 
force and to receive assistance from third states in pursuit of 
self-determination objectives.260 Nor did the conflicts subside 
257. Declaration of Colonial Independence, G.A. Res. 1514 (XV), 1 U.N. GAOR 
Supp. (No. 16), U.N. Doc. A/4684 (1960). Nine states including the United States, Great 
Britain, France, Portugal, and Australia abstained even in the vote that brought unani-
mous adoption of the centrally important Resolution 1514 (XV) of 1960. Negative votes 
and abstentions were also registered with respect to General Assembly Resolution 2105, 
G.A. Res. 2105, 20 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 14) at 3, U.N. Doc. A/6014 (1965), and to 
General Assembly Resolution 2189, G.A. Res. 2189, 21 U.N, GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 5, 
U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), which introduced the denunciation of colonial rule and 
apartheid as a threat to the peace and a crime against humanity. In addition, in explain-
ing their affirmative votes on some occasions, certain states took great pains to empha-
size that they considered the provisions of the resolutions nothing more than statements 
of political will by the General Assembly devoid of any legal force. With regard to Gen-
eral Assembly Resolution 2160 (XXI), see, e.g., the explanations by the United States 
and France of their affirmative votes, 21 U.N, GAOR (1482d plen. mtg.) at 194-96 (Nov. 
1966), and of Japan in U.N. Doc. A/AC.125/SR.69, at 16 (1967). 
258. Declaration on Friendly Relations, supra note 159. See also W. VEBWEV, supra 
note 136, at 123. 
259. Definition of Aggression, supra note 107, at art. 7. 
260. Objections to these proposals were expressed by many states including the So-
viet bloc states, which were keen to reject anything in the definition that might affect a 
state's right to take "police action" against dissident movements. See Report of the Spe-
cial Committee on the Question of Defining Aggression, 28 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 19) 
at 19, U.N. Doc. A/9019 (1973). The ensuing conflicts prompted the drafting committee 
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following the drafting of article 7 of the Definition of Aggression, 
which contained, as noted earlier, a vague reference to the "right 
. . . to struggle."2*1 Indeed, the preconsensual confrontation be-
came an acute conflict of interpretation between states which in-
sisted that the "struggle" deemed as lawful under article 7 of the 
definition encompassed armed struggle and others that denied 
this.292 
State practice and the practice of the political organs of the 
United Nations offer little assistance in removing the uncer-
tainty. Status of Goa,™3 for instance, is often considered as a 
turning point in the United Nations approach to the use of force 
in colonial situations. Goa, however, has merely established that 
any action by the Security Council favorable to the colonial 
power would be vetoed by the Soviet Union, while the colonial 
power itself could not count on the General Assembly's support 
because of the anticolonial majority present in that body. At 
most, Goa suggests that a state resorting to arms in such circum-
stances could expect a passive attitude on the part of the United 
Nations, 
In view of the considerable doubt and opposition, which ap-
pear to prevail in relation to the use of force in pursuit of self-
determination objectives, the existence of a rule of customary in-
ternational law can hardly be accepted uncritically.264 Although 
it is clear that the general climate of opinion has turned sharply 
against colonialism, the use of force in national liberation strug-
gles has by no means obtained the status of opinio juris and the 
sense of legal obligation required for the establishment of a new 
rule of international law.aas 
There are even greater barriers to a recognition of the valid-
ity of claims to employ force in pursuit of self-determination 
to report that "there [is] no general agreement as to the text to be adopted." Id, 
261. Definition of Aggression, supra note 107, at art. 7. 
262. See Stone, Hopes and Loopholes, supra note 250, at 234. 
263. The case concerned the 1961 Indian attack, occupation, and annexation of Goa, 
formerly under Portuguese control. See Status of Goa, 16 U.N. SCOR (987th mtg. 10-11) 
(988th mtg. 7-8) (1961). See also Wright, supra note 252, at 617. 
264. On the importance of the presence of an international consensus to the legality 
of a contested claim to employ force in international society, see, e.g., Falk, On the 
Quasi-Legislative Competence of the General Assembly, 60 AM. J. INT'L L. 782 (1966). 
265. This is not to deny that the United Nations General Assembly can employ its 
resolutions effectively in political battles and that it can always bring the weight of its 
majority to bear against specific target states and on behalf of specific favored "selves" 
and "liberation movements." See M. POMERANCE, SELF DETERMINATION IN LAW AND 
PRACTICE: THE NEW DOCTRINE m THE UN 61 (1982) [hereinafter M. POMERANCE], 
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goals, the most critical of which are the difficulties involved in 
defining the "self" entitled to self-determination or the holder of 
the right to self-determination.266 Does self-determination apply, 
for instance, only to people located within a colonial territory or 
does it also extend to ethnic or religious groups seeking to secede 
from an established country? Neither the Definition of Aggres-
sion nor the Declaration on Friendly Relations provides any ob-
jective guidance in this respect.267 States thus remain free to 
claim for themselves and their favored selves absolute legitimacy 
and exemption from the restriction on the use of force, as well as 
to deny all rights to competing "selves."**8 
266. On the scope of this issue, see the instructive discussion in Emerson, Self De-
termination, 65 AM. J. INT'L L. 459 (1971), and in M. POMERANCE, supra note 265, at 14-
23. 
267. See generally Definition of Aggression, supra note 107; Declaration on 
Friendly Relations, supra note 159. 
268. Bowett, who concludes that "as a basis for intervention, support for self-deter-
mination is unacceptable so long as the decision that self-determination is denied re-
mains subjective to the would be intervener," draws attention, for example, to the dis-
paraging claims of denial of self-determination made by: the Western states with respect 
to the Soviet occupation of the Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania; those of 
North Vietnam vis-a-vis Saigon and the United States; and similar claims by the 
Somalia Republic concerning the Ethiopian occupation of land and the Ogaden as well as 
the Kenyan occupation of the former Northern Frontier District of Kenya. See D. 
Bowett, The Interrelation of Theories of Intervention of Self-defense, in LAW AND CIVIL 
WAR IN THE MODERN WORLD 38, 43-44 (J. Moore ed. 1974). In a similar vein, Stone raises 
the spectre of such claims being advanced by: 
[T]he Welsh and the Scots in the [United Kingdom], the Indians and blacks of 
the [United States], the aborigines of Australia, the Chinese in Malaya, the 
French in Canada, the Walloons in Belgium, the Bretons in France, Basques 
and Castillians in Spain, the Kurds in Iraq and Iran and many other identified 
peoples in Europe, Asia and the Americas. 
See J. STONE, ISRAEL AND PALESTINE: ASSAULT ON THE LAW OF NATIONS 93-04 (1981) 
[hereinafter J. STONE, ISRAEL AND PALESTINE], 
In fact, there are hardly any states that do not contain groups that could be de-
scribed as "peoples" claiming the right to self-determination. As noted by Stone, id. at 
94, the qualifying phrase in article 7 of Resolution 3314, "peoples under colonial and 
racist regimes or other forms of alien domination" which is itself subject to diverse inter-
pretations, (see Gros Espiel, Special Rapporteur, Implementation of the UN Resolu-
tions Relating to the Rights of Peoples Under Colonial and Alien Domination to Self 
Determination, Study for the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and 
Protection of Minorities of the Commission on Human Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/ 
390, at 38 (1977)), has not dispelled the doubts. Nor has the issue been settled by the 
Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, the Helsinki Decla-
ration, 14 I.L.M. 1292 (1975). Indeed, the range of views procured by the Special Rap-
porteur of the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Mi-
norities attests to the prevailing ambiguity. See H. GROS BSPIEL, The Right to Self 
Determination, in IMPLEMENTATION OF UN RESOLUTIONS, NEW YORK, UNITED NATIONS 6-
7 (1980). Thus, for instance, while Mexico emphasized the "occupation through the use 
of armed force in contravention of the Charter.or in which neo-cokmialism has prevented 
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An additional complication arises when one considers that 
self-determination claims do not generally conflict with non-self-
determination claims but with competing claims of different 
selves to self-determination with respect to the same territory. 
On what objective basis are the claims of these rival "selves" 
then to be weighed?2*9 Notably, article 7 of the Definition of Ag-
gression is directed solely to people oppressed by states and 
overlooks struggles of people against people.270 This problem is 
not accorded sufficient attention in the various reports on the 
implementation of the right to self-determination.271 The diffi-
culties are further compounded "where the competing claims 
and accompanying military activities punctuated by actual wars, 
armistices and ceasefire agreements, have been made over long 
historical periods."272 This is particularly true "when in the 
course of such a long time span later developing nationalism 
arises, like the Palestinian that claims to override retrospectively 
the sovereign statehood already attained by the competing 
people."273 
the people or country concerned from following a course of its own," id., Afghanistan 
focused on "all forms of domination, both direct and indirect, regarded or declared 
alien" by peoples of any area and that constitutes an impediment or a suppressive factor 
in the realization of their fundamental freedoms and human rights as enshrined in the 
Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Id. According to the view of 
the German Democratic Republic, the beneficiaries of the right to self-determination are 
"nations and peoples that are prevented by a foreign imperialist power employing politi-
cal, economic, or military coercion from exercising their right to self-determination, or 
where the right to self-determination is impaired otherwise . . . in particular peoples or 
larger groups of peoples whose territory has been illegally occupied or annexed by an 
aggressor," Id. Iraq, on the other hand, chose to highlight the "foreign elements which 
leads to economic exploitation," id., whereas the Philippine government limited the right 
of self-determination to "peoples residing in territories or areas who have not attained 
sovereign status and who are within the jurisdiction of the [United Nations) trusteeship 
system as enumerated in [a]rticle 77 of the Charter, as well as the non-self-governing 
people within the purview of [a]rticle 73 of the Charter." Id. Another limitation was 
stressed by the representative of Pakistan who excluded peoples seeking secession "un-
less the association in question had been accomplished illegally against the wishes of the 
peoples concerned." Id. The Special Rapporteur added his own version of the latter as-
pect by specifying that if the national unity claimed and the territorial integrity invoked 
are merely legal fictions that cloak real colonial and alien domination resulting from ac-
tual disregard of the principle of self determination, the subject people or peoples are 
entitled to exercise, with all the consequences thereof, their right to self-determination. 
Id. at 14, If 90. 
269. See generally J. STONE, ISRAEL AND PALESTINE, supra note 268, at 94-96. 
270. Definition of Aggression, supra note 107, at art. 7. 
271. See Stone, Hopes and Loopholes, supra note 250, at 236. 
272. Stone, Hopes and Loopholes, supra note 250, at 236. 
273. Stone, Hopes and Loopholes, supra note 250, at 236. The time limit on the act 
of forcible deprivation that gives rise to the right to engage in a struggle in pursuit of 
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Finally, a rational process of balancing conflicting values 
similar to the one suggested in relation to humanitarian inter-
vention cannot be used to assess the use of force by national 
liberation groups. This is because the essential characteristic of 
revolutionary wars is that the ends justify the means deemed 
instrumental to realize those ends. It is evident that a require-
ment of proportion does not feature either in the jus ad bellum 
or jus in bello of contemporary revolutionary movements. It is 
thus hardly practical to refer to a "temporary" violation of terri-
torial integrity and political independence or to a short term use 
of armed force on a small scale or the restoration of infringed 
values upon completion of the operation.274 
(d) Recovery Of That Which Was Unjustly Taken 
Another controversial just cause, which received attention 
in contemporary contexts, is one that is analogous to the classi-
cal repossession of what was unjustly taken. Three main argu-
ments have been made in support of the claim that recourse to 
arms is justifiable if directed toward recovering territories wres-
tled by force. 
One argument is that article 51 applies if unlawful occupa-
tion of territory is regarded as a "prolonged armed attack," jus-
tifying action in self-defense.278 It appears, however, that such a 
broad interpretation of article 51 cannot be sustained. After all, 
the rationale of a defensive action under article 51 lies in its pre-
vention of an actual or anticipated peril. An action against an 
alleged attacker, after the attack has taken place and formally 
ended by means of intervention by an international body, cease 
self-determination objectives has not been addressed earnestly in any international docu-
ment concerning self-determination. Stone legitimately queries, "[djoes it embrace all 
such deprivations that have occurred, at however remote time, in the establishment of a 
state now existing?," or "does a peaceable settlement in a territory, decadeB or even 
centuries ago, become forcible deprivation of self determination of the original inhabi-
tants when the latter, at a later time, cotne to a group consciousness that regards the 
presence of the long-settled community as an oppression or even demands exclusive re-
possession of the whole territory for itself?" J. STONE, ISRAEL AND PALESTINE, supra note 
268, at 96-97. 
It seems that the scope of potential claims could be vast and most probably incom-
patible with the development of "friendly relations amongst nations based on respect for 
the principle of equal rights and self-determination of people and the taking of other 
appropriate measures of universal peace." U.N. CMAETER art. 1, para. 2. 
274. Stone, Hopes and Loopholes, supra note 250, at 233-34. 
275. See, e.g., Shihata, Destination Embargo of Arab Oil: Its Legality Under Inter' 
national Law, 68 AM. J. INT'L L. 591, 607-08 (1974) [hereinafter Shihata], 
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fire, or an armistice agreement, would clearly not repulse the at-
tack. As a corollary, no legitimate claim of self-defense interven-
tion can be made since the aggressor has already ceased hostili-
ties.27* Indeed, a forcible action of this type would itself 
constitute an armed attack that might warrant recourse to law-
ful measures of self-defense.277 
Another argument for justifying the recovery of territory by 
force is based on territorial integrity. It has been claimed that 
the right to employ arms to regain occupied territories is an es-
sential aspect of a state's right to territorial integrity. "Without 
such a right," it is asserted by Shihata that "state jurisdiction, 
let alone sovereignty would be nothing but a sham."278 This ar-
gument, however, does not appear to be supported by the Char-
ter's provisions, which authorize the unilateral use of force only 
in cases of individual and collective self-defense or in circum-
stances that do not constitute a breach of article 2(4).Z79 The 
implication of the Charter is that a forcible action to occupy ter-
ritory in de facto possession of another state would result in in-
fringement of the territorial integrity of the latter even if the 
attackers had reason to believe that they had a legal title to that 
territory. "If this were not true . . . attacks would be permissi-
ble in every boundary dispute and the barriers by which the 
Charter seeks to protect territorial integrity would be broken 
down."280 
Although the subject is generally accorded little attention in 
literature, other views have occasionally been expressed. Jen-
nings, for instance, contends that a state, which has legal title to 
territory actually in the possession of another state, is entitled to 
use force in order to recover its possession since this does not 
constitute an employment of force contrary to the provisions of 
article 2(4) of the Charter.481 According to Jennings, "[i]t cannot 
276. In this connection, see S.C, Res. S/2322 (Sept- 1, 1951), which states that given 
the existence of an "armistice regime," "neither party can reasonably assert that it is 
actively a belligerent or requires to exercise the right of visit, search and seizure for any 
legitimate purpose of [self-defense]." Id. 
277. See K, SKVBISZEWSKI, Use of Force by States- Collective Security: Law of War 
and Neutrality, in MANUAL OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 739, 808 (M. Sorensen ed. 
1968). 
278. Shihata, supra note 275, at 608. 
279. U.N. CHARTER art. 51. 
280. Wright, supra note 252, at 623. 
281. R. JENNINGS, THE ACQUISITION OF TERRITORY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 72 (1963) 
[hereinafter R. JENNINGS], 
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be force used against territorial integrity or political indepen-
dence of another state because the actor state is merely occupy-
ing its own territory. The matter is one within its domestic 
jurisdiction."282 
Evidently, Jenning's conclusion would be rejected by expo-
nents of the "restrictionist view" who interpret article 2(4) 
stricto jure as a categorical interdiction from which there is no 
possibility of derogation.283 Jenning's conclusion also appears to 
conflict with paragraph 5 of the Principle of Non-Use in the 
Declaration on Friendly Relations, which stipulates that: 
"[E]very state . . . has the duty to refrain from the threat or use 
of force to violate international lines of demarcation such as ar-
mistice lines, established by and pursuant to an international 
agreement to which it is a party or which it is otherwise bound 
to respect."28'1 Thus, the prohibition on the use of force is ex 
tended to violations of territorial frontiers regardless of whether 
they are internationally fixed boundaries or demarcated follow-
ing an armed confrontation. In these circumstances the use of 
force "cannot be justified by a claim that the territory beyond 
belongs to the sovereignty of the acting state."285 
Moreover, this third argument, which is based on an inde-
pendent right of "liberation" of occupied territories, is not sup-
ported by contemporary international law and practice despite 
its popularity with certain states.286 This is because the utiliza-
tion of the Declaration on Friendly Relations, by advocates of 
such a right, is misplaced. The stipulation in the preamble that 
282. R. JENNINGS, supra note 281, at 72. 
283. See, e.g., Arangio-Ruiz, supra note 248, at 431, 534. Arangio-Ruiz stated that: 
The prohibition contained in [ajrticle 2(4) is a general one . . . . Any . . . use 
of force is condemned as illegal wherever it took place and whatever the nature 
of the dispute or conflict of interest with regard to which the test of force (or 
threat of force) was applied. The dispute may be legal or political, territorial or 
economic, financial or ideological. 
Id. See also De Arechaga, International Law in the Past Third of a Century, 159 HAGUE 
RECUEIL 1, 91 (1978) (hereinafter De Arechaga) (". . . any use of force, except in self-
defense, is inconsistent with the basic purposes of the Charter and thus forbidden by 
[a]rticle 2(4)"). 
284. Declaration on Friendly Relations, supra note 159, at para. 5 (Principle of 
Non-Use). 
285. De Arechaga, supra note 283, at 319 n.167. 
286. In this connection, see statements made in the United States Security Council 
following the Yom Kippur War by Yugoslavia, the Syrian Arab Republic, Sudan, Guinea, 
the Soviet Union, and China, in UN MONTHLY CHBON. 8, 9, 14, 17, 20, 31 (Nov. 1973). 
For similar statements in the General Assembly debates by United Arab Emirates, Ku-
wait, and Pakistan, see id at 93, 130, 146. 
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"the territory of a state shall not be the object of military occu-
pation resulting from the use of force in contravention of the 
provisions of the Charter"287 merely restates the principle of ex 
injuria non oritur ius299 as applied to unauthorized use of force. 
No reference is made to permissibility of military countermea-
sures to recover territory illegally occupied, even though a re-
fusal to withdraw from such territory may provoke the enforce-
ment measures provided in chapter VII of the Charter. 
Furthermore, a clear distinction is drawn in the Declaration on 
Friendly Relations between "occupation of territory" and "ac-
quisition of territory," the former being forbidden only if carried 
out illegally or, as stipulated in the tenth paragraph of the pre-
amble, "in contravention of the Charter."28* A similar distinction 
may be found in the Definition of Aggression, which strictly lim-
its the invalidity of acquisition of territory to "acquisition by ag-
gression by and in contravention of the Charter," and thus ex-
cludes acts of self-defense.290 It is also interesting to note that, 
as suggested by Feinberg, the Soviet doctrine of international 
law postulates that a state, which has been attacked and won a 
war waged in self-defense, has the right to demand part of the 
territory of the aggressor in order to secure itself against the re-
newal of aggression.281 
Support for a contended right to the possession of occupied 
territories is found in the preamble of General Assembly Resolu-
tion 2396 (XXVIII) on the Non-Use of Force in International 
Relations and Permanent Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear 
Weapons (Preamble). The Preamble refers to "the inadmissibil-
ity of acquisition of territory by force and the inherent right of 
states to recover such territories by all means at their dispo-
sal."292 This presumably includes military measures. 
287. U.N. CHARTER preamble. 
288. This phrase implies that injury alone does not provide a cognizable legal right 
of compensation. 
289. For example, see statements by the Syrian Republic, in U.N. Doc. A/7326, at 48 
(1968), 
290. Indeed, according to Higgins, "[tjhere is nothing in either the [CJharter or gen-
eral international law [that] leads one to suppose that military occupation pending a 
peace treaty is illegal. . . . " See Higgins, The Place of international Law in the Settle-
ment of Disputes by the Security Council, 64 AM. J. INT'L L. 8 (1970). 
291. See Feinberg, The Legality of the Use of Force to Recover Occupied Territory, 
15 ISR. L. REV. 160, 17S n.61 (1980). 
292. General Assembly Resolution 2396 (XXVIII) on the Non-Use of Force in Inter 
national Relations and Permanent Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons, G.A. Res. 
2396 (XXVIII), 27 U.N, GAOR (2093rd plen. mtg.) Supp. (No. 30), U.N. Doc. A/8730, at 
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Without subjecting the legal status of the resolution to close 
scrutiny, however, it is legitimate to conclude that its political 
significance should not be overestimated.293 The above proposi-
tion is an exception rather than the rule in the context of Gen-
eral Assembly pronouncements and later resolutions on the 
same subject, that include the phrase "in accordance with the 
Charter."294 It is in any event a dubious practice to base a cus-
tomary legal right on a single resolution of the General Assem-
bly. Moreover, there are solid grounds for inferring that the use 
of force to recover occupied territory has not been recognized as 
a just cause in modern international law. 
Finally, attempts to justify recourse to arms on breach of an 
international agreement that permits a counter use of force by 
the aggrieved state are also unlikely to find support. Even under 
a broad construction of article 51, the concept of the sovereign 
right of self-defense enshrined therein cannot be extended to 
such forms of international behavior.8*5 
5 (1972). 
£93. Note should be taken that none of the permanent members of the Security 
Council (with the exception of the Soviet Union) nor the European states (except for 
Finland) voted in favor of the resolution. Furthermore, the supporters of the resolution 
explained their subjective position by reference to the specific need to guarantee the 
right of Arabs to use force in order to recover the territories occupied in June 1967. 
294. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 3236 (XXIX) that recognized the "right of Palestinian peo-
ple to regain its rights by all means in accordance with the purposes and principles of 
the Charter of the [United Nations]" and appealed "to all states and international orga-
nizations to extend their support to the Palestinian people in its struggle to restore its 
rights in accordance with the Charter." G.A, Res. 3236 (XXIX), 29 U.N, GAOR (2296th 
plen. mtg.) (1974) (emphasis added). 
295. In this connection, see D, BOWETT, supra note 1S7, at 189; A. MCNAIR, THE 
LAW OF TREATIES 577 n.l (1961). The perceived limits on the sovereign right of self-
defense were duly reflected in the response of the international community to the Suez 
Crisis and the Korean War. In the former case, Britain and France justified their limited 
attack on Egypt by claiming, inter alia, that the Egyptian nationalization of the Suez 
Canal violated its international obligations. In the fatter case, the invasion was justified 
on the grounds that Korea had not yet been unified by political means although the 
Korean people had been assured independence and reunification at Cairo and Potsdam 
and in the succession of General Assembly resolutions thereafter. One exception appears 
to be allowed in cases involving the violation of an important arms control or disarma-
ment treaty. As suggested by the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission in its first 
report issued in 1946, if the members concluded an atomic arms control treaty, "a viola-
tion might be of grave character as to give rise to the inherent right of self-defense recog-
nized in [a]rticle 51." U.N, Doc, AEC/18/Rev,l, at 24 (1946), Conclusions and recommen-
dations of the report were overwhelmingly endorsed by the General Assembly. See G.A. 
Res. 191 (III), 3 U.N. GAOR (157th plen. mtg.) (1948). 
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(e) Concluding Observations on Contemporary Just Causes 
What emerges from the survey of causes deemed by the in-
ternational community as justifying the use of force reaffirms 
the earlier observation that just causes tend to reflect historical 
circumstances and prevailing values.29* At present both the em-
phasis placed on the quality of the social system and the inter-
nationalization of domestic concerns have found expression in 
the causes considered by actors in the international arena as 
permitting recourse to arms. It may be said that legitimate just 
causes in the contemporary context are basically defensive, often 
at the cost of producing inconsistencies that arise from deter-
mined attempts to force politically inspired positions into gener-
ally acceptable categories of legal principles. 
2. Proportionality 
a. Meaning 
As indicated in the analytical history summary in the begin-
ning of this Article,S97 meeting the criterion of just cause is not 
merely a matter of seeking an end that is unmistakably just. 
Other requirements must be complied with as well, including 
proportionality. Proportionality is a concept that has different 
meanings in different contexts. In the context of the initial re-
sort to force, proportionality pertains to the magnitude of the 
cause or the use of extreme means of war only for the protection 
of important values. Proportionality also requires that the use of 
force in self-defense does not threaten destruction of values dis-
proportionate to the values initially threatened.298 Proportional-
ity acquires a different meaning in the context of the conduct of 
hostilities, where it is postulated that only minimum force nec-
essary for the effective defense of values threatened is 
permitted.299 
b. Applicability to Self-Defense Under the Charter 
Before analyzing the values accepted under international 
law as sufficiently important to justify recourse to arms, the 
question of whether the requirement of proportional grave cause 
296. See Mushkat, Is War Ever Justifiable?, supra note I, at 227-35. 
297. See supra notes 4-90 and accompanying text. 
298. Kunz, Sanctions in International Law, supra note 160, at 333. 
299. Kunz, Sanctions in International Law, supra note 160, at 333. 
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applies to or affects just wars of self-defense shall be ad-
dressed.300 Kunz believes that "necessity or proportionality [is 
no condition] for the exercise of self-defense under [a]rticle 
51. "301 To Kunz an " 'armed attack' means . . , any illegal 
armed attack."502 A different opinion is expressed by Higgins 
who suggests that "[a]rticle 51 has in no way impaired the tradi-
tional requirement of proportionality and reasonableness in the 
exercise of the right of self-defense."303 He stressed that "this is 
clearly shown by [United Nations] practice."304 Similarly, 
Schwarzenberger concludes that self-defense is limited "to ac-
tion in protection of vital, or at least important rights or inter-
ests and precludes such action in cases of merely formal or triv-
ial breaches of international law."30* In the less severe cases 
"proper reciprocities, retaliations, and remedies other than high 
level coercion are called for."30* By implication this recognizes 
the pronouncement in article 2 of the Definition of Aggression 
that a use of force must be of sufficient gravity to constitute an 
act of aggression.307 A claim of self-defense to justify a war in 
support of secondary interests or against threats that may be 
contained effectively without the use of force is, therefore, 
unacceptable. 
c. Proportionality in the Sense of Consistency with: 
i. International Values 
To assess compliance with the proportionality requirement, 
it must be determined whether the goals pursued through mili-
tary means are consistent with the fundamental values of the 
international community. In order to establish such consonance, 
Farer suggests: the study of sources such as treaties; the practice 
of states, including tacit agreements; the prevalence of certain 
norms in domestic law; the writings of scholars and propagan-
300. As noted in the analytical historical summary, medieval theorists drew a dis-
tinction in this respect between defensive wars and resorts to force in which one took the 
initiative. See supra notes 4-25 and accompanying text. 
301. Kunz, Sanctions in International Law, supra note ISO, at 872, 878. 
302. Kunz, Sanctions in International Law, supra note 160, at 872, 878. 
303. Kunz, Sanctions in International Law, supra note 160, at 872, 878. 
304. Higgins, The Legal Limits to the Use of Force by Sovereign States: UN Prac-
tice, 37 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 269, 303 (1961) [hereinafter Higgins]. 
305. Schwarzenberger, supra note 128, at 195, 333 (emphasis added). 
306. McDougal & Feliciano, supra note 110, at 1139. 
307. Definition of Aggression, supra note 107, at art. 2. 
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dists; public declarations of foreign policy decision-makers; arti-
cles in the press and popular journals; and resolutions of the va-
rious organs of the United Nations.308 From the above sources 
Farer concludes that the values of self-determination, mainte-
nance of basic human rights, minimum public order, and the 
promotion of modernization are the priorities of the contempo-
rary international community.309 The same values have also been 
identified as typical of those enshrined in the Charter.310 
More traditional values are emphasized by McDougal and 
Feliciano. These theorists characterize proportionate coercion as 
a response to a threat or attack on rights, interests, or values, 
the loss or destruction of which "will substantially impair the 
functioning of the territorially organized community or preclude 
its continued existence as a distinct polity."311 McDougal and 
Feliciano argue that territorial integrity and political indepen-
dence constitute the "main bases of community power" and that 
any threat to those indispensable values would therefore warrant 
a "high-level coercion."312 Walzer takes this theory a step fur-
ther by asserting that territorial integrity and political indepen-
dence are indefeasible rights of all political communities that are 
derived from the fundamental rights possessed by the citizens of 
those communities. Thus, any act of a country that violates the 
territorial integrity and political independence of another coun-
try, justifies the full measure of forceful resistance. Put another 
way, a state that responds to a violation of these fundamental 
rights is embarking on a "just war."313 
The high value placed on the inviolability of interests or 
rights directly connected with its territorial and political secur-
ity by the international community finds ample expression in 
contemporary international law.314 This accords with the general 
308. Farer, Harnessing Rough Elephants: A Short Discourse on Foreign Interven-
tion m Civil Strife, 82 HARV, L. REV. 511, 513 (1969) [hereinafter Farer]. 
309. Farer, supra note 308, at 513. 
310. For a detailed discussion of these values, see Moore, The Control of Foreign 
Intervention in Internal Conflict, 9 VA. J. INT'L L. 205 (1969) [hereinafter Moore]. 
311. McDougal & Feliciano, supra note 110, at 1140. 
312. McDougal & Feliciano, supra note 110, at 1140. 
313. M. WALZES, JUST AND UNJUST WARS: A MORAL ARGUMENT WITH HISTORICAL IL-
LUSTRATIONS 53-55 (1977) [hereinafter M. WALZBR]. 
314. Article 1 of the Definition of Aggression states: "Aggression is the use of armed 
force by a state against the sovereignty, territorial integrity, or political independence of 
another [s]tate , , , , " Definition of Aggression, supra note 107, at art. 1. 
Article 3 lists the following as illustrations of aggressive acts: 
(a) The invasion or attack by the armed forces of a [s]tate of the territory of 
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assumption that "the state is an absolute institutional value and 
that its security is the one immutable imperative for state ac-
tion."315 The rights of territorial integrity and political indepen-
dence are, however, not absolute and may have to give way when 
the use of force is required to rescue people threatened with 
massacre or other acts by their own government that "shock the 
moral conscience of mankind."31* 
Indeed, as noted earlier, the Charter, numerous United Na-
tions resolutions, and many international agreements have con-
sistently elevated the value of human rights in the hierarchy of 
international values.317 A careful balancing process is arguably 
called for when the protection of human rights comes into con-
flict with the important values of territorial integrity and politi-
cal independence. A situation may consequently be envisioned in 
which a military action for the preservation of fundamental 
another [sjtate, or any military occupation, however temporary, resulting from 
such invasion or attack, or any annexation by the use of force of the territory 
of another [sjtate or part thereof; 
(b) Bombardment by the armed forces of a [sjtate against the territory of an-
other [s]tate . . . ; 
(c) The blockade of the ports or coasts of a [sjtate by the armed forces of 
another [sjtate; 
(e) The use of armed forces of one [sjtate which are within the territory of 
another [sjtate with the agreement of the receiving [sjtate, in contravention of 
the conditions provided for in the agreement or any extension of their presence 
in such territory beyond the termination of the agreement; 
(f) The action of a [s]tate in allowing its territory, which it has placed at the 
disposal of another [sjtate, to be used by that [sjtate for perpetrating an act of 
aggression against a third [sjtate; 
(g) The sending by or on behalf of a [sjtate of armed bands, groups, irregulars 
or mercenaries, which carry out acts of armed force against another [sjtate of 
such gravity as to amount to the acts listed above, or its substantial involve-
ment therein. 
Id. 
315. Coplin, International Law and the Assumption about the State System, 17 
WORLD POL. 615, S18 (1965). 
316. M. WALZER, supra note 313, at 107. 
317. Article 60(5) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Vienna Con-
vention), for example, is a reflection of the high value accorded in the international legal 
order to human rights. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, done May 23, 1969, 
U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 39/27 (1969) (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980). The following states 
are parties to the Vienna Convention: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Barbados, Canada, 
the Central African Republic, Chile, Colombia, the Congo, Cyprus, Denmark, Egypt, Fin-
land, Greece, Haiti, Holy See, Honduras, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, the Republic of Korea, 
Kuwait, Lesotho, Liberia, Malawi, Mauritius, Mexico, Morocco, Naura, the Netherlands, 
New Zealand, Niger, Nigeria, Panama, Paraguay, the Philippines, Rwanda, Spain, Swe-
den, Syria, Tanzania, Togo, Tunisia, the United Kingdom, Uruguay, Yugoslavia, and 
Zaire. 
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human rights would be deemed justifiable, even if it entails a 
temporary infringement of territorial integrity and political 
independence. 
More problematic, however, is the reconciliation of self-de-
termination with other international values. As might be ex-
pected, the General Assembly has not provided any real guid-
ance in this respect. Countless resolutions beginning with the 
famous Declaration on Colonialism,318 have merely restated the 
"territorial integrity versus self-determination" problem.319 The 
Declaration on Friendly Relations does negate one type of terri-
torial integrity claim, namely that which a state administering a 
"colony" might wish to present with respect to that depen-
dency320 but reinforces the prevailing uncertainty regarding 
"noncolonial" situations.321 The Definition of Aggression did not 
seek to resolve the problem when it reaffirmed "the duty of 
states not to use armed force to deprive peoples of their right to 
self-determination, freedom, and independence or to disrupt ter-
318. Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Territories and Peo-
ples, G.A. Res. 1514 (XX), 15 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 66, U.N. Doc. A/4684 (1960) 
[hereinafter Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Territories and 
Peoples). 
319. Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Territories and Peo-
ples, supra note 318. Paragraph 6 provides that "[a]ny attempt aimed at the partial or 
total disruption of the national unity and the territorial integrity of a country is incom-
patible with the purposes and principles of the Charter." Id. at para. 6. Paragraph 7 calls 
on all states to observe the Charter, the Universal Declaration, and the Declaration on 
Colonialism "on the basis of . . . respect for the sovereign rights of all peoples and their 
territorial integrity." Id. at para. 7. 
320. The Declaration on Friendly Relations provides: 
The territory of a colony or other [non-self-governing] [territory has, under 
the Charter, a status separate and distinct from the territory of the state ad-
ministering it; and such separate and distinct status under the Charter shall 
exist until the people of the colony or (non-self-governing) [territory have ex-
ercised their right of self-determination in accordance with the Charter and 
particularly its purposes and principles. 
Declaration on Friendly Relations, supra note 159, at preamble, para. 6. 
321. The uncertainty regarding "[noncolonial]" situations is reinforced by providing: 
Nothing in the foregoing paragraphs shall be construed as authorizing or en-
couraging any action which would dismember or impair, totally or in part, the 
territorial integrity and political unity of sovereign and independent states 
conducting themselves in compliance with the principle of equal rights and 
self-determination of peoples as described above and thus possessed of a gov-
ernment representing the whole people belonging to the territory without dis-
tinction as to race, creed, or color. 
Declaration on Friendly Relations, supra note 159, at preamble, para. 7. In addition, 
"[e]very state shall refrain from any action aimed at the partial or total disruption of the 
national unity and territorial integrity of any other (s)tate or country." Id. at preamble, 
para. 8. 
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ritorial integrity."322 By the same token no attempt has been 
made to strike a balance between self-determination and inher-
ently conflicting values such as sovereign equality and noninter-
vention, which are erroneously bracketed together.323 
Interjected into the conflict between self-determination and 
the value of protection of human rights is what Emerson calls 
"major ethnic cleavages."32* According to Emerson, since this 
"divide[s] the people of a state, the principle that self-determi-
nation underlies all human rights may well be found incompati-
ble with the principle that no continuing right of self-determina-
tion for any part of the population survives once independent 
statehood has been achieved,"326 Insistence on self-determina-
tion may result in an overall erosion of human rights in yet an-
other respect. Rostow asserts that "a strong international move-
ment for self-determination would force many states to suppress 
liberty in the name of security, as the only alternative they per-
ceive to anarchy. And it would grievously weaken the safeguards 
of peace."326 
Members of the United Nations have acknowledged to some 
extent the relative nature of the principle of self-determination 
but, as noted by Pomerance, such acknowledgement is "selec-
tive;" that is, "it is reserved for oneself and those with whom 
one sympathizes."327 Indeed, recent developments have rein-
322. Definition of Aggression, supra note 107. 
323. A sentiment is thus expressed, for example, in the preamble of the Declaration 
on Friendly Relations that "the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peo-
ples constitutes a significant contribution to contemporary international taw that its ef-
fective application is of paramount importance for the promotion of friendly relations 
among [s]tates, based on respect for the principle of sovereign equality." Declaration on 
Friendly Relations, supra note 159, at preamble. The prevailing ambivalence is exempli-
fied by juxtaposing the Declaration on Inadmissibility of Intervention adopted by the 
General Assembly in 1965, G.A. Res. 2131 (XX), 20 U.N. GAOR (1408th plen. mtg.), 
U.N. Doc. A/6220 (1965) (which provides that "[n]o state shall . . . tolerate subversive 
terrorist or armed activities"), with resolutions of the General Assembly (such as G.A. 
Res. 2107, U.N. Doc. A/6209 (1965), G.A. Res. 2151, U.N. Doc. A/6482/Add.l (1966), and 
G.A. Res. 2465, U.N. Doc. NL.560/Rev.l, A/L.561/Add.l, A/L.563 (1968)), urging support 
for insurgents in South Africa, Such contradictory impulses are often emitted from the 
international arena. For example, African states regularly condemn foreign intervention 
in their domestic affairs while openly supporting Southern African liberation 
movements. 
324. Emerson, The Fate of Human Rights in the Third World, 27 WORLD POL. 201, 
207 (1975) [hereinafter Emerson]. 
325. Emerson, supra note 324, at 207. 
326. Rostow, Review of J. Moore, Law and the Indo-China War, 82 YALE L.J. 829, 
848 (1973). 
327. M. POMERANCE, supra note 265, a t 72. 
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forced the dichotomous character conferred upon claims to self-
determination by according legitimacy on the basis of a subjec-
tive assessment of whose cause is deemed to be just.828 
Even more ambiguity surrounds other values on the list of 
generally acknowledged international values. For instance, "min-
imum world public order" is characterized by Friedman as 
"Humpty-Dumpty like, [in that it means] what the policy-mak-
ers want it to mean, a catch-all phrase to justify whatever action 
the writer wishes to justify."329 Friedman is just as critical of the 
value of "modernization," In his view, 
even if one were to accept "modernization" as a generally ac-
ceptable value of world order — a proposition made doubtful 
by man's recent preoccupation with environment and his dis-
covery of the devastating effects of much of his "moderniza-
tion" — the ambiguity of the criterion is only too obvious. 
Does it mean compulsory democratization, conversion of an ag-
ricultural to an industrial economic structure, the redistribu-
tion of land or total socialization?330 
ii. Legitimate National Interests 
An appraisal of the "proportionality" of a forcible action 
must be undertaken with regard not only to the common inter-
ests of the global community but also to the consistency of the 
action with national interests.831 Hence, a weighing of competing 
interests may be necessary in order to clarify the values at stake 
in a decision to use force. For instance, given the General As-
sembly's recognition of a nation's control over its natural re-
sources, states are free to dispose of their natural wealth subject 
to the award of "appropriate compensation" in case of expropri-
ation.332 Such an exercise of this fundamental right may, how-
ever, be viewed by another state as a grave threat to its security 
which would, in turn, justify a forceful response. An assessment 
of the justifiability of such a response would depend, therefore, 
on the weight given to each of the values involved. 
328. M. POMERANCE, supra note 265, at 72. 
329. W. FRIEDMAN, 1 LAW AND POLITICS IN THE VIETNAMESE WAR: A COMMENT, THE 
VIETNAM WAR AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 298 (R. Falk ed. 1968). 
330. Friedman, Intervention and International Law, in L. HENKIN, R. PUGH, O. 
SCHACHTER & H. SHUT, INTERNATIONAL LAW 924-25 (2d ed. 1980). 
331. See J. MOORE, supra note 122, at 5. 
332. See J. MOORE, supra note 122, at 5. 
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Some form of distributive justice is advocated in a conflict 
involving a leading status quo power and a minor state. Accord-
ing to Boyle, for instance, a violation of an international legal 
rule by a weaker state against a leading status quo power should 
not justify the use of interstate coercion and violence by the 
leading power.335 In a system of unequally distributed power, it 
is unacceptable for policy-makers in a major status quo power to 
insist on fulfilling the principles of rectificatory justice while at 
the same time ignoring the distributive and rectifiable claim ad-
vanced by a major adversary.334 A similarly broad conception of 
international justice would arguably require an exploration of 
fundamental national values in order to arrive at a balanced de-
cision concerning the existence of a just cause. One must thus 
examine factors such as the degree to which a belligerent repre-
sents a repressive, unjust, or dehumanizing regime as well as the 
prospects for creating a better social order.338 As pointed out by 
O'Brien, "a responsible just war analysis of just cause can[not] 
avoid the character of the societies in conflict and the implica-
tions for human rights and dignity if one side subjugates the 
other."336 A strong jus ad bellum is created, for instance, when a 
just, free, self-correcting polity, responsive to the population, 
finds itself threatened by aggression from an unjust and totali-
tarian polity. The prospect of a military defeat or surrender 
without war would probably result in an unjust social order and 
an alien system of values being imposed upon the just regime. 
d. Proportionality as a Cost-Benefit Analysis 
A more common manner of viewing proportionality is in 
terms of a calculus of the good to be accomplished through war 
and the harm predictably to be suffered by all parties. The prin-
ciple of proportionality here requires that the good resulting 
from the use of force must outweigh, or be proportional to, the 
evil attending recourse to arms. Alternatively, the evil resulting 
from the use of force ought to be less than the evil resulting 
333. Boyle, International Law as a Basis for Conducting American Foreign Policy: 
1979-1982, 8 YALE J. WORLD PUB. ORD. 103, 110-11 (1983) [hereinafter Boyle]. 
334. Boyle, supra note 333, at 110-11. 
335. This does not mean that a military action, to be justified, must immediately 
usher in a new and better era. Rather, the implication is that it must create conditions 
under which there ia a good prospect for greater order, justice, and freedom than there 
was before. 
336. W. O'BRIEN, supra note 89, at 335. 
1989] JUST WAR THEORIES 287 
from a failure to employ it. This is an indispensable require-
ment. As emphatically stated by Ramsey: 
It can never be right to resort to war, no matter how just the 
cause, unless a proportionality can be established between mil-
itary/political objectives and their price, or unless one has rea-
son to believe that in the end more good will be done than 
undone or a greater measure of evil prevented.337 
Indeed, where the existence of such proportionality is seriously 
challenged,338 this fact in itself often leads to a condemnation of 
a war deemed just on other grounds.33* 
At the same time the process of balancing evil effects 
against salutary effects is highly complex and entails considera-
ble uncertainty. As Falk conceded, "we have no adequate way to 
qualify, or otherwise render precise, the relation between the 
cost and the benefit from the use of force."340 Be that as it may, 
"our moral agency leads us to make intuitive distinctions that 
emphasize the continuing need to justify force by some sense of 
cost-benefit relationship."*41 
i. Proportionality of Values 
The relationship between the costs and benefits resulting 
from the use of force is analyzed by moralists in terms of "pro-
portionality of values."942 Osgood and Tucker maintain that it is 
incumbent upon the proponents of this view to engage in a com-
parison "between realities of the moral order and not merely be-
tween two sets of material damage and loss."348 The relevant 
standard is not only "utilitarianism of materialist origin" that 
would avoid war merely because its repression would be 
337. P. RAMSEY, supra note 66, at 195. 
338. The existence of such proportionality was seriously challenged, for example, in 
the destruction of Vietnam during the Vietnam War and the starvation of Biafran chil-
dren during the Biafran War. 
339. Such considerations may be contributed to a change of attitude amongst Amer-
icans from "hawkish" to "dovish" that prompted revaluation amongst early supporters 
of Biafra. 
340. R. FALK, LAW, MORALITY AND WAR IN THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD 40-41 (1963) 
[hereinafter R. FALK, LAW, MORALITY AND W A S ] . 
341. R. FALK, LAW, MORALITY AND WAR, supra note 340, at 40-41. 
342. The concept "proportionality of values," as used by Osgood and Tucker, is dis-
tinguishable from "proportionality of effectiveness." See E, OSGOOD & W. TUCKER, 
FORCE, ORDER AND JUSTICE 301-02 (1967) [hereinafter E. OSGOOD & W. TUCKER]. 
343. Murray, supra note 128, at 80. 
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costly.344 Rather, the issue of proportionality must be assessed 
more rigorously from the standpoint of a comprehensive hierar-
chy of strictly moral values. There are greater evils than physical 
death and destruction wrought in war. Realistically, the exis-
tence of a high order of human good may also require that im-
mense sacrifices may have to be borne in the defense of good.3*5 
Moralists and others who approach the subject from an eth-
ical perspective propose that a similar balance sheet of good and 
evil be estimated for each belligerent and that it encompass the 
effects on individual third parties as well as the international 
common good.348 An illustration of what may be envisaged under 
a calculus of values can be found in a statement by the former 
Defense Minister of the People's Republic of China, Marshall 
Lin, who affirmed the inevitability and justice of people's wars 
in the following terms: 
We know that war brings destruction, sacrifice, and suffering 
on the people. But the destruction, sacrifice, and suffering will 
be much greater if no resistance is offered to imperialist armed 
aggression and the people become willing slaves. The sacrifice 
of a small number of people in revolutionary wars is repaid by 
security for whole nations, whole countries and even the whole 
of mankind; temporary suffering is repaid by lasting or even 
perpetual peace and happiness.3*7 
There is little doubt about which of the acknowledged values the 
Chinese cherish most. Revolutionaries and counter-insurgents 
are likely to be equally adamant that their wars do not lead to a 
greater evil. More often than not, however, priorities are not im-
mediately apparent. A difficult choice, for instance, may present 
itself in the context of determining the permissibility of humani-
tarian intervention where the dangers posed to self-determina-
tion and the maintenance of world order by permitting such in-
tervention have to be balanced against the dangers to human 
rights by not permitting it.346 One is inclined to invoke the sanc-
344. Murray, supra note 128, at 80. 
345. Murray, supra note 128, at 80. 
346. See W. O'BRIEN, supra note 89, at 27. 
347. N.Y. Times, Sept. 4, 1965, at 2. 
348. See J. MOORE, supra note 122, at 25, regarding the requirement of proportion-
ality of values in interventions for humanitarian purposes ("a proportional use of force 
which does not threaten greater destruction of values than the human rights at stake 
. . . "). For a similar guideline, see R. LILLICH & F. NEWMAN, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN 
RIGHTS: PROBLEMS OF LAW AND POLICY 538-39 (1979). 
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tity of human life as the supreme value, but it is clear that the 
preservation of life is not the only — nor necessarily the highest 
— value at stake in war, and how people live has frequently 
been considered more important a value than whether some con-
tinue to live at all, 
ii. Quantitative Factors 
Whatever significance one may attach to other values, these 
values cannot be divorced from the level of physical destruction 
that war entails. It is argued that quantitative factors have a 
critical influence on political and moral judgments for after all, 
numbers ultimately affect the way people live.34* Political scien-
tists, for instance, single out a number of more concrete and po-
tentially quantifiable factors that may play a part in a calculus 
of proportionality employed by states before embarking on 
war.350 They contend that any formal analysis of the expected 
utility of military action would have to take account of the costs 
and benefits of such an action arising from each of these factors 
and aggregate them in some explicit fashion. 
Political scientists pay particular attention to three sets of 
factors: (a) the structural and contextual characteristics of the 
prevailing international system; (b) the internal political 
processes of the actor-state; and (c) the internal political 
processes of the target-state. The first category includes factors 
such as the degree of competitiveness of an interventionary situ-
ation,381 ideological politics,352 side effects,353 interactive ef-
fects,364 technological factors,8" system-wide sanctioning proce-
dures, 3Be and worldwide public opinion.357 Factors in the second 
category relate to effects coercive actions have on domestic polit-
349. See E. OSGOOD & W. TUCKER, supra note 342, at 237. 
350. For a typical analysis, see J. MOORE, .supra note 122, at 11. 
351. That is, this first category inquires to what extent military action is likely to 
invite counteraction or intervention by others. 
352. The ideological politics category scrutinizes how much value an actor places on 
achieving certain goals. 
353. Since interactions are part of a complex weh, an actor should also consider 
probable effects of its action on simultaneous interaction with other states. 
354. Interactive effects refer to the effects of the current action on future 
interactions. 
355. Technological advancement and technological superiority may reduce the cost 
of military action, 
356. These procedures must be analyzed even though their impact is difficult to esti 
mate with great precision. 
357. This refers to the likelihood of either formal or informal communal sanction. 
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ics3S8 and on a state's economy.350 The third category encom-
passes factors that pertain, for instance, to whether the target-
state is united politically and mobilized to resist oncoming mili-
tary action, or whether it is experiencing civil strife. In the for-
mer case, the cost of military action would be higher. 
In practice, of course, one should aim at combining value 
considerations with the narrower and more tangible factors in 
order to provide a comprehensive appraisal. Exclusive reliance 
on one set of criteria would conceivably lead to a conception of 
proportionality that is either too abstract or too heavily oriented 
towards transient phenomena. It is unrealistic to think that a 
universal formula will be applicable in each instance of recourse 
to arms. Nevertheless, persistent efforts to produce a compre-
hensive formula and to apply it to concrete situations may facili-
tate the development of reasonably workable criteria. 
iii. Proportionality in a Nuclear War 
Special considerations arise in the context of nuclear wars. 
It is asserted that the condition of proportionality in itself is suf-
ficient to rule out the justifiability of a total nuclear war for it 
does not appear that any resultant good could justify the eradi-
cation of whole societies. The argument that one should choose 
the death of millions rather than accept survival at the price of 
subjugation to tyranny is not a very compelling one.380 Indeed, a 
large number of people have become nuclear pacifists by con-
cluding that no political ends, not even the preservation of free-
dom and democracy, are worth a possible extinction of the 
human race resulting from a nuclear holocaust. While the crite-
rion of proportionality rules out the use of total nuclear war, it 
does not imply that the threat of such a war or even a limited 
nuclear exchange is unjustifiable.381 
358. For example, the possibility of upheavals must be considered. 
359. Diversion of scarce resources from other domains will obviously impose signifi-
cant opportunity costs on the action. 
360. In this connection, see the Russel-Hook debate in 1958 concerning whether it 
would be better to he "red than dead" in the event a United States-Soviet nuclear con-
frontation came down to the alternatives of surrender or death. Professor Sidney Hook 
felt that death was preferable to life under Communism, while Bertrand Rusgell argued 
that almost any kind of political or military regime could be tolerated if the alternative 
was the end of the human race or a large segment of it. The most significant of these 
exchanges are reprinted in ETHICS AND METAETHICS 158-79 (R. Abelson ed. 1963). 
361. See C. JOYNT & P. CORBETT, THEORY AND REALITY IN WORLD POLITICS 15 (1978). 
On the concept of "limited nuclear war," see I. CLARK, supra note 123. The question of 
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e. Proportionality of Effectiveness 
Contemporary international law appears to be more con-
cerned with proportionality in the third sense: namely the condi-
tion of refraining from the use of more force than is required by 
the legitimate military necessity to achieve a specific war objec-
tive. Referred to by Osgood and Tucker as "proportionality of 
effectiveness,"363 it is distinguished from "proportionality of val-
ues" in that it pertains to the extent of force employed in rela-
tion to the effective protection of endangered interests. Propor-
tionality of values, as seen earlier, entails the balancing of the 
values preserved through force with values sacrificed through 
force.3*3 
Thus, proportionality of effectiveness does not directly re-
late to the question of whether a state has a compelling reason 
to wage war, which is the subject of this Article, but pertains to 
the issue of whether a state conforms to the jus in bello in its 
conduct of war.364 Nonetheless, political analysts tend to over-
look this distinction, and judgments concerning proportionality 
of effectiveness are often colored by considerations of the 
calculus of values. The 1982 war in Lebanon serves as a recent 
case in point. Strong criticism was levelled at Israel on the 
ground that the resulting death and disruption had been dispro-
portionate in its effects in relation to the ends sought. By focus-
ing exclusively upon the "means versus ends" questions36" critics 
arguably failed to subject the war to an informed and reasoned 
test of proportionality of values. 
A proper calculus should have taken into account the values 
at stake, such as the security of the state of Israel,386 and the 
proportionality and the use of nuclear weapons will be further discussed in connection 
with the jus in bello. See infra notes 364-68 and accompanying text. 
362. See E. OSGOOD & W. TUCKER, supra note 342. 
363. -See supra notes 342-48 and accompanying text. 
364. A discussion of proportionality in this respect is undertaken in R. Mushkat, 
The Concept of Just War, supra note 19. 
365. Commentators such as Robert W. Tucker and Conor Cruise O'Brien are, how-
ever, of the opinion that Israel acted in accordance with the principle of proportionality 
both in terms of the calculus of values and the effectiveness of means. See O'Brien, A 
Review of The Longest War: Israel in Lebanon by J. Timmerrnan, 60 ENCOUNTER 49-54 
(Jan. 1983); Tucker, Lebanon: the Case for the War, 74 COMMENTARY 19-30 (Oct. 1982); 
N.Y. Times, July 15, 1982, at A23. A different conclusion is drawn by another commenta-
tor who purports to subject the war in Lebanon to a calculus of values. See Mack, 
Israel's Lebanon War, 37 AusrL, OUTLOOK 1 (1983), 
366. The PLO maintained a large and fairly sophisticated war machine on Israel's 
northern border whose raison d'etre was the achievement of the strategy enshrined in 
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values actually gained through the war that, from Israel's point 
of view, included removal of a threat to the security of Northern 
Israel; the undermining of the infrastructure of the Palestinian 
Liberation Organization (PLO); de facto peace with Lebanon; 
and the tipping of the balance within Lebanon in favor of con-
servative, as distinct from radical elements, From the Lebanese 
perspective the war appeared to have enhanced the long-term 
prospects for independence and internal stability, which could 
lead to the resumption of economic growth. With respect to the 
region as a whole it can be said that the war has pushed the 
Soviet Union to the sidelines and has contributed to the isola-
tion of Syria, the most belligerent member state of the Arab-
Israeli core. Viewed from a global perspective, the war has 
brought about a greater involvement on the part of Western 
powers in the management of strife ridden Lebanon. At least 
part of the international community seems less willing to let the 
explosive situation there deteriorate below a certain level, 
whereas in the past it remained largely indifferent to the de-
struction and chaos engulfing Lebanon. 
In addition, the above values should have been juxtaposed 
with the values sacrificed through the war. Comprised in the lat-
ter category are the heavy losses of life incurred by Israel, the 
substantial economic cost of the war and the ensuing occupation, 
the damage to Israel's image and its estrangement from the in-
ternational community, the intensification of ideological conflict 
within the country, and the raising of the level of unrest among 
Israel's Arabs and the inhabitants of the occupied territories. On 
the Lebanese side one cannot ignore the heavy casualties and 
physical destruction caused by the war. In the regional context 
the war increased the probability of Israeli-Syrian confrontation 
and has drawn Syria and the Soviet Union closer to each other. 
In fact, Soviet involvement in Syrian defense build-up has 
grown to such an extent that the Soviet Union could conceivably 
become directly involved in regional hostilities.397 In terms of 
global implications one could perhaps argue that the war has 
brought the superpower confrontation into a sharper focus. The 
the Palestine National Covenant, namely the liquidation of the state of Israel. In addi-
tion, belief in the PLO's ability to liberate Palestine and to destroy Israel encouraged 
terrorist acts by Arabs in Israel, the occupied territories, and Jordan. 
367. See, e.g., Sciolino, Behind the Rigid Facade, Damascus Has a Softer Side, 
N.Y. Times, Feb. 16, 198S, at 18, col. 3; Gwertzman, U.S. Denies Plan to Attack Syria, 
N.Y. Times, Nov. 8, 1983, at 1, col. 6. 
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Soviet Union resents the reemergence of the United States as a 
regional broker and is apparently willing to take greater risks in 
its commitment to its Syrian ally.398 This situation possibly con-
tains the seeds of superpower involvement in a future conflict. 
It is obviously difficult to aggregate the large number of 
costs and benefits enumerated above. The value of the exercise, 
however, lies in providing a sounder basis for appraisal. In the 
process of identifying the relevant factors on both sides of the 
ledger, one becomes aware of the exact nature of the aspect of 
the war that is singled out for criticism. This awareness allows 
more precise evaluation and hence facilitates overall judgment. 
3. Probability of Success 
Closely linked to the condition of proportionality — indeed 
referred to at times as the "second consideration of proportion-
ality"869 — is the requirement that a state waging a war should 
have a reasonable probability of success. Success in this context 
has been interpreted in traditional political-military terms as 
"winning the war."370 In just war terms success is said to mean 
"repelling the attack and establishing just peace"371 or the "re-
pression of unjust action."372 According to McKenna, victory 
today: 
[CJannot mean . . . , if it ever did, the categorical imposition 
of the winning side's will upon the loser. The erosion of the 
victor's comparative advantage vis-a-vis the vanquished in 
both [w]orld [w]ars demonstrates this; even after an atomic 
clash the co-operation of the defeated country will be worth 
bargaining for. Success can mean, at best, the accomplishment 
of limited objectives,373 
368. See supra note 36V and accompanying text. 
369. Murray, supra note 128, at 80. Brandt, for example, expresses the probability 
of success in a formula designed to facilitate the calculation of proportionality. According 
to Brandt: 
A military action is permissible only if the utility . . . of victory to all con-
cerned, multiplied by the increase in probability if the action is executed, on 
the evidence (when the evidence is reasonably solid, considering the stakes) is 
greater than the possible disutility of the action to both sides multiplied by its 
probability. 
R. BRANDT, Utilitarianism and the Rules of War, in WAR AND MORAL RESPONSIBILITY 37 
(M. Cohen, T. Nagel & T. Scanlon eds. 1974). 
370. Wells, How Much Can "the Just War" Justify?, 46 J, PHIL. 819, 821 (1969). 
371. Purtill, On the Just War, 1 Soc. THEORY & PRAC, 97, 98 (1971). 
372. Murray, supra note 128, at 80. 
373. McKenna, Ethics and War: A Catholic View, 54 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 647, 651-52 
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At the same time success is deemed to be broader than victory. 
In Childress's opinion "success" encompasses "witnessing the 
values as well as achieving goals."374 Thus, even if a nation has a 
good reason to believe that it will be defeated, its spirited resis-
tance may preserve significant values — such as self-respect — 
beyond the number of lives lost and retention of territory and 
sovereignty. 
a. The Moral Calculus 
Again, there appears to be a strong tendency to view this 
requirement of just cause in terms of moral values. The empha-
sis on morality is evident in Murray's assertion that "the condi-
tion of probable success is not, of course, simply the statesmen's 
classical political calculus of success."375 It is the moral calculus 
that is enjoined in the traditional theory of rebellion against 
tyranny.3™ 
This moral dimension is explored by those writers who fo-
cus upon the just war requirement of probability of success. 
Childress, for instance, maintains that only a strong commit-
ment and a reasonable prospect to achieve fundamental values 
can override the prima facie duties not to injure or kill others, 
duties binding on states as well as on individuals.377 Totally use-
less, pointless, or self-indulgent warfare, in which reasonable 
people would not expect to achieve goals or express values, is 
excluded by the criterion of probability of success. Furthermore, 
according to Potter, this criterion flows from the moral ban upon 
suicide and the fundamental principle that political leaders are 
stewards of the welfare of the nation and the life of each citi-
zen.378 War, therefore, must be a "politically purposeful act 
made barely tolerable by the necessity of defending the inno 
cent. It can never be justified by the main desire to avoid admit-
ting an error in past judgment, a refusal to acknowledge chang-
ing circumstances or an extravagant or misplaced sense of 
(I960) [hereinafter McKenna]. 
374. Childress, Just-War Theories: the Bases, Interrelations, Priorities and Func-
tions of their Criteria, 39 THEOLOGICAL STUD. 427, 437 (1978) (hereinafter Childress]. 
375. Murray, supra note 128, at 80. 
376. Murray, supra note 128, at 80, 
377. Childress, supra note 374, at 437. 
378. Ft. POTTER, The Moral Logic of War, in PEACE AND WAR 7, 14 (C. Beitz & T. 
Herman eds. 1973) [hereinafter R POTTER], 
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heroism."379 Childress concludes that "[i]t is immoral to expose 
other men to death to save one's political face."380 Since these 
types of hostilities cannot justifiably be chosen as an end, they 
can only justifiably be entered into with a reasonably high 
probability that they constitute a means to achieving an objec-
tive that is worth pursuing. Presumably, if defeat is certain, hos-
tilities will only aggravate the injustice that precipitated them in 
the first place. 
b. The Effectiveness Calculus 
There is also a more secular element of effectiveness. A 
statesperson with a just cause should choose means of coercion 
that have a reasonable chance of success.981 Lacking the will or 
the resources to succeed, a statesperson should not undertake 
the action. This is a rule of simple prudence. For example, the 
type of sacrifice expressed by the famous Patrick Henry slogan 
"[g]ive me liberty or give me death" is more appropriate for an 
individual patriot than for a responsible head of state.382 In 
Hoffmann's opinion an ineffective use of force is also unethical 
for "the ethics of foreign policy behavior is an ethics of conse-
quences; no policy is ethical, however, generous its end, if suc-
cess is ruled out."383 Hence, if the costs appear to be high and 
the probability of success low or highly uncertain, morality, pru-
dence, and ethics counsel against initiating a military action. 
Indeed, such a yardstick was employed to criticize the 1982 
Israeli action in Lebanon in that the objective sought — the de-
struction of the PLO — was unrealizable and hence Israel stood 
no chance of success in attaining its ultimate aims. This criti-
cism, however, has little validity for the prospects for neutraliz-
379. R. POTTER, supra note 378, at 14. 
380. Childress, supra note 374, at 437. 
381. For an example of the high value placed on the criterion of probability of suc-
cess in relation to the legality of a military action, see Y. BEN-PORAT, E. HEBER & 2. 
SCHIBF, ENTEBBE RESCUE 253-54 (1977), The authors cite the Israeli Minister of Justice's 
advice to the Ministerial Crisis Management Team to the effect that "[t]he question is 
not what Zionism and our sovereignty can expect if we don't rescue the hostages. The 
question is whether there is a plan for a military rescue — one with high probability of 
success." Id. 
382. See Lefever, The Just War Doctrine; Is it Relevant to the Nuclear Age?t 4 
WORIDVIEW 7, 10 (1961). 
383. S. HOFFMANN, Vietnam and American Foreign Policy, in 2 THE VIETNAM WAR 
AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 1134, 1160-61 (R. Falk ed. 1968) [hereinafter S. HOFFMANN, Vi-
etnam and American Foreign Policy], 
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ing the PLO's military capability, destroying its organizational 
infrastructure, and removing its territorial base appeared to be 
quite good when Israel embarked upon military action. 
Criticism based on the lack of probability of success is more 
appropriate in the case of the Vietnam War where dispropor-
tionality existed between the costs of the war (human losses, 
physical destruction, and social dislocation of the Vietnamese 
people) and its ends.884 O'Brien,385 for instance, maintains that 
by approaching the problem from a purely military perspective, 
American strategists estimated that the United States could 
avert the collapse of South Vietnam and then rebuild it to a 
point where the North Vietnamese and Vietcong would have no 
hope of victory and be forced to desist from fighting. Two non-
military variables were thus omitted from the equation, namely, 
the will and power of resistance of the North Vietnamese and 
Vietcong leadership, and the loyalty and the durability of their 
rank and file. Secondly, United States defense planners greatly 
overestimated the willingness of key American elites to support 
the war. As a corollary, it may be argued that the United States 
failed to grapple with the issue of probability of success, over-
looking critical factors such as the internal dynamics of various 
areas; the particular type of intervention involved, whether an 
open battle or otherwise; and the limits of its own power.386 
What is considered reasonable, however, in terms of the 
probability of success depends on the situation in which the ac-
tors must make responsible decisions. Retrospective judgments 
by others should include only what the actors could and should 
have foreseen.387 Ironically, only upon termination of hostilities 
384. See Falk, International Law and the U.S. Role, in 2 THE VIETNAM WAR AND 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 362, 399 (R. Falk ed. 1968) [hereinafter Falk, International Law]; S. 
HOFFMANN, Vietnam and American Foreign Policy, supra note 383; W. O'BRIEN, U.S. 
MIUTABY INTERVENTION LAW AND MORALITY 70 (1979) [hereinafter W. O'BRIEN, U.S. MIL-
ITARY INTERVENTION], 
The strategic tunnel vision on the part of United States defense planners also mili-
tated against the action's possible success. 
385. W, O'BRIEN, U.S. MILITARY INTERVENTION, supra note 384, at 93-94. 
386. S. HOFFMANN, supra note 124, at 116. Murray comments on a general inability 
of United States authorities to reckon with a possibility of failure or be prepared to 
accept it, which is a corollary of the requirement of the probability of success. Citing the 
1958 Senate decision to deny governmental funds to person? or institutions proposing or 
actually conducting a study regarding the surrender of the government of the United 
States, Murray condemns an attitude that supports the subjugation of political aims to 
military action, with the only legitimate aim being victory regardless of any calculus of 
proportional moral costs. Murray, supra note 128, at 84-86. 
387. Childress, supra note 374, at 437. 
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can this criterion be properly applied. It is sufficient to establish, 
however, that the decision-makers, after giving due considera-
tion to all the factors known and perceived as relevant, had 
come to the conclusion that there was a high degree of 
probability of success. By the same token it is apparent that an 
initial estimate of probability of success and proportionality of 
evil to good effects may be substantially modified by the course 
of the conflict. Thus, a just belligerent should continuously mon-
itor developments in order to reevaluate the probability of suc-
cess and the proportionality of the war to the just cause. 
c. Wars of Self-Defense 
The requirement of probability of success is nonetheless 
subject to an important qualification that reflects the distinction 
between "offensive" and "defensive" wars. It is thus contended 
that a war of self-defense may be entered upon irrespective of 
the prospects of success, particularly if there is a considerable 
threat to continued existence and fundamental values.3*8 Evi-
dently, so strong is the presumption in favor of the right of self-
defense that the requirement of probable success may be waived. 
Yet the limits, if any, of this qualification are unclear. It is 
postulated that a desperate, if not hopeless, defense is permitted 
if fundamental moral values are manifestly threatened by the 
aggressor.388 This is also the view expressed by McKenna, who 
employs the case of Belgium in 1914 to illustrate that in extreme 
circumstances the moral value of national martyrdom may com-
pensate for the material destruction of unsuccessful wars,990 
Generally, McKenna maintains that a nation defending itself 
against attack may be more inclined to assume the risks inher-
ent in the option to fight, as Finland did in 1939, than a nation 
on the offensive.391 A state may, of course, choose not to respond 
to force with counterforce because of the military supremacy of 
the attacking country, since recourse to war in self-defense is a 
right and not a duty, and a state need not exercise that right 
even when it is entitled to. Be that as it may, it cannot be ex-
pected to surrender if this would result in the destruction of the 
388. See W. O'BRIEN, supra note 89, at 31. 
389. See W. O'BRIEN, supra note 89, at 31. 
390. McKenna, supra note 373, at 651. 
391. McKenna, supra note 373, at 651. 
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nation or its primary cultural values.392 
4. Last Resort 
a. Exhaustion of Peaceful Means 
War cannot rationally be supported as a legitimate means of 
settling disputes because of the enormous social costs it entails. 
Thus, it is well-understood that the justification of war requires 
evidence that peaceful methods had been fully explored and 
that war was embarked upon only as a last resort. The impor-
tance of this requirement has been greatly enhanced since the 
inception of the United Nations, given the fact that one of the 
basic purposes of the organization is "to bring about by peaceful 
means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and in-
ternational law, adjustment or settlement of international dis-
putes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace."393 
Specifically, articles 2(3) and 2(4) of the Charter3** contain 
two parallel obligations requiring all members to "settle their in-
ternational disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that 
international peace and security and justice, are not endan-
gered"395 and "refrain in their international relations from the 
threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political 
independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent 
with the [pjurposes of the [United Nations]."366 These principles 
have been elaborated in the Declaration on Friendly 
Relations.3*7 
Accordingly, an extensive machinery for the peaceful settle-
ment of disputes has been established under the Charter with 
the intention of rendering unnecessary the recourse to war as a 
means of self-help and confining the need for collective enforce-
ment action to extreme cases of breaches of international law 
and order. States have also assumed similar obligations within 
regional arrangements398 as well as under bilateral treaties for 
392. See Struckmeyer, The "Just War" and the Right of Self-defense, 82 ETHICS 
48, 53-54 (1971). 
393. U.N. CHARTER art. 1. 
394. U.N. CHARTER arts. 2(3), 4. 
395. Id. at art. 2(3). 
396. Id, at art. 2(4). 
397. See Declaration on Friendly Relations, supra note 159. 
398. For examples of these regional arrangements, see The Protocol of the Commis-
sion of Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration of the Organization of African Unity, 
adopted July 1964, Cairo, Res. CM/Res.42/III; The European Convention for the Peace-
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the settlement of international disputes.399 The existing instru-
mentalities for the peaceful settlement of disputes, in conjunc-
tion with an increasing recognition of the irrationality and grave 
consequences of war, may thus be said to have contributed to 
the emergence of the normative principle that international vio-
lence must be deferred until every conceivable alternative has 
been fully explored.400 
Indeed, it appears that the international community of ju-
rists and statespeople has adopted a "rough rule of thumb;"401 a 
state failing to exhaust available peaceful remedies before opting 
for war is presumed to be an aggressor. An implicit expression of 
this idea may be found in article 40 of the Charter, which pro-
vides in the context of the Security Council's function with re-
spect to threats to the peace, breach of the peace, or acts of ag-
gression, that account shall be taken "of failure to comply with 
. . . provisional measures."*02 The implications of a lack of read-
iness to accept peaceful recommendations in regard to the re-
sponsibility of states for breaches of the peace or acts of aggres-
sion are elaborated further in General Assembly Resolution 
378(V) on the Duties of States in the Event of the Outbreak of 
Hostilities.40* In fact, refusal by states to comply with provi-
ful Settlement of Disputes of Apr. 29, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 267, 5 Eur. V.B. 587, 1979 Gr. 
Brit. T.S. No. 15 (Cmd. 7460); The American Treaty on Pacific Settlement of Apr. 30, 
1948 (Pact of Bogota), 30 U.N.T.S. 55. 
399. For example, see arbitration and conciliation bipartite treaties entered by the 
United States with 48 countries in 1913 and 1914, These treaties became known as the 
"Bryan treaties" because they generally were signed by William Jennings Bryan for the 
United States. 
400. The "exhaustion of peaceful means" requirement features in most criteria pro-
posed by legal scholars for the evaluation of the use of force. See, e.g., Falk, Interna' 
tional Law, supra note 384, at 415, 444-42; Lillkh, supra note 201, at 347-51; J. MOORE, 
supra note 122, at 264; Nanda, supra note 196, at 475. The accepted view is that rejec-
tion of community procedures for peaceful settlement is highly relevant both in assessing 
objectives in the use of coercion and in assessing responsibility for the continuation of 
coercion. 
Excluded, however, by their very nature are wars of self-defense under article 51 of 
the Charter in which states are not obliged to first seek redress by peaceful methods. At 
the same time, it should be noted that customary law requires as a condition to permissi-
ble armed reprisals that reasonable efforts be made to secure a peaceful remedy to the 
alleged international delinquency and that the machinery for peaceful settlement of dis-
putes provided by the Charter and general international law be exhausted. See J. 
BRIEBLY, supra note 173, at 398, 402. 
401. The term is employed by O'Brien. W. O'BMBN, supra note 89, at 31. 
402. U.N. CHARTER art. 40. 
403. Most notably, General Assembly Resolution 378(V) of 1950, naming the Peo-
ple's Republic of China an aggressor, made specific reference to the nonadherence of the 
latter to "[United Nations] proposals to bring about a cessation of hostilities in Korea 
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sional measures, such as cease-fire orders, generally precedes 
condemnation or indictment by United Nations organs. More-
over, states are eager to point out their compliance with "com-
munity procedures" as evidence of their "reasonable conduct."404 
It is also reasonable to conclude that the reference to "other rel-
evant circumstances" in article 2 of the Definition of Aggression 
encompasses the factor of prior attempts at peaceful settlement 
of a conflict.405 Finally, legal scholars tend to agree that "the rel-
ative willingness of the contending parties to accept community 
intervention for the cessation of violence and [nonviolent] proce-
dures for settlement" should be considered as a factor in the 
designation of a coercive action as permissible or non-
permissible.406 
Underlying this concept appears to be a series of assump-
tions about the nature of war.4*7 It is postulated, for instance, 
that war is chosen as a settlement device because of the passions 
aroused by disputes. Hence, there exists cooling off rationale 
furnished by the various peaceful procedures so that tempers 
may subside and temperate judgment prevail in order to allow 
the pursuit of rational nonviolent solutions. The second relevant 
assumption is that war is often the outcome of ignorance and 
misunderstanding of facts involved in an international crisis. 
The pacific settlement provisions are designed thus to provide 
an impartial and informed mode of inquiry. It is further posited 
that war results from pride of governments and peoples who are 
too immersed in these situations to be able to seek a more rea-
sonable and less drastic solution. Pacific settlement, therefore, 
offers to inject into the dispute a disinterested party that might 
with a view to peaceful settlement." G.A. Res. 378(V), 5 U.N. GAOR (308th plen. mtg.), 
U.N. Doc. A/C.l/615 (1950). 
404. For illustrations, see Higgins, supra note 304, at 269, 298. 
405. Definition of Aggression, supra note 107, at art. 2. 
406. See McDougal & Felieiano, International Coercion and World Public Order: 
The General Principles of the Law of War, 67 YALE L.J. 771, 821 (1958). In this connec-
tion, see also Quincy Wright's proposition that "refusal to accept an armistice proposed 
in accordance with a procedure which [a state] has accepted to implement its no-force 
obligation" may be taken as a test of aggression. Wright, The Concept of Aggression in 
International Law, 29 AM. J. INT'L L. 373, 395 (1935). J. Verzijl too is of the opinion that 
"[a] state that proceeds to the use of violence against a fellow state without previously 
resorting to the available means of conciliation or arbitral (judicial) settlement desig-
nated for that purpose, whether compulsory or otherwise, is per se in the wrong.1' J. 
VERZIJL, 1 INTERNATIONAL LAW IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 230 (1968). 
407. The following discussion draws on Inis C. Claude's analysis of peaceful settle-
ment of disputes. I. CLAUDE, JR., SWORDS TO PLOWSHARES: T H E PROBLEMS AND PROGRESS 
OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 217 (1971) [hereinafter I. CLAUDE, J R . ] . 
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help the rival states to extricate themselves from psychological 
dead end streets, 
These two assumptions, while occasionally warranted, can-
not provide a viable basis for decision-making in all cases of 
armed conflict. Nor is the application of the peaceful settlement 
option free from difficulties. War is a highly complex phenomena 
and its outcome is not wholly dependent on the availability, ac-
tual or potential, of pacific settlement agencies. 
It is evident, for instance, that "states generally have not 
been willing to risk their most vital interests on the outcome of 
international processes beyond their control."40* Past experience 
suggests that while comparatively minor matters may be re-
ferred to international institutions, the most vital interests tend 
to be protected by states with the threat or use of force. Where 
peaceful settlements of matters of vital interest did take place, it 
was often the outcome of traditional diplomatic negotiations 
supported by recourse to arms, either actual or potential. It is 
equally clear that issues which constitute the core of conflict do 
not always lend themselves to formulation in terms of disputes 
that can be subjected to peaceful resolution. Some controversies 
are in fact just "minor symptoms of a fundamental hostility that 
is not definable by the solution of the disputes."409 
It follows that when such irreconcilable differences exist and 
no evidence can be adduced for a likely fundamental change in 
attitudes of the states involved, the last resort criterion may be 
satisfied at a rather early stage.410 Put another way, the last re-
sort criterion should not be interpreted to mean that all alterna-
tives to war should be exhausted if there is no reasonable expec-
tation that they would be successful. 
Another problem arising in the context of the adherence to 
the requirement of exhaustion of peaceful alternatives stems 
408. W. O'BRIEN, supra note 89, at 31. 
409. I. CLAUDE, JR., supra note 407, at 242. Thus, for instance: 
The crucial antagonisms that brought about World War II were not matters 
capable of being dealt with primarily by a transfusion of calm rationality, or by 
injection of level-headedness and deliberateness into the situation; they were 
eruptions of the deep-seated malignancy of the human situation, outcroppings 
of force, manifestations of drives and symptoms of irrationalities of power 
politics that lie essentially beyond the range of pacific settlement techniques. 
Id. The protracted Arab-Israeli conflict provides another illustration of an intense con-
frontation whose underlying causes are apparently not amenable to peaceful means of 
settlement, 
410. Nonetheless, willingness to use the institutions of peaceful settlement must be 
clearly demonstrated. 
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from the technical deficiencies of the United Nations peacekeep-
ing system and the ineffectiveness of United Nations organiza-
tions as dispute-settlement agencies.411 Indeed, because the 
United Nations is not a supranational organization with inde-
pendent powers to control international violence, and given the 
highly political nature of its decision-making process,412 it has 
failed to foster a sense of confidence among political minorities 
with respect to its ability to dispense justice in matters concern-
ing their security.413 The politicization of the Security Council 
and the built-in bias characterizing its decisions have prompted 
one writer to conclude that, "the tendency of Israeli leaders to 
opt for military 'solutions' may stem, in part, from a conscious-
ness of Israel's increasing isolation and vulnerability."414 Nor is 
it just a question of politicization and bias with respect to Israel. 
The general record of the Security Council in resolving interna-
tional disputes is rather poor. An analysis of its past perform-
ance has clearly demonstrated the organization's impotence and 
411. The limited applicability of the Great Powers Veto to Pacific Settlement Ac-
tion in the Security Council is an obvious handicap. Even more damaging is the fact that 
the major members of the Security Council are so deeply embroiled in conflict that they 
transform the council from an organ of conciliation into an arena for playing their own 
mutual antagonisms. See P. HASLUCK, WORKSHOP OF SECURITY 94 (1948). 
412. Security Council members have all too frequently assumed positions and pro-
posed policies on the basis of their various national interests rather than in accordance 
With the objective principles enshrined in the Charter. A case in point is the massive 
strategic and economic advantages of collaboration with the Arab oil-producing states 
that have inevitably influenced the stance of certain Security Council members towards 
the Arab-Israeli conflict. The conspicuous shift in Soviet and French policies in favor of 
the Arabs is evidence of this trend. 
413. The lack of confidence in the system's integrity is reflected in a statement by 
Israel's former representative to the United Nations, Yehuda Blum: 
One of the most disturbing aspects of the Middle East conflict — disturbing as 
much to the cause of 'world order' as to the cause of Israel — is the fact that 
on one single occasion over the past fifteen years has Israel been able to get 
satisfaction from the political organs of the (United Nations] on her com-
plaints against neighboring Arab states. The Soviet veto that has been made 
available to the Arabs, to block any decision by the Security Council which the 
latter regarded as unfavorable to them, ensured that such a decision even if it 
received the requisite number of votes in the Council, would not be adopted, 
This fact (in turn) was naturally taken into account by other members of the 
Security Council more favorably disposed to Israel and largely conditioned the 
very tone and formulation of any watered down draft resolutions concerning 
Israeli complaints, since it was realized that the submission of a draft resolu 
tion giving satisfaction to Israel was bound to become an exercise in futility. 
Blum, The Beirut Raid and the International Double Standard, 64 AM. J, INT'L L. 73, 
98 (1970). 
414. Pogany, The Destruction of Osirak: A Legal Perspective, 37 WORLD TODAY 413, 
418 (1981). 
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ineffectiveness throughout major international conflicts.415 
The achievements of another organ of dispute settlement, 
the International Court of Justice, are equally unimpressive. 
Apart from the general reluctance of states to submit their dis-
putes to the International Court of Justice as a measure of 
peaceful settlement, the judicial approach is also limited by the 
fact that a judgment does nqt always constitute a settlement. 
Indeed, the authoritative statement of legal rights and wrongs 
may even impede settlement in some situations by encouraging 
self-assertive rigidity on one side and self-defensive rigidity on 
the other, attitudes which are clearly not conducive to the spirit 
of political compromise that is required foT the solution of criti-
cal problems marring the relationships between states. As a co-
rollary, an assessment of compliance with the requirement of ex-
haustion of peaceful alternatives should take into account the 
partiality and ineffectiveness of the dispute-settlement institu-
tions in the present time. This assessment should consider the 
possibility that the requirement of last resort may be fulfilled by 
default of the international system. 
In this context the question may arise as to whether a state 
loses its right to employ force in self-defense when a dispute is 
brought before the Security Council and when the latter is ac-
tively involved in its settlement. According to Dugard, article 51 
only envisaged the unilateral use of force pending Security 
Council action or "until the Security Council has taken mea-
sures necessary to maintain international peace and security. It 
cannot, therefore, be invoked in a situation which is considered 
by the Security Council."418 A similar opinion was expressed by 
Murphy who asserted that "[w]hen the [c]ouncil assumed juris-
diction over the Falklands controversy on April 3, [1982,] the 
principles of peaceful settlement enshrined in the Charter took 
precedence over coercive actions and precluded the British from 
using force to retake the islands."417 It should be emphasized, 
however, that article 51 refers to the Security Council taking 
"measures necessary to maintain international peace and secur-
ity"418 and it is a known fact that not all Security Council reso-
lutions constitute such effective measures. Furthermore, 
415. See J. MUHPHV, T H E U.N. AND THE CONTROL OF INTERNATIONAL VIOLENCE: A 
LEGAL AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS (1982). 
416. Dugard, supra note 244, at 144, 151. 
417. N.Y. Times, May 19, 1982, at A26. 
418. U.N. CHARTER art. 51. 
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Dugard's and Murphy's contention that once the Security Coun-
cil assumes jurisdiction over a dispute member states lose their 
right to use force in self-defense, has rather dangerous implica-
tions for the maintenance of peace. The effect of this theory is 
that states would be reluctant to bring disputes before the coun-
cil lest they lose their freedom to use force. Hence, the last re-
sort requirement may be met when recourse to peaceful means 
has not resulted in an effective solution of the dispute. 
b. The Requirement of Necessity 
It should, nonetheless, be pointed out that besides the im-
perative to exhaust peaceful means, the last resort criterion em-
braces another related aspect, namely that of necessity. It is 
thus maintained that only strict necessity can legitimate re-
course to arms and hence preventive war cannot be justified. 
This element of necessity is often discussed in relation to wars 
of self-defense and has been the core of considerable disagree-
ment and controversy regarding anticipatory self-defense. 
Under one interpretation of article 51, the justifying condi-
tions of necessity for self-defense should be limited to an antece-
dent armed attack. According to this view, the responding coer-
cion must in all circumstances be deferred until lawful coercion 
escalates into destructive violence and cannot be invoked by the 
mere threat of, or preparation for, attack.418 This interpretation 
was viewed as consistent with the overriding policy of the 
United Nations: the restriction of the right of states to use force 
unilaterally. As asserted by Quincy Wright: 
The obligation of states to refrain from threats to the peace 
under [a]rticle 2 paragraph 4 and the competence of the 
[United Nations] to take action in case of a threat to the peace 
under [a]rticle 39 were not intended to give a unilateral right 
of military self-defense in case of such threats. For that reason, 
self-defense against threats was excluded in [ajrticle 51 and 
states were explicitly obliged to submit disputes or situations 
which they think threaten peace, to the [United Nations] and 
419. For a discussion of Jessup's contention that under the Charter alarming mili-
tary preparations by a neighboring state would justify recourse to the Security Council 
but would not justify resort to an anticipatory force by the state that believes itself to be 
threatened, see P. JESSUP, supra note 156, at 166. Similarly, Brownlie concluded that 
"[t]he beginning of an armed attack is a condition precedent for resort to force in self-
defense." Erownlie, The Use of Force in Self-defense, 37 BBIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 183, 266 
(1961). 
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to refrain from unilateral use of force.*20 
Furthermore, the limitation inherent in the expression "if an 
armed attack occurs" in article 51 is, according to Henkin, "com-
paratively clear, objective, easy to prove, difficult to misinterpret 
or fabricate."421 Henkin cautions that: 
To permit anticipation may virtually destroy the rule against 
the use of force, leaving it to every nation to claim anticipation 
and unleash fury. Nations will not be prevented or deterred by 
the fear that later — if there is anyone left to judge — some-
one may determine that there had in fact been no threat of 
armed attack legitimately anticipated/22 
Another school of thought has advanced arguments in favor 
of a more liberal interpretation of article 51 and in support of an 
anticipatory right of self-defense. Reference is often made by 
those who subscribe to this position to a statement by United 
States Secretary of State Webster in the Caroline case,423 which 
allegedly stands for the proposition that military defensive ac-
tion was permissible in case of an instant and overwhelming ne-
cessity. This condition of necessity is said to "have never been 
restricted to 'actual armed attack.' "424 Rather, "imminence of 
attack of such high degree as to preclude effective resort by the 
intended victim to nonviolent modalities of response has always 
been regarded as sufficient justification."425 The implication is 
that article 51 should be interpreted to mean that a state may 
use military force when it "regards itself as intolerably 
threatened by the activities of another."428 "To read [a]rticle 51 
otherwise," maintains Waldock, "is to protect the aggressor's 
right to the first strike."427 
It is further argued that such a construction is necessary in 
the nuclear age because to delay defensive action until an actual 
420. Wright, The Cuban Quarantine, 51 AM. J. INT'L L, 546, 559 (1963). 
421. Henkin, Force, Intervention and Neutrality in Contemporary International 
Law, PKOC, AM, SOC, INT'L L. 147, 151 (1963) [hereinafter Henkin, Force, Intervention 
and Neutrality]. See also U.N. CHARTER art. 51. 
422. Henkin, Force, Intervention and Neutrality, supra note 421, at 151. 
423. The Caroline, J. MOORE, 2 DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 412 (1906). 
424. Id. 
425. McDougal, The Soviet-Cuban Quarantine and Self-defense, 57 AM. J. INT'L L. 
597, 598 (1963). 
426. McDougal, Intervention from the Floor, PROC. AM. SOC. INT'L L. 164 (1963), 
427. Waldock, The Regulation and Use of Force by Individual States in Interna-
tional law, 81 RECUEIL DES COURS 455, 499 (1952) [hereinafter Waldock]. 
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nuclear attack occurs would be suicidal. Interpreting article 51 
literally to apply only after an armed attack has taken place 
would be against all reason and absurd as a practical matter. As 
Waldock points out, "to cut down the customary right of self-
defense beyond even the Caroline doctrine does not make sense 
in times when speed and power of weapons of attack has enor-
mously increased."428 A similar conclusion was reached by 
Kaplan and Katzenbach who considered this limitation on an 
armed attack to be both "naive and futile in an atomic age, or 
for small states, in an age of jet planes and fast tanks."*m In 
their opinion: 
It would be unreasonable to expect any state to permit another 
the advantages of military build-up} surprise attack and total 
offense against which there may be no defense, particularly 
when given the possibility that a surprise nuclear blow might 
bring about total destruction, or at least total subjugation, un-
less the attack was forestalled.4*0 
Moreover, Osgood and Tucker maintain that: 
If speed and destructive power of modern weapons may defeat 
the purpose of self-defense in the absence of a right to take 
anticipatory measures against an imminent attack, it is these 
same characteristics of modern weapons that must also render 
a right to take anticipatory measures particularly dangerous 
and subject to abuse.431 
Attempts to resolve the dilemma posed by modern weap-
onry have resulted in a compromise formula emphasizing the 
distinction between an "attack" and the "actual preparation for 
the mounting of the attack."434 Taking into account that "in nu-
clear warfare time is the very essence," Singh introduced a con-
ception of "armed attack" that would permit the target state to 
respond with force at some time before an attack is actually felt 
428. Waldock, supra note 427, at 498. 
429. M. KAPLAN & N. KATZENBACH, T H E POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 212 (1961) [hereinafter M. KAPLAN & N. KATZENBACH]. 
430. M. KAPLAN & N. KATZENBACH, supra note 429, at 212. See also D, BOWETT, 
supra note 157, at 191-92. Bowett asserted that: "[n]o state can be expected to await an 
initial attack which, in the present state of armaments, may well destroy the state's ca-
pacity for further resistance and so jeopardize its very existence." Id. 
431. E. OSGOOD & W. TUCKER, supra note 342, at 297. 
432. Singh, The Right to Self~Defense in Relation to the Use of Nuclear Weapons, 
5 INDIAN Y.B. INT'L AFF. 3, 25 (1956) [hereinafter Singh, The Right to Self-Defense], 
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in its political or territorial domain.433 As he elaborated: 
[I]f the provisions of [a]rticle 51 are carefully examined, it 
would appear that what is necessary to invoke the right of self-
defense is an armed attack and not the actual physical viola-
tion of the territories of the state . . . As long as it can be 
proved that the aggressor state with the definite intention of 
launching an armed attack on a victim member-state has pul-
led the trigger and thereby taken the last proximate act on its 
side which is necessary for the commission of the offense of an 
armed attack, the requirements of [a]rticle 51 may be said to 
have been fulfilled even though physical violation of the terri-
tories by the armed forces may as yet have not taken place.434 
The criterion of the last irrevocable act proposed by Singh 
has, however, been criticized as imposing an unreal and arbi-
trary distinction. McDougal and Peliciano argue that with the 
advent of modern technology (such as submarines, aircraft, and 
guided missiles) there may in fact be no last irrevocable act 
short of dropping or exploding a nuclear weapon.485 Thus, the 
teat suggested by Singh would compel a state to defer its reac-
tion until it would no longer be possible to repel an attack and 
avoid damage to itself. Similarly, where weapons are used 
whose trajectory is traversed in matters of minutes and against 
which effective repulsion measures have yet to be devised, it 
should be even clearer that to require postponement of re-
sponse until after the 'last irrevocable act' is in fact to reduce 
self-defense to the possible infliction, if enough defenders sur-
vive, of retaliatory damage upon the enemy.436 
United Nations practice has also not proved of much assis-
tance in suggesting solutions to the problem of anticipatory self-
defense. While relevant claims have been advanced and debated 
before the organization, there is still considerable uncertainty as 
to the legality, scope, and limits of the exercise of such a right. 
According to Higgins, the attitude of the United Nations in such 
cases has been that of discouraging reliance on anticipatory self-
defense. Higgins, however, hastens to add that: 
[T]his does not . . . warrant the assumption that [ajrticle 51 
has restricted the right as laid down in the Caroline; there has 
433. Singh, The Right to Self-Defense, supra note 432, at 25. 
434. Singh, The Right to Self-Defense, supra note 432, at 25. 
435. McDougal & Feliciano, supra note 110, at 1150, 
436. McDougal & Feliciano, supra note 110, at 1150, 
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merely been a reluctance on the part of the [United Nations] 
to encourage it for fear it may be too fraught with danger for 
the basic policy of peace and stability.437 
Indirectly, it may be possible to read a recognition of the possi-
bility of factual situations, in which a preemptive strike against 
imminent attack may be justified, into General Assembly Reso-
lution 3314, according to which the first use of armed force is to 
be regarded only as prima facie evidence of an act of 
aggression.438 
Whether or not article 51 permits anticipatory self-defense, 
states have assumed that it does. Analysts of international con-
flicts tend to evaluate individual cases in the light of their par-
ticular circumstances, especially if a state reasonably believed 
that it was about to be attacked. Employing such a yardstick, 
most commentators agree, for instance, that the 1967 Six Day 
War provides a clear illustration of a "truly [preemptive action] 
in the strict sense."436 On the other hand, it is generally believed 
that most other cases of allegedly preemptive use of force were 
the product of circumstances in which the imminence of a crip-
pling attack by the other side was less apparent.440 
In sum, although the validity of arguments favoring a re-
strictive interpretation of article 51 may be acknowledged, the 
cogency of arguments in support of a more liberal interpretation 
of this article cannot be overlooked- The concept of anticipatory 
self-defense, despite its vulnerability to abuse, whether inten-
tional or accidental, is a viable one in the nuclear age subject, 
however, to stringent limitations and safeguards. By extension it 
is reasonable to argue that the requirement of last resort may 
also be satisfied in first-strike cases as long as a careful assess-
ment is undertaken of all relevant factors. According to Shapira, 
these factors include 
the chronology, extent and nature of the military mobilization, 
deployment, build-up and movements of the adversaries; the 
respective over-all military potential, including available re-
437. Higgins, supra note 804, at 302. 
438. See Definition of Aggression, supra note 107. 
439. See Franck, Who Killed Art. 2(4) or: Changing Norms Gouerning the Use of 
Force by Slates, 64 AM. J. INT'L L. 809, 821 (1970); Rohlik, Some Remarks on Self-
defense and Intervention: A Reaction to Reading Law and the Civil War in the Modern 
World, 6 GA. J, INT'L & COMP. L. 395, 421 (1976) [hereinafter Rohlik). 
440. Rohlik, supra note 439, at 421. Included in the latter category are the Cuban 
Missile Crisis, the Goa Incident, and the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia. 
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sources of man-power and equipment, of the adversaries; the 
political, diplomatic and public relations manoeuvres of the ad-
versaries; the reaction of the international community, particu-
larly the big powers; and the likelihood of the [United Na-
tions], primarily the Security Council, promptly and effectively 
taking preventive or remedial measures.441 
The point is that the presence of these factors would justify a 
decision to use force in self-defense. Doubtless, no precise 
formula or a reliable test is possible. Nevertheless, a set of guid-
ing considerations, such as the ones discussed above or criteria 
proposed by other jurists,442 may provide a sensible framework 
for analysis and decision-making. 
C. Formal Declaration of War 
The condition that war should be preceded by a formal dec-
laration appears to carry less significance in the contemporary 
era than the other criteria for the justification of war. On the 
one hand, the signatories of the 1907 Hague Convention Relative 
to the Opening of Hostilities443 are still bound by the duty to 
441. A, SHAPIRA, The Six Day War and the Right of Self-defense, in 2 T H E ARAB-
ISRAELI CONFLICT: READINGS 205, 215 (J. Moore ed. 1974). 
442. Consider, for example, McDougal's and Feliciano's reference to the "realism of 
expectation created in the target-state by the intensity and proportions of the coercion 
threatened or exercised as to the necessity or imminence of necessity of resort to 
countercoercion for the maintenance of its freedom of decision-making and of its territo-
rial base." McDougal & Feliciano, supra note 110, at 821. 
Moreover, Rohlik's test provides that: 
The danger of obliteration of the threatened state must be real, the threaten-
ing state must be in a position to obliterate the threatened state, the threaten-
ing state must have the means to obliterate the threatened state, and there 
roust be sufficient evidence to support the belief of the intended victim that 
the threatening state made the decision to attack. 
Rohlik, supra note 439, at 419. 
443. The binding character of the Hague Convention III was invoked at the trials 
before the International Military Tribunals in both Nuremberg and Tokyo. Convention 
Relative To The Opening of Hostilities, signed at The Hague, Oct. 18, 1907, T.S. 538 
(codified at 36 U.S.C. § 2259 (1982)). The Judgment of the Nuremberg International 
Tribunal made specific findings that during the Second World War, the German invasion 
of Norway, Denmark, Greece, Yugoslavia, and the Soviet Union were started without 
previous warnings. Absence of a previous declaration of war is specifically cited by the 
judgment as aggravating the crime against peace in the case of Germany's attack on the 
Soviet Union on June 22, 1941, 1 TRIAL OP THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE IN-
TERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL, NUREMBERG, 14 Nov. 1945 - 1 OCT. 1946, at 214, 215 
(1947). In his opening statement on June 4, 1946, before the Tokyo Tribunal, the United 
States Chief of Counsel argued that "undeclared wars and treacherous attacks were 
branded as international crimes." U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, TRIALS OP THE JAPANESE WAR 
CRIMINALS, DOCUMENTS 27 (Far E. Series 1946). 
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deliver a prior declaration of war and state practice does not re-
veal the existence of the necessary contrary opinio juris of all 
parties for the rule to be abrogated by disuse. On the other 
hand, state practice also demonstrates that the duty to declare 
war has not become part of universal customary international 
law. Since World War II there ha9 not been a single war that 
was preceded by declaration of war444 although in some cases 
states that were attacked subsequently asserted that they were 
at war,446 Nonetheless, the latter were declarations primarily for 
internal consumption and did not quite meet what are generally 
deemed as the requirements of international law for a valid dec-
laration of war.446 
The requirements for a valid declaration of war, however, 
have not been clearly formulated. No explicit reference is con-
tained in the Third Hague Convention447 or in any other inter-
national document, for instance, as to the time in which a decla-
ration of war should be issued. This prompted one writer to 
state cynically that "so far as international law lays down a rule, 
the declaration may be issued even after the war is ended and 
the treaty of peace signed."44* It is equally apparent that the 
failure to perform the obligation under the Third Hague Con-
vention would not preclude the existence of a state of war and 
would not entitle one to claim damages for such a failure .*** 
That nations are increasingly reluctant to resort to formal 
declarations of war may be seen as the result of the complex 
nature of contemporary war. The effective waging of war now 
hinges on elements such as maximum surprise and overwhelm-
ing speed, and the sophisticated technology that underpins de-
fense postures renders slow declaratory acts counterproduc-
tive.460 From a political perspective the aversion to formal 
declarations of war may be attributed to the proscription of 
444. See N.Y. Times, May 19, 1966, at 11, col. 2. 
445. This was asserted, for example, in the Suez conflict, 1956; in the Indo-Pakistan 
conflicts, 1965 and 1971; and in the Iran-Iraq war, 1980. 
446. For a detailed discussion of these requirements, iee Eagleton, supra note 80, at 
19. 
447. See generally Hague Convention foi the Pacific Settlement of International 
Disputes, signed at The Hague, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2199, 1 Bevans 577. 
448. Eagleton, supra note 80, at 29. 
449. Eagleton, supra note 80, at 29. 
450. See contra U.S. DEPT. QF THE ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 27-10 (1956). "Surprise is 
still possible. Nothing in the foregoing rule requires that any particular length of time 
shall elapse between a declaration of war and the commencement of hostilities." Id, at 
art. 5. 
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force in article 2(4) of the Charter and to the danger inherent in 
formal declarations of war in the nuclear age,4" particularly 
since such declarations may trigger the treaty obligations of na-
tions aligned against the declaring state. 
Recent discussions refer also to what has become known as 
the outmoded argument.462 It is contended that whereas declara-
tions of war were appropriate in earlier periods, because the 
wars fought then were total in nature, today, when it is common 
to fight limited wars for limited objectives, a declaration of war 
is outmoded for it would mislead other nations as to the objec-
tives of the declaring state.*63 This argument may nonetheless be 
countered by pointing out that there is no reason why a declara-
tion could not specify that the war declared was limited, stating 
what the limited objectives were, even setting limits to the 
amount of force that could be employed to achieve those objec-
tives. Moreover, time limits could be placed on the period during 
which force could be used. 
An additional argument is advanced in an attempt to em-
phasize the limited usefulness of declarations of war in the con-
temporary era. It is asserted that while a requirement that war 
be formally declared might have been viable in earlier centuries 
— when the line between peace and war seemed clear and a dec-
laration of war was seen as marking the "disruption" of peace 
and the descent into war — it is not viable in the era of the Cold 
War where the distinctions between states of peace and war are 
more blurred.4" 
In any event a legally recognized state of war comes into 
existence when hostilities are actually initiated, even without a 
formal declaration of war. Although there may have been a time 
when the issuance of a declaration constituted a legal act with 
potentially profound consequences,4"5 countries have long en-
gaged in undeclared hostilities which, in terms of the effort in-
451. See Note, Congress, the President and the Powers to Commit Forces to Com-
bat, 81 HAEV. L. REV. 1771, 1772-73 (1968) [hereinafter Note, Powers to Commit Forces], 
452. See infra note 453. 
453. See L. VELVEL, The War in Vietnam: Unconstitutional, Justiciable and Juris-
dictionally Attackable, in II THE VIETNAM WAK AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 651, 662-63 (R. 
Falk ed. 1969) (statements of the Under Secretary of State Katzenbach during the Na-
tional Commitment Hearings), 
454. See D. WALLACE, JR., The War Making Power: A Constitutional Flaw?, in IV 
T H E VIETNAM WAR AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE CONCLUDING PHASE 662, 685 (R. Falk 
ed. 1976). 
455. See Eagleton, supra note 80, at 20, 32-35. 
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volved, the impact on citizens, and the effect on domestic and 
international relations, are often indistinguishable from a for-
mally declared war/** Indeed, article 3 of the Definition of Ag-
gression recognizes that a declaration of war is no longer a pre-
requisite for determining that aggression had taken place.48' 
Yet, even if one essentially concurs with the conclusion that 
"the only function [that] uniquely remains for the formal decla-
ration of war is largely that of a solemn act of state which serves 
as a means of arousing popular support at home and abroad,"468 
it is nonetheless possible to qualify it on a number of grounds. 
Specifically, it is arguable that the interests of the international 
community as well as the legal and moral position of the "vic-
tim" (and, as the case may be, the victim's collective helpers) are 
still better served if the victim and its helpers issue a reasoned 
declaration of war on their own. Since it is often difficult to de-
termine which side actually initiated war, the state that claims 
not to have started it should explain and justify the claim in its 
own reasoned declaration of war. Given the disapprobation of 
aggressive war and its acknowledgement as an international 
crime, it appears all the more important for the victim-defend-
ing state to demonstrate the defensive character to its side of 
the war. Indeed, according to Greenspan: 
The necessity for a formal declaration of war has assumed par-
ticular significance in view of the modern concept of the crime 
of aggressive war, first formulated judicially in the judgment of 
the Nuremberg Tribunal . . . Today the very fact that war is 
launched without formal declaration may furnish one of the el-
ements of proof that such a war is a war of aggression and as 
such a crime against peace. It is difficult to envisage circum-
stances where an innocent state waging a lawful war would be 
prevented from issuing a formal declaration of war in accor-
dance with the Hague Convention III. War must be declared in 
order to rebut the presumption of unlawful war.4SB 
From the point of view of internal politics a declaration of war 
may also fulfill a useful role. This is because decision-makers 
within one nation are often divided themselves and thus, the 
cause of peace could only benefit if those who claim self-defense 
456. See Note, Powers to Commit Forces, supra note 451, at 1772 nn,9 & 11, 
457. Definition of Aggression, supra note 107, at art. 3. 
458. Definition, of Aggression, supra note 107, at art. 3. 
459. M. GREENSPAN, THE MODERN LAW OF LAND WARFARE 37-38 (1959). 
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would first prove the claim to those who deny it. 
Finally, support may be adduced for some form of an-
nouncement — if not a formal declaration — for reasons of "de-
cent regard for mankind" and "public good faith," which require 
that a government explain and justify its departure from 
peace.460 Given the strong presumption against the use of force, 
one may agree with Childress that "[a] failure to announce the 
intention and reasons for waging war is a failure to exercise the 
responsibility of explaining and justifying exceptional action to 
those involved, including the citizens of one's own country, the 
enemy, and third parties who have to decide how to respond,"461 
It should be added that where a particular state's constitu-
tion requires a formal declaration of war, a failure to comply 
with such a requirement would raise the issue of competence. In 
such a case the public official concerned may be said to have 
exceeded his authority in mobilizing the people and conducting 
the war — an issue that may affect the question of competent 
authority and is subsumed under the question who may wage 
war? 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The proliferation of criteria pertaining to the question of 
when war may be waged stands out as perhaps the most prob-
lematic feature of the contemporary analysis of this question. 
Specifically, no consensus has been reached as to what weight 
should be accorded to the various criteria, what are the interre-
lationships between them, and in what collective form they 
should be applied in practice. 
Some writers maintain that satisfying each criterion is nec-
essary for a just war and that all criteria are thus collectively 
sufficient.'**2 The implication is that inability to satisfy any sin-
gle criterion, such as proportionality, renders a war unjust, A 
second possible approach allows greater latitude in judgment in 
that it assumes that a just war must more or less satisfy or ap-
proximate the criteria, No particular criterion is absolutely nec-
essary, but at least several must be satisfied for a war to be just 
460. See Childress, Francis Lieber's Interpretation of the Laws of War: General 
Order No. 100 in the Context of His Life and Thought, 21 AM, J. JURIS. 34, 49 (1976) 
(reference to Lieber's defense of the necessity of a declaration). 
461. Childress, supra note 374, at 437. 
462. See, e.g., Johnson, Just War Theory: What's the Use?, 19 WORLDVIEW 41, 42, 
46 (July-Aug. 1976). 
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and justified. This approach offers the advantage of flexibility, 
which makes it useful in policy-making contexts, but does not 
identify the degree of approximation that is sufficient to make a 
war just and justified. A third approach entails a serial or lexical 
ordering of the criteria, stipulating that the satisfaction of some 
must precede that of others. This third approach differs from 
the first and the second approaches in that it does not apply the 
criteria en bloc but seeks to establish the hierarchical relation-
ships amongst them. A fourth approach reduces the criteria to 
mere guidelines, employed in an open-ended fashion in a judg-
mental process oriented toward ascertaining in general terms 
whether a given war produces the greatest good. This approach, 
however, lacks the prescriptive focus of its predecessors. 
Additional approaches are theoretically possible*83 that 
serve to illustrate the difficulties inherent in combining the cri-
teria into a viable decision rule. Most moral philosophers employ 
the criteria in a manner consistent with the fourth approach, re-
lying on them to provide an overall framework within which to 
conduct ethical debates.4*4 It appears, however, that traditional 
theorists envisaged a more rigidly integrated set of criteria and 
expected them to be consistently followed in decision-making 
contexts. 
The greater proclivity on the part of modern theorists to-
ward ad hoc use of the criteria notwithstanding, it is arguable 
that the rigorous demands exemplified by the first approach are 
more applicable to contemporary attitudes to war. The require-
ment that all conditions must be satisfied is consistent with the 
prevalent view that war in the nuclear era must be effectively 
restrained, if not totally eliminated. Furthermore, it is becoming 
increasingly apparent that there is no evident hierarchy amongst 
the criteria.496 On the contrary they form a comprehensive 
whole, although, as demonstrated by O'Brien, different times 
and circumstances may thrust one or the other of the criteria 
into a more focal role.466 
Perhaps the most viable conclusion under contemporary cir-
463. See Childress, supra note 374, at 441. 
464. See, e.g., J. HARE & C. JOYNT, ETHICS AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 68 (1982); 
O'Connor, supra note 126, at 173; R, POTTER, supra note 378, at 15-16. 
465. At the same time, contemporary analysis suggests that if there is one element 
in the just war calculus that is most important, it may be that of just cause. See W. 
O'BRIEN, supra note 89, at 348. 
466. W. O'BRIEN, supra note 89, at 348. 
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cumstances is that judgment must be exercised on a case-by-
case basis with all the just war criteria being given careful con-
sideration. This solution may fall short of meeting the stringent 
requirements built into the first approach but may be perceived 
as a pragmatic version of it. 
